치안한류 확산방안 연구

경 찰 청

최 영

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제1장 서 론	4

제1절 연구의 목적	4

제2절 연구의 범위 및 방법	6

제2장 치안한류의 현황 및 문제점	11

제1절 치안한류의 현황	11

Ⅰ. 치안인프라 구축사업	11

Ⅱ. 치안시스템 전수사업	12

Ⅲ. 외국경찰관 초청연수	12

Ⅳ. 기타 사업	13

제2절 치안한류의 문제점	13

Ⅰ. 기존 공여국과의 비교우위 측면	13

Ⅱ. 예산 및 인력운용 측면	14

Ⅲ. 한류가 가지고 있는 한계	16

제3장 영국의 치안분야 국제개발협력 분석	19

제1절 정책적 측면	19

Ⅰ. 영국 국제개발협력 2030 아젠다 개요	19

Ⅱ. 치안 분야 국제개발협력 전략	19

Ⅲ. 비교 분석	22

제2절 예산적 측면	23

Ⅰ. CSSF 개요	23

Ⅱ. 사업 목표별 세부 사업내용	24

Ⅲ. 비교 분석	25

제3절 조직 측면	27

Ⅰ. Stabilisation Unit 개요	27

Ⅱ. 주요 활동	27

제4장 전수가능한 치안한류	29

제1절 주요내용 요약	29

제2절 한국 경찰의 시사점	31

제3절 한국 경찰시스템의 개발도상국 전수분석 예시	68

제5장 치안한류 확산방안	93

제1절 정책적 측면	93

Ⅰ. 범정부 차원의 국제개발협력 중장기 전략 수립	93

Ⅱ. 명확한 목표를 설정	93

제2절 예산적 측면	95

Ⅰ. 별도 기금을 운영	95

Ⅱ. 국민의 안전을 위한 예산 확보	96

제3절 조직적 측면	97

Ⅰ. 범정부 및 민간 전문가 차원의 별도 조직 구성	97

Ⅱ. 개발학적 전문성 강화	97

제6장  결론	100

국외훈련개요

1. 훈련국 : 영국

2. 훈련기관명 :
1) University of Sussex (학위)
2) Institute of Development Studies (직무)

3. 훈련분야 : 치안

4. 훈련기간 : 2016. 6. 24.～2018. 6. 23.

제1장  서 론

제1절  연구 배경

1990년대 후반부터 가시화된 ‘한류(韓流)’는 한국의 문화가 해외로 전파되어 인기리에 소비되고 있는 현상을 말하며, 이는 영화, 드라마, 대중음악, 게임 등 대중문화의 해외 유통과 소비가 위주였지만, 점차 패션, 음식, 한글 등 보다 폭넓은 한국 문화의 해외 진출로 확산되고 있다. 이러한 한류에 발맞춰 한국의 공공행정 컨텐츠에 대한 확산을 위해 정부에서는‘행정한류’라는 이름으로 행정 제도, 행정 시스템, 공무원 역량 등을 국제협력 및 공적개발원조에 접목시키는 일들을 추진해 나가고 있다.

특히 경찰청은 그 범위를 치안 분야에 집중한 ‘치안한류’라는 이름으로 외국 경찰기관과의 국제협력을 강화하고 있다. 주요 활동내용을 보면 치안전문가를 요청하는 국가에 치안전문가를 단기간 파견하여 교육하고 KOICA 및 자체 예산을 바탕으로 외국 경찰관들 초청하여 한국의 선진 치안기법을 교육하고 있다. 또한, 공적개발원조 예산을 활용하여 KOICA 협업 치안사업들과 자체 추진하는 치안사업들을 통해 우수한 치안시스템을 구축하고 전문가를 파견하는 등의 노력을 다하고 있다. 이와 더불어 여러 경찰기관과 치안협력 MOU를 체결하고 재외국민 보호 및 국제범죄 공동 대응을 위한 협력회의를 개최하는 등 다각적 치안협력 네트워크도 구축하고 있다.

하지만 국제사회에서의 입장에서 볼 때 이러한 노력과 결과들에 대한 의문도 적지 않다. 이미 주요 공여국과 국제기구에서 추진했던 우수한 제도와 시스템을 전수하는 ‘best practice programme’들의 문제점과 한계들에 대해 오래 전부터 논의가 되어 왔고, Governance에 대한 관심이 고조되어 있으며, 치안 분야 공적개발원조 및 국제협력의 질적 양적 측면을 주요 선진국들의 활동과 비교할 때 턱없이 부족한 현실이다.

이러한 측면에서 본 연구는 여러 선진국 중 공적개발원조의 역사가 길고 특히 치안 분야에 많은 예산과 인력을 투입하고 있는 영국의 제도를 비교 분석하고, 새로운 치안한류 확산방안에 대한 정책적인 제언을 하고자 한다.

제2절 연구의 범위 및 방법

연구 주제인 치안한류는 다양한 형태의 치안분야 협력을 토대로 하고 있으나, 각 경찰기관과의 MOU 체결 등 개별적인 협력보다는 그 중심이 되고 있는 공적개발원조에 대한 발전방안을 중점으로 연구할 것이다. 이에 따라 국가 예산으로 개발도상국 치안 분야의 개선을 위해 운용하는 사업들과 이를 운용하기 위한 제도와 시스템 등을 한정하여 살펴보게 된다.

이를 세부적으로 살펴보면 먼저 한국의 치안한류의 현황과 문제점에 대해 살펴본 후, 비교 분석을 위해 영국의 해당 분야와 관련한 예산, 제도, 전문가 구성 등을 중점적으로 연구한다. 특히 경찰청 주도의 치안한류 뿐만 아니라 현재 한국 전반적인 치안분야 공적개발원조에 대한 현황과 문제점을 살펴봄으로서 단순히 경찰청만이 해결할 문제가 아닌 범정부 차원에서 고민해야 보아야 할 문제들을 다루게 될 것이다.

이후 국제사회와 주요 공여국 사이에서 논의되고 있는 핵심 이론들을 바탕으로 과연 한국의 치안 분야에서 개발도상국 경찰들이 배울 수 있는 교훈들은 무엇이 있는지에 대해 살펴보는데, 해당 내용들은 실제 개발도상국 경찰기관들이 바로 읽고 이해하고, 실제 변화에 활용할 수 있도록 영문으로 작성하도록 한다.

마지막으로는 영국과의 비교연구와 한국 치안에 대한 이해를 바탕으로 치안한류 확산방안에 대한 정책적 제언들을 제시한다.

연구방법에 있어서는, 영국 정부 담당자로부터 받거나 홈페이지 등을 통해 오픈되어 있는 공식자료들과 관련 논문과 언론보도를 중심으로 했으며, 한국의 자료들 역시 경찰청을 비롯한 주요 정부기관들의 공식 자료들과 언론보도 등을 참고로 작성하였다. 특히 한국의 치안 발전과정의 분석을 통한 개발도상국 경찰기관에 줄 수 있는 시사점들을 발견하기 위해 여러 경찰관의 인터뷰 등을 병행하였으며, 이는 영문으로 작성하여 본 연구 결과에 포함시켰다.

제2장  치안한류의 현황 및 문제점

제1절  치안한류의 현황

경찰청 경찰백서를 참조

Ⅰ. 치안인프라 구축사업

경찰청 최초의 치안인프라 구축사업은 KOICA에서 추진 중이였던 ‘중미 3개국 치안역량 강화사업’을 2014년 공공협력 방식으로 추진하기로 협정하면서 시작되었다. 기존에 KOICA가 통상적인 방식으로 공개입찰을 통해 엘살바도르 경찰청을 대상으로 실시했던 치안역량 강화사업 (CCTV 시스템 구축사업)에서 민간 기업의 치안 분야에 대한 전문성 부족과 PM의 사업 운용에 대한 역량 부족으로 해당 사업에 대한 문제점이 발견되었고, 이를 당시 경찰교육원 교수요원들을 중심으로 현상실사와 점검을 통해 문제점들을 찾아내고 새로운 사업계획을 제안함으로서 이루어 지게 되었다.

이후 2016-18년 총액 660만불 규모로 확정된 필리핀 경찰수사역량 강화사업(순찰차, 순찰 오토바이, 수사 기자재)은 경찰청이 실행주체로서 보다 적극적으로 구체적 사업 방안을 제안하고 직접 현장실사와 사업계획 수립 등을 주도적으로 실시했으며, KOICA에서 이를 지속적으로 검토하고 최종 수용함으로서 치안인프라 구축사업이 점차 확산되어 가고 있다.

이 뿐만 아니라, 경찰청에서는 KOICA 예산이 아닌 독자 예산 확보를 통해 베트남 과학수사 역량 강화사업 및 우간다 치안역량 강화 사업을 신규발굴하여, 베트남에는 17-19년간 총액 60억 규모로 베트남 형사과학원에 현장증거분석실, 지문감식 시스템 등 과학수사 기자재를 제공하고, 경찰전문가 18명을 파견하며, 120명의 베트남 공안을 초청교육 하여 베트남과의 협력관계를 강화하고자 한다. 또한, 우간다에는 3년간 매년 우간다 경찰관 20명을 국내로 초청하여 CCTV 활용 범죄예방 및 112 시스템 등 연수과정을 진행하고, 선진 치안시스템 전수를 통해 우간다 치안환경 개선과 사회안전망 구축을 지원하고자 한다.

Ⅱ. 치안시스템 전수사업

(1) 치안전문가 장기파견 사업

UAE와 오만에서는 한국 경찰 전문가들을 단기간 요청하여 지도 받은 바 있으며, 고위직 대표단이 한국 경찰의 발전상을 직접 본 후 한국경찰 치안전문가의 장기간 파견을 요청해옴에 따라 파견 요건 등에 대한 오랜 협의를 통해 2015년 최종적으로 경비 전문가를 2년간 파견하여 한국의 선진 치안시스템을 전수하게 되었다. 또한, 카타르 경찰대학생들을 대상으로 무도 전문가를 1년간 파견하여 무도와 체포술 교육을 지도하고 있다.

이러한 치안전문가 장기파견은 주로 국가 예산은 풍부하나 관련 분야의 전문지식과 경험이 부족한 중동 국가들을 중심으로 요청이 이어지고 있으며, 해당 전문가 파견은 단순히 선진 치안시스템을 전수하는 것에 그치지 않고 중동 국가와의 치안협력 네트워크 강화에도 도움을 주고 있다.

(2) 치안전문가 단기파견 사업

2012년부터 경찰청은 외국 경찰청의 요청을 받아 범죄수사, 대테러 등의 분야를 중심으로 한국 치안전문가를 해당 국가에 2-4주 가량 단기로 파견하여 해당 국가 경찰관들을 대상으로 선진 치안기업을 전수하는 사업을 추진하고 있다. 특히 2015년부터는 경찰청이 외교부 및 한국 대사관들의 협력을 통해 적극적으로 개발도상국 경찰기관들을 대상으로 해당 프로그램에 대한 자세한 안내와 함께 체계적으로 요청을 받아 관리하고 있으며, 다양한 분야 중에서도 한국 경찰이 강점을 가지고 있는 대테러, 사이버범죄 수사, 과학수사, CCTV 활용 범죄예방 등을 중점으로 실시하고 있다.

구체적인 현황으로는 2012년부터 15년까지는 UAE, 캄보디아, 과테말라 등 11개국에 치안전문가를 파견했고, 16년에는 카타르, 케냐, 몽골, 멕시코 등 총 14개국 20개팀 62명을 파견하였다.

Ⅲ.  외국경찰관 초청연수

KOICA에서 주관하는 초청연수 사업 중 치안분야 연수에 참여하여 2005년부터 2016년까지 총 70개국 1,402명의 경찰관을 대상으로 과학수사, 범죄예방 등 다양한 분야의 교육을 실시하였다. 특히 2016년에는 13개 과정과 경찰청 자체 4개 과정을 포함한 총 17개의 초청연수 과정을 개설하여 27개 국가에서 197명의 외국 경찰관들을 한국 경찰교육기관에 초청해 각종 치안기법을 전수하였다.

이러한 연수과정을 통해 한국 경찰의 축적된 경험과 기술을 개도국에 공유, 전파함으로써 그들의 치안역량 발전에 기여하고, 현지 경찰과 인적 네트워크 형성 등 협력관계를 강화해 궁극적으로는 해당 국가의 교민 보호 및 국제성 범죄 대응 등의 기여하고자 한다.

Ⅳ. 기타 사업

기존의 치안한류 사업들은 1회성, 특정 분야 지원을 중심으로 이루어져 치안시스템 전수 효과가 경찰 발전에 실질적으로 영향을 미치지 못하는 문제점을 개선하기 위해 한 국가를 대상으로 종합적으로 치안기법을 전수해 주는 ‘치안한류 모델국가’ 육성을 추진하였다. 이에 따라 지속적인 협력관계를 구축해 온 UAE와 치안협력 MOU를 체결하고 향후 양국 경찰협력을 더욱 확대하기로 합의하였다.

또한, 퇴직 경찰관들을 대상으로 KOICA에서 주관하는 자문단 참여를 지원하여, 그들이 가진 전문성과 경험을 개발도상국 치안역량 향상에 기여하도록 하였다. 이에 따라, 2015년에는 몽골, 태국, 동티모르를 대상으로 자문단 3명을 파견한 이래, 2016년에는 베트남, 인도네시아, 과테말라, 파라과이 등 총 8개국에 10명의 퇴직경찰 자문단을 파견하였다.

제2절 치안한류의 문제점

Ⅰ. 기존 공여국과의 비교우위 측면

지난 30년 간 미국과 영국을 중심으로 많은 공여국들은 주요 분쟁국가 등 개발도상국을 대상으로 Peace-building 및 State-building 사업에 많은 예산과 전문가를 투입해 오고 있다. 예를 들어 보스니아 헤르체고비나, 동티모르, 코소보 등은 내전 등 분쟁을 겪은 이후 UN 평화유지군을 비롯한 주요 공여국들을 중심으로 한 Good governance 프로그램을 통해 성공적으로 안정을 되찾고 빠른 경제성장을 보여주고 있는 사례로 손꼽히고 있다. 이러한 치안 분야 공적개발원조의 경험들은 2015년에 비로소 치안한류라는 이름으로 개발협력 사업들은 시작한 한국 정부와 경찰청이 가지지 못한 중요한 요소들로 동일한 예산과 인력을 투입했다고 가정할 때 효과성 측면에서 미흡할 우려가 높다.

Zaum, D., 2007. The sovereignty paradox: the norms and politics of international statebuilding. Oxford University Press on Demand.

특히, 영국, 프랑스, 스페인, 독일, 이탈리아 등 20세기 초까지 식민지를 지배했던 공여국들은 식민지배를 경험한 국가들에 자신들의 법과 제도, 문화 등을 그대로 심어놓았고, 이러한 동질성은 국제개발협력을 추진함에 있어 상당한 장점으로 작용하고 있다. 예를 들어 인도의 경우 영국으로부터 독립한 이후에도 몇 십년간 영국에서 정해둔 형법 제도와 경찰 체계를 그대로 유지할 만큼 두 국가 간의 치안 분야의 동질성은 높다고 할 수 있다. 또한, 미국과 영국의 경우 영어로 수원국 담당자들과 원활한 커뮤니케이션이 가능하고, 주요 공여국들도 피식민지배 경험 국가들과 동일한 언어를 사용함으로서 보다 손쉽게 사업을 관리하고 자신들의 노하우를 전수할 수 있다. 이에 반해, 한국 경찰은 언어의 제약으로 인해 치안전문가가 직접 치안기법을 전수하는 것에 어려움이 있고, 사업을 위해 통역이 필요하는 등 원할한 사업수행에 장애요인이 많다.

또한, 치안한류의 주요 분야로 손꼽히는 대테러, 과학수사 등은 공여국과 비교할 때 한국 경찰이 더 우수하다고 이야기하기 어려운 측면도 있다. 예를 들어 대테러 분야는 미국과 유럽에서는 매일 직면하는 문제이며, 군 전문가와 민간 전문가가 경찰 전문가와 합동으로 팀을 운영하여 공적개발원조를 수행하는 경우가 많아 한국과 같이 경찰만으로 장, 단기 치안기법 전수와 비교할 때 질적으로 우수한 현실이다.

이에 따라, 아무리 다수의 개발도상국에서 한국 경찰관의 파견을 요청하거나 사업을 요청한다 해도 그 이유가 한국 경찰이 다른 공여국보다 우위에 있기보다 단순히 무상원조의 맹점으로 거론되는 ‘공짜이기 때문에’ 필요여부에 상관없이 요청하는 경우가 발생할 가능성이 높다. 또한 이러한 무상원조의 경우 수원국가 경찰기관의 리더들은 해당 사업의 성공여부에 대한 책임감이 결여되고, 부수적인 개인적 이익을 추구할 가능성이 높아지게 된다.

Ⅱ. 예산 및 인력 운용 측면

미국과 EU 국가들을 중심으로 한 공여국들은 공적개발원조 예산 중 치안 분야 (평화, 인권, 거버넌스 등 SDGs 16)에 집행하는 예산을 비중이 높으며, 국가의 안정이 다른 SDGs 사업들에 미치는 영향이 크다고 판단하고 있다. 특히 난민 문제와 테러 등의 위협으로 인해 주변 국가들의 불안정한 정세가 자국에 직접적인 영향을 미치고 있어 해당 분야를 국제개발협력 전략의 중요한 목표가 되고 있다.

Peace and Justice

Sustainable Development Goals

영국, 스웨덴, 독일, 미국 등

특히 치안 분야는 지속적인 예산 투입과 사업의 연속성이 필요하여, 매년 별도 예산을 신청하고 심의하는 것은 비효율성의 문제가 발생할 수 있다. 이에 따라, 영국 및 스웨덴의 경우 해당 분야의 별도 공적개발원조 기금(Fund)을 마련하여 해당 기금 내에서 매년 사업을 구상하고 집행하고 있으며, 단순히 1개 기관에서 운용하는 것이 아닌 범정부 차원의 위원회를 구성하고 개별 사업은 각 기관에서 운영하지만 범정부 담당자 및 기관장 간 정기적인 회의를 개최하고 체계적으로 관리함으로서 사업 간 연계와 효율적 관리를 강화하고 있다. 또한, 사업의 평가와 예산 감사 등은 외부 기관에서 책임지게 함으로서 보다 객관적이고 효과적인 사업 집행이 가능하도록 한다.

이에 반해 한국의 공적개발원조 예산을 보면, KOICA가 가장 많은 예산을 집행하고 있으나, 경찰청, 검찰청, 법원, 국방부가 자체적으로 개별 사업을 운영할 수 있으며, 기재부에서 총괄적으로 예산을 심의하나 1회성 사업 검토에 그쳐 기관 간 연계 및 중장기적 전략 수립에 문제가 발생할 수 있다. 또한, 지난 5년간 KOICA의 공공행정 분야 사업 총 94건을 살펴보면, 행정서비스의 효과성 향상 (74건, 79%)에 치중되어 있음을 알 수 있고, 치안역량 강화는 단 9건에 불과하여 한국의 공적개발원조 예산에서 해당 분야가 소외되어 있음을 알 수 있다.

인력 측면에서도 해당 사업들을 위한 별도의 정원 배정이 없고, 전문가를 육성하는 체계도 미흡하며, 개발학적 지식과 치안 분야의 경험을 모두 가지고 있는 전문가도 부족한 실정이다. 주요 공여국의 경우 수원국에 전문가를 10년 이상 파견하여 현지 기관들과 인적 네트워크를 구성하고, 지속적으로 필요한 정책을 자문하며, 해당 국가를 대상으로 사업을 형성할 때 가장 필요한 요소가 무엇인지 위험요인은 무엇인지 정확하게 이야기 해 줄 수 있다. 한국의 경우 경찰주재관 제도를 통해 최대 3년간 특정 국가에 근무하는 경우가 있으나, 외교 영사 업무를 위한 것이며, 그 외 다른 전문가 제도도 없고 별도의 정원 배정도 없는 실정이다. 또한, 주요 공여국의 경우 사업을 위한 팀을 구성할 때 범정부 차원의 민, 관, 군 등 다양한 전문가들로 구성하는 경우가 많지만 한국의 경우 사업을 주관하는 특정 기관 내 구성원을 중심으로 기자재를 제공하는 민간 참여업체들만 포함되는 경우에 불과하거나, 민간 참여업체를 중심으로 전문가(공무원)들이 조언하는 수준에 그치고 있다.

Ⅲ. ‘한류’가 가지고 있는 한계

다시 한번 ‘한류’를 살펴보면, 이는 한국의 대중문화가 다른 나라에서 유행하는 현상이고, 엔터테인먼트 분야를 중심으로 관심과 수요를 불러오는 것이다. 이러한 문화적 확산은 누구나 쉽게 소비할 수 있는 컨텐츠며, 그러한 한국의 대중문화를 따라하거나 지속적으로 관심을 가짐으로서 지속할 수 있다.

하지만 개발학적인 측면에서 한류는 학계와 NGOs를 중심으로 국제사회에서 지난 수 십년간 비판을 받아 온 Best Practice 전수와 유사한 부분이 많이 있다. 개발학에서 배우고 싶은 혹은 따라하고 싶은 우수한 시스템을 전수할 때에는 전수 받고자 하는 나라의 정치, 사회, 경제, 문화, 거버넌스 등 모든 요소들을 고려해야 하며, 지속 가능한 개발인지를 반드시 판단해야 한다. 이에 비해 한류는 그 나라의 복잡한 정세를 고려하지 않고 쉽고 빠르게 전달되고 소비될 수 있다.

예를 들어, 한국 정부는 UN 전자정부 평가에서 3회 연속 세계 1위를 차지하며 우수성을 인정받았다. 이를 만약 개발도상국에 전수했을 때 과연 대상 국가 역시 세계적인 수준의 전자정부 체계를 갖출 수 있을까에 대한 의문이며, 이에 대한 수 많은 실패사례들은 전 세계에서 쉽게 찾아볼 수 있다. 실제 전자정부 시스템을 갖춘 후 행정 서비스를 통해 뇌물을 받던 공무원들의 저항과 생소한 시스템에 대한 거부감을 가지는 시민들, 인프라 부족으로 소외받는 저소득층, 예산 부족과 전문 기술의 부족으로 시스템의 잦은 고장 등으로 결국 수 많은 예산을 투입한 사업들이 제대로 운영되지 않는 경우가 발생한다.

결국 치안+한류 또는 행정+한류는 서로 속성이 상반되는 두 개의 개념을 내포하고 있고, 한류에 대한 강한 이미지와 그 간의 성공적인 성과들로 인해 정작 중요한 개발학적 요소들이 무시되어 이미 주요 공여국에서 수 십년 전 실패로 돌아갔던 사업들을 새롭게 공여국이 된 한국 정부가 되풀이하기 시작할 우려가 있다. 이미 선진국들은 많은 기능을 가진 최첨단 시스템을 전수하기 보다 기능을 최소화하되 고장이 나지 않고 고치기가 쉬우며, 태양광 등으로 자체 전력생산이 가능하고, 사용자와 관리자가 이해하기 쉽게 구성하는 등의 가장 알맞은 시스템을 전수하는 방향으로 선회하고 그 과정에서 발생할 수 있는 공무원의 부패, 정부의 효율성 및 책임성, 시민들의 접근성 등을 고려하고 있는 상황에서 한국만 최신식, 최첨단 시스템을 자랑하며, 수원국에 맞지 않는 공적개발원조 사업들을 벌여나가지 않을까 우려되는 상황이다.

제3장 영국의 치안 분야 국제개발협력 분석

제1절 정책적 측면

Ⅰ. 영국 국제개발협력 2030 아젠다 개요

○ UN에서 2030년까지 달성을 목표로 수립한 17개의 Global Goals for Sustainable Development에 따라 영국 자체 계획 수립함

- 각 17개의 목표에 대해 각각 국내전략과 국외를 구분하여 전략 수립

- 영국 정부의 Single Departmental Plans을 반영함

- Bilateral Development Review와 Multilateral Development Review를 토대로 작성함

○ 영국 정부, 국가 통계청은 UN에서 지속적으로 작성되는 검토보고서에 따라 계속 진행사항을 보고할 예정임

○ 각 17개의 목표별로 구체적인 세부 전략들을 제시하고 있음

Ⅱ. 치안 분야 국제개발협력 전략 (SDG 16)

○ 3가지 주요 목표

- Instability, Insecurity, conflict의 원인을 파악하고, 개발 협력 예산과 국제인권준수를 통해 범죄와 부패 문제를 해결함

- 여성과 아동에 대한 폭력을 해결함

- 책무성과 투명성을 향상시키기 위해 사법시스템에 대한 공정한 접근을 제공하고, 정부와 공공 서비스를 개혁함

○ 개별 세부내용

1) 부패와 중요 조직범죄

- 영국에 영향을 미치는 부패와 범죄 문제를 우선 해결
※ 돈세탁, 탈세, 불법 이민, 범죄조직 활동 등

- 범 집행팀의 지원을 통해 불법적으로 유통되는 자산을 발견하고 막는 업무 수행

- London 반부패 Summit 등을 통해 국가 간 협력 강화 및 반부패 전략을 공동 수립하며, 해결을 위해 노력

○ Governance, 평화, 안전과 정의

- 모든 분야에 영향을 미치는 Governance를 영국 국제협력의 최우선 과제로 설정

- UN Security Council의 P5로서 인권존중을 위해 노력

- Magna Carta Fund 등 인권과 민주주의를 위한 예산 지원

- 구체적인 사업으로는,
1) 13개 국가를 대상으로 수백만명이 공정하고 자유로운 선거를 치룰수 있도록 협력
2) 천만명의 여성과 소녀가 안전하고 사법체계의 도움을 받을 수 있도록 협력
3) 610만명이 재산권을 보호받을 수 있도록 지원
4) 1억명이 스스로 자기계발을 할 수 있도록 지원

- 특히 전체 국제 개발협력사업의 50%이상의 예산을 분쟁국가 및 지역을 위해 집행 (특히 시리아)

- 양성평등과 여성 강화을 통해 평화와 사법정의, Governance에 도움이 되도록 함 (약 35%의 여성이 이 과정에 참여)

○ 여성과 아동에 대한 폭력

- 폭력, 학대 및 착취 문제에 대해 주도적인 역할을 수행

- 특히 현대판 노예제도와 아동의 노동력 착취 문제에 집중

- UN Women에 1,325만 파운드를 지원하고, 20개국에 해당 프로그램 (VAWG)을 운영 (22개국 추가 예정)

○ 세금 및 조세제도 관련

- 효율성과 책무성을 강화하기 위해 조세제도 개혁과 탈세 및 세금회피를 막기 위한 예산을 2배로 증가

- 영국이 반부패와 책무성 분야에서 국제적 선두주자로 인정 받기 위해 노력

- G7 및 G20 국가들과 함께 불법적인 자금과 부패 문제를 해결하기 위한 국제적 아키텍쳐를 확립

- 국제 반부패 Unit과 국립수사청 등을 포함하여 개발도상국 국가와는 파트너쉽을 강화

○ 인권

- Rule of Law와 인권분야에 대한 존경심을 가질 수 있게 국제사회에 지속적인 문제제기

- International fora, UN, OSCE (the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 유럽의회와 협력

- 강제적인 조혼, 분쟁지역에서의 성범죄, 현대판 노예제도, 극단주의와 싸우고 종교와 신념의 자유를 보호

- Freedom Online Coalition, Equal Rights Coalition 등과 같은 시민사회와의 연대 강화

- Modern Slavery Act 2015와 같은 입법활동 강화

- FCO Magna Carta Fund, Rules Based International System Fund, Government Fund for the Westerminster Foundation 과 같은 김을 통해 민주주의와 의회 강화

Ⅲ. 비교 분석

○ 영국은 UN의 SDG에 따라 2030년까지의 국제개발협력의 목표를 수립하고 특히 개별 부처의 계획에 반영

- 영국 경찰은 DFID, 민간 전문가 등과 함께 협력하여 개발협력 계획에 중요한 역할을 수행하나, 한국의 경우 산발적 개별적 참여에 불과하여 관련 부처간 공동 전략수립 필요

○ 특히 반부패와 불법자금 추적, 분쟁 분야에 있어서 영국 국립수사청의 역할이 중요

- 한국 경찰 역시 국제사회에서 충분한 역량을 갖추고 있는 만큼 국가 차원의 전략을 바탕으로 적극적으로 국제적 공동 노력에 주도적으로 참여

○ 또한, 다양한 목표에 따른 별도 기금을 마련하여 운영함으로서 안정적이고 지속가능한 활동 진행

- 매년 개별적으로 기재부를 통한 예산 확보보다 별도의 기금을 마련, 운영하는 것이 필요

제2절 예산적 측면

Ⅰ. CSSF (Conflict Stability and Security Fund) 개요

○ 영국은 정부 차원에서 치안분야 국제개발협력 사업을 위한 별도 기금인 CSSF를 운영

○ 주요 전략목표

1) 국내·외 영국 국민의 보호

- 극단주의 및 테러와의 전쟁

- 심각한 범죄와 조직범죄의 대응

- 위기대응

2) 국제적 영향력 강화

- 동맹국, 협력국 등과의 협력 및 국제적 개입 강화

- 양성평등, 평화, 안전 등 국제적 질서 강화

- 국제분쟁의 중단 및 안전성 강화

○ 대상국가: 10개 지역 70개국

- 37개 프로그램을 통해 16/17년도 총 11억 파운드 예산 소요

- 예산은 FCO(Foreign and Commonwealth Office) 63%, 국방부 19%, DFID (Department for International Development) 11% 및 기타 7% 부담

- 주요 5개국은 아프가니스탄(£8,900만), 시리아(£6,400만), 소말리아(£3,350만), 요르단(£2,530만), 레바논(£2,400만) 순

○ 조직 및 운영

- 각 기관 및 부서별로 개별 사업을 수행할 팀을 구성, 3개월에 1회 이상 관련 기관 및 부서가 모여 프로그램을 구성하고 집행

- 해당 사업 관련 부서장은 사업팀의 예산집행 사항을 관리하고 지역별 CSSF 이사회(분기별)에 참석

- 관련된 장관들은 NSC (National Security Council)을 통해 중요 정책에 관여하고, 금액이 큰 계약들은 직접 서명

※ NSC에서는 전략을 수립하고 조정하며, 약 70%의 CSSF 예산을 집행

- 총리는 전체 부처별 예산집행을 책임지고, 총액이 현저히 높거나 위험성이 높은 계약들에 직접 서명 (의회에 대해 설명 등 책임 부여)

○ 모니터링 및 평가

- 일반적으로는 CSSF 팀들과 지역별 이사회를 통해 프로그램들을 모니터링 하며, 필요 시 외부 기관에 의뢰하여 실시

- 모든 프로그램들은 연례보고서를 제출해야 하며, 내외부 팀들이 함께 전략적 중요성, 위험성, 가치 등을 기초로 하여 작성함

- 심층 평가와 검토는 범부처 합동팀이 주관으로, 전 부처와 민간·경찰·군이 모두 포함된 Stabilisation Unit이나 외부 기관 전문가를 이용하며, 이를 통해 향후 수행할 프로그램을 결정할 수 있게 함

Ⅱ. 사업 목표별 세부 사업내용

< 국내외 영국 국민의 보호 (1억 5,300만 파운드 소요) >

○ 본토 및 해외 영토에서의 불법 이민자 감시, 치안력 강화를 위한 지역 네트워크 강화, 총기류를 사용한 범죄 억제, 법 집행 강화 등

○ 테러와 폭력적 극단주의 등에 대한 대응, 특히 극단주의 세력의 여성에 대한 폭력이 간과되어 이에 대한 예방이 중요

○ 무능력한 정부와 가난, 위험, 부패, 분쟁 등으로 인해 심각하고 조직화된 범죄가 지속 발생함에 따라 영국 국립범죄청을 중심으로 해당 정부와 협력하여 범죄 해결하고,

- 검찰 네트워크를 구성하여 영국식 제도 전수 및 능력 향상

○ 불법 이민 문제와 현대판 노예 매매 문제 해결

○ 신속 대응 체계를 구축하고 수색 및 구조용품, 재난 구호물품 등을 사전에 구매하여 긴급한 개입이 필요한 경우 사용

< 국제적 영향력 강화 (9억 5,700만 파운드 소요) >

○ 경찰, 군, 법무부(교정 포함), 법원 등에 대한 개혁을 통해 국가 안정성을 강화, 최종적으로 영국과 관심국가에 대한 위험을 완화

- 치안분야의 책무성과 업무능력을 향상이 가장 중요한 목표

○ 비상 군사활동을 위한 군사 지원 Pool을 구성하여 불법적인 인신매매, 동맹국의 군사작전 수립 및 활동 지원 및 NATO 지원

○ 국제 평화유지를 위해 UN 분담금(3억 5100만 파운드)을 통해 군사, 경찰, 민간 전문가의 평화유지 활동을 지원

○ 평화, 안보, 인권 등과 관련하여 여성의 참여와 리더십을 강화하기 위해 재정적 지원과 전문가 파견

○ 분쟁지역 대상 기본적인 치안안정 지원, 피해복구, 정치적 안정 지원 및 자원봉사자 훈련을 통한 현지 구호활동 전개

※ 약 3,000명의 지원봉사자를 훈련하여 85,000명 이상의 사람을 구호

○ 콜롬비아 정부와 FARC의 평화협상과 같이 지역 내 긴장 완화와 평화 정착을 위한 과정들을 지원

Ⅲ. 비교 분석

○ 영국은 명확한 전략목표와 운영 체계를 확립하고, 각 부처와 민간 전문가를 포함한 상호 협력과 내외부 모니터링 및 평가 강화를 통해 지속적으로 국민 보호 및 영향력 확대라는 목표를 달성함

- 현재 한국의 치안분야 국제개발협력은 명확한 목표와 전략 없이 단순히 외적인 규모의 확대와 수원국 요구 충족이 치우침

※ 예를 들어, UN 등에서 최근 필리핀 경찰의 공권력 남용(적법 절차 무시, 사적 목적의 살인 등)을 지적하고 있음에도 한국은 필리핀 치안역량 강화사업을 통해 오히려 필리핀 경찰의 경찰력 강화를 지원하는 형태

- 국제적 기준에 부합하는 범위 내에서 교민보호, 국제적 영향력 강화와 같이 국익에 도움이 되는 방향으로 전략 목표 수립 필요

○ 특히 국제적인 분쟁지역의 양상을 볼 때, 단순히 해당 지역의 치안 안정을 위해 경찰 분야의 치안력 강화만으로 해결되기 힘듦

- 경찰 외 공공기관(군, 검찰, 법원, 법무부)와 민간 전문가를 아우르는 CSSF와 같은 기금 마련 및 국제개발협력 체계 구축이 효과적

- 총리실 산하의 국제개발협력 위원회가 총괄하고, 기재부와 외교부의 지원 및 모니터링 하에 관련 부처의 공동 기금 운영 필요

○ 또한, 영국의 Stabilisation Unit과 같이 관련 부처와 민간·경찰·군을 비롯하여 외부 민간 전문가까지 포함한 전담 팀을 구성함으로서, 긴급 상황에 보다 효과적으로 대응 가능

제3절 조직 측면

Ⅰ. Stabilisation Unit 개요

영국 정부의 Security Sector Stabilisation Issues Note 참조

○ 영국은 고도의 위험한 환경에서 훈련을 수행할 민, 관 합동의 Stabilisation Unit을 운영하고 있으며, 전문성을 가진 내근직을 포함하여 전문화되고, 장기간 다양한 업무를 수행할 수 있는 민간인 인력풀 제도를 운영

○ 목적은 필수적이고 최소한의 치안과 사법정의를 실현할 수 있게 하고, 법적인 정치적 공권력을 보호 및 장려하며, 중장기 치안분야 개혁을 위한 기초를 마련함

Ⅱ. 주요 활동

○ 정치적 상황과 치안 현실에 대해 이해

- 공식적인 국가 체계 뿐만 아니라 비공식적이거나 전통에 바탕을 두고 있는 메커니즘을 이해해야 함

- 정치인들과 치안 책임자들과의 친밀한 협력을 바탕으로 정치력과 분쟁을 같은 선상에서 이해해야 함

- 일반적으로 긍정적인 정치적 결과물들은 빠른 치안안정을 만듦

○ 폭력을 감소시키고, 사람들을 안전하게 하며, 대화를 위한 정치적 공간을 마련

- 정상적인 국가체계와 비공식적이거나 전통적인 메커니즘 간의 협상과 변화는 중요한 도전요소임

- 평화체계를 구축해 나가는 과정에 있어 전통적인 사법정의의 요소들을 치안과 사법기관에 연계하는 것은 해당 기관이 책임감을 갖도록 함

- 이에 따라 외부적인 도움을 지방정부의 자원이 한정되어 있거나 단기간에 광범위한 치안구조의 개혁이 필요한 경우로 제한함

○ 지역 무장세력에 대한 적절한 이해와 개입

- 군부 등 정규군과 반군 지도자 등 비정규군 모두 정치와 치안력 제공에 중요한 요소임

- 특히 외부의 군 지도자들은 정당간의 분쟁을 발생시킴

- 이에 따라, 비정부군 관계자들도 정치적인 협상과정에 참여시킴으로서 분쟁을 종식시키는데 중요한 역할을 수행하도록 해야 함

○ 지방정부에 대한 역량강화 및 주인의식 고취

- 치안과 사법 분야의 국제개발협력 프로그램의 성공적 수행을 위해 지방정부의 역량강화와 주인의식 고취는 필수적인 요소임.

- 예를 들어 1999년 코소보 치안안정을 위한 프로그램으로 UNMIK, KFOR, OSCE에서 경찰훈련대학을 설립하여 지방경찰의 역량강화와 주체적인 치안서비스 제공이 가능하도록 훈련함

○ 지속적인 문제해결과 충분히 바람직한 결과을 만들기

제4장 전수 가능한 치안한류

제1절  주요내용 요약

앞서 살펴본 바와 같이 한국 경찰의 치안력과 선진화된 체계 및 시스템은 세계적인 수준이라 할 수 있으나, 주요 공여국의 치안 분야 공적개발원조의 정책, 예산, 조직 등을 비교해보면, 왜 꼭 치안한류여야만 하는 가에 대한 의문이 생길 수 밖에 없다. 특히 이러한 분야에 대한 오랜 동안의 노하우를 축적하고 있는 영국과 비교하면 중장기적 관점에서의 정책의 완성도가 없고, 예산도 턱없이 부족하고, 전문화된 인력 구성도 찾아볼 수 없는 등 모든 면에서 뒤쳐져 있는 것이 현실이다.

이러한 상황에서 우리가 모색해봐야 할 점은 한국 경찰이 다른 선진국 경찰과 비교할 때 무엇이 특별한 것인가에 대한 고민이다. 미국, 영국 등 주요 선진국이 ‘best practice’전수 방식의 사업들을 할 때, 많은 실패가 있었던 부분은 선진국의 정치적, 경제적, 문화적 배경과 수원 국가의 해당 여건과의 차이가 큰 점이고, 부패, 분쟁, 비효율성, 무책임, 비효과성 등 수원국 경찰기관이 가지고 있는 문제점들은 선진국 경찰기관이 오래 전에 해결했던 문제들로서 공감하기 어려운 부분이 많다.

하지만, 한국경찰의 역사를 살펴보면, 1990년대까지의 경찰기관의 여건과 환경은 개발도상국과 비슷하며, 그러한 문제점들을 빠른 시일 내에 개혁하고 고쳤다는 점이 다른 선진국들과 비교할 때 특징이라고 할 수 있다. 또한, 개발도상국 치안 분야 기관들의 가장 관심있는 분야 역시 어떻게 하면 단기간에 자신들의 치안 문제점을 개혁하고 해결할 수 있을까 하는 것이라는 점에서 치안한류가 가지고 있는 시사점을 발견할 수 있다.

이에 따라 제2절에서는 한국 경찰의 변천과 1980년부터 2001년까지의 개혁의 흐름에서 개발 도상국 경찰기관들이 배울 수 있는 요소는 무엇인지 알아보기 위해 개발학과 조직변화와 관련한 핵심 이론들을 중심으로 살펴본다.

구체적으로, 일제 강점기 경찰제도가 대한민국 정부 수립 및 창경 시 어떻게 변화되었고 무엇이 중요한 부분인지를 살펴보는데, 동일하게 일제 강점기를 겪었지만 그 양상이 다른 대만 경찰을 비교분석한다. 이후 권위주의 정권 시대와 민주 정권시대를 구분하여 정치적 상황들을 먼저 이해하고 그러한 상황 속에 경찰기관은 어떻게 활동하고 어떻게 변화되는 지 살펴본다. 특히 경찰대학의 설립과 범죄 수사와 관련해서는 보다 자세한 연구를 통해 무엇이 어떻게 영향을 미쳤는지를 살펴본다.

이와 더불어 제3절에서는 실제 한국의 치안분야에서 우수한 시스템 중 하나인 KICS를 개발도상국(과테말라)에 도입하게 된다면 먼저 무엇을 분석해야 하고 어떻게 접근해 나가야 하는지를 실제 검토하는 실제 과정을 보여줌으로서 향후 치안한류 사업들을 어떻게 해야 하는지 예시를 제시한다. 또한 특정 시스템을 전수하기 위해서 어떠한 분석들을 해야 하는 지 D-Brain 시스템을 예시로 제시한다.

제2절  한국 경찰의 시사점

Introduction

In the last decade, over two thousand police officers in developing countries have visited South Korea (hereinafter ‘Korea’) to learn how to solve their crime problems, which have become one of the most concerning issues of daily life. The trainees have high expectations on these short-term fellowship programmes run by the Korean government as the Korean police transformed from an unfair and malfunctioning organisation to a trustworthy and effective one within a short period. Similar to many developing countries, it is widely known that Korean police officers publicly received bribes from offenders and forced false confessions in many criminal cases until the 1990s. Between the 1990s and the 2000s, however, the Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) rapidly reformed their unfairness, corruption and ineffectiveness (Interview).

The name of the Korean National Police Agency has been changed since its establishment in 1948. For consistency, the KNPA was used throughout this research.

Through their successful reforms, the Korean police has been able to provide ‘good’ policing services. The Fragile States Index (Messner, 2018) indicates that Korea is one of the safest countries in the public security sector. According to annual surveys on the satisfaction of the policing service conducted by the KNPA, moreover, citizens have given nearly eighty points out of a hundred in the 2010s, while only twenty percent of respondents trusted the police in 1999 (Park, cited in Moon and Morash, 2009, p. 112). In terms of effectiveness, the police have solved almost all murder, robbery and rape cases even though Korea is much easier to police with very heavy security surveillance of its closed border with North Korea.

Source: Unpublished statistics in the KNPA

Source: Unpublished statistics in the KNPA

Notwithstanding these noteworthy changes, there has been very little research directly investigating how the Korean police were able to succeed in reforming, with consideration for the context at that time. Hence, the lecturers in fellow programmes provide inapplicable lessons, such as the use of current advanced equipment and systematic standards, to other police institutions in developing countries. In Korea, these are the most effective solutions to control crime and violence, given enough budget, good governance, high quality technology and professional skills. This aspect stood out in aid programmes. In 2010, for example, the Korean government decided to help the El Salvadoran police to fight against increasing criminal activities through creating a CCTV control centre and installing fifty CCTV cameras, overlooking the fact that the CCTV system needs much monetary and technical support to operate sustainably (Central and South America Team, 2014). Due to the lack of expertise in CCTV and maintenance budget, in fact, the aid-recipient organisation started to neglect broken-down machines and monitoring officers, who did not receive specific instructions.

Source: Unpublished internal reports in the KNPA

In light of this situation, this research investigates the factors that contribute to reforming the Korean police, focusing on the national and institutional context since the KNPA overlooked these contexts when they explained the process of successful reforms. Looking into the history of the Korean police written by the KNPA (2006), for example, we can see that the police agency had more focus on diversity of policies as a key factor of their successful changes, rather than dynamics among external stakeholders such as politicians, citizens and the press, and internal actors such as executives, reformers and resisters of the reforms. Therefore, the extent to which these policies resulted in changes remains unclear.

From this perspective, my main questions focus on three main issues: 1) who influenced these changes in the Korean police and why; 2) when reformers tried to change; and 3) how they led these reforms under the situation of widespread corruption and ineffectiveness within the organisation. Prior to analysing the changes of the Korean police, this paper will analyse relevant literature to understand what factors influenced these changes, and explain proper methodologies as following literature review.

Literature review

In general, public organisations in developing countries have difficulties performing efficiently and effectively for citizens and reforming due to political conflict, and lack of finance and qualified human resources (Grindle, 1997). Under these conditions, much of the literature on bureaucracy and governance has focused on the enabling and constraining factors for organisational reform in developing countries. While a great part of the literature is concerned with the approaches to governance reform of poor bureaucracies through the intervention of external actors, such as donors and special organisations, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the bureaucracy’s ability to adapt in accord with the context. In this paper, we seek to draw together key views of the thesis to understand how conducive low-quality public organisations are to reform themselves under the influence of internal and external stakeholders in the context.

The first question is who enables a bureaucracy to reform. In general, leadership has been one of the essential elements in reform. Hartley and Allison (2000) argue that the power and responsibility to reform is concentrated within the higher ranks, such as chiefs, of public sector organisations, even though leadership can be distributed from the top-down through substitutes. In particular, the leadership is more significant in Korea as Korean public bureaucracies have strong and effective structures with well-organised hierarchies (Evans, 1998; World Bank, 1993), and the Korean police institutions have a highly centralised system, controlled by executives in the headquarters of the KNPA.

In addition to leadership, limited literature has recently paid attention to individual officers and their departments. Crook (2010) focuses on some effective public organisation in weak governance settings, which he called ‘islands of effectiveness’ and treated as unexpected success. Some studies (Grindle, 1997; Tendler, 1997 cited in Crook, 2010, p. 496) identified five kinds of factors for this effectiveness: 1) a pride in their job, 2) the sense of belonging to a team, 3) managerial skill, 4) acknowledgement of their specificity and 5) operational autonomy within an organisation. Even if the autonomy led to corruption, furthermore, Tendler (1997) finds that frontline officers try to perform better, when they recognise the new found trust from their clients and citizens.

Another research paper which focuses on workers in the field is the Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). In many developing countries, donor and recipient governments have made efforts to build capacity to carry out basic public functions through specific programmes. Despite the introduction of ‘best practices’, however, the organisation has difficulty implementing them due to errors known as ‘Capacity traps’ in daily practices by large numbers of individuals (Andrews et al., 2013). In a study investigating capacity traps, Andrews et al. (2013) suggested an approach to development intervention which focuses on agents in the local contexts with iterative experimentation, involving experiential learning and feedback to find new solutions.

Even though governments face numerous concerning issues, they require opportunities to put their efforts into their most complex problems. Through the recognition of contextual constraints and limitations, and the consideration of feasibility and capability, policy-makers should discover solutions to their problems, which will bring about a wide range of disputes and conflicting pressures (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009). To examine this issue, Kingdon (2003, p165) analyses policy windows, which are defined as “an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems”. In his study, he argues that when the emergence of critical problems or political stream brings about the opening of the policy windows which remain for a short time, solutions come to couple with problems and favourable political will.

Finally, the relationship between the internet and corruption has been investigated. By using a panel in seventy countries, Lio et al. (2011) show that the internet has the ability to reduce corruption through adequate change to the principal-agent-client relationship and effective e-government corruption control. Moreover, the emergence of independent press on the internet, with high level of press freedom, might play a great role in check against corruption as an independent press has strong incentive to expose it (Brunetti and Weder, 2003).

Methodology

It was decided that the best method to adopt for this research was to interview twelve significant police officers, who could explain ‘missing’ stories in official documents of the Korean government and previous studies. Interviewees were selected by their ranks and roles in the 1990s, and current positions from those who are well-known for their criticisms or achievements within the KNPA and are able to comment on their experiences and opinions in depth. In an attempt to make each interviewee feel as comfortable as possible, both oral and written interviews were conducted, depending on what they preferred, and all participants were anonymous as almost all are still working in the KNPA.

As a police officer and a manager of the Korean government-driven aid programmes, moreover, I am able to access unpublished internal documents to understand practical issues. In Korea, the government has internally produced a large number of reports, analysing current problems, selectable options and expected outcomes, so as to enable executives to easily decide a proper solution. Annually, in addition, all departments in the headquarters of the KNPA have internally published white papers and sourcebooks regarding policing services, with statistics and policies in detail. Even if these sources have amicable attitudes toward the public organisations, it would be useful to understand the context within which each policy was considered.

The analysis of the context draws on secondary data sources from both English and Korean-language literature. Generally, the research investigated the Korean police reforms through the lenses of literature review as discussed above. Since there were fewer English research papers on the Korean police reforms, this study utilised a range of useful literature in Korean, including case studies and surveys, to look into the context in detail. Due to practical constraints, this dissertation is unable to put emphasis on the details of each reform, narrowing its focus to deal only with factors which influence these reforms.

Structure of the paper

To understand the aspects of transition of the Korean police and examine these under the influence of political changes, this paper chronologically explores the national context and institutional changes between sections 2 and 4. Section 2 begins by addressing the history of the Korean police in the colonial and post-colonial era, in which negative images of the police were established in Korea, comparing it with the colonial police force in Taiwan. In section 3, we analyse manners and attitudes of the Korean police under the authoritarian regimes, including attempts to politically neutralise the organisation. The fourth section is concerned with police reforms under the democratic regimes in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s, in relation to how these reforms were able to be implemented.

The findings of the research are discussed in section 5. We discuss how the Korean police was able to reform in the national and institutional context under the influence of political changes, through looking into each movement and change, linking these with the literature review.

The final part summarises the main findings of this research in relation to the lessons from these reform cases, and offers insights into its limitations with recommendations of future research.

Establishment of the national police force in 1948

Prior to looking into the establishment of the Korean modern police force in 1948, it is important to analyse the Japanese colonial police force due to the fact that many Korean people regarded the KNPA as merely a rebranded form of the colonial police. This section will focus on the political changes at the national level, which had great impact on the formation of the Korean national police and compare with the Taiwanese police force to understand why Korean citizens had negative perceptions of the KNPA over vast periods of time.

Governmental Changes

During the Japanese colonial era from 1910 to 1945, the colonial government, many of whose governors had a military background, oppressed Korean citizens due to the fact that Korean people attempted to achieve independence from Japan, participating in and supporting underground organisations, the exiled Korean government and independence armies. Under these circumstances, the government appointed Japanese senior police officers from the military and utilised the police force to suppress independent activists through unpunished abuses of power such as detention warrants and torture in the 1910s (Lee, 2005). Although the government replaced the military police with the civil police after large independence movements in 1919, the civil police, utilising their strong power, also intervened in all areas of the colonial lives (Chen, 1984).

After gaining independence from Japan in 1945, the South Korean police force was still regarded by citizens as a symbol of coercion since the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), which were responsible for governing South Korea, decided to permit a great number of colonial police officers to remain in police institutions and established a new police organisation, with similar centralised structures and systems to the colonial institution (Lee, 2005; Kim 2008; Edward, 1970; Cumings, 2010). There were two key reasons for this decision: 1) there were a lack of skilled police officers, and 2) the USAMGIK focused more on anti-communist policies rather than the punishment of pro-Japanese collaborators in the Cold War. Therefore, as shown in Figure 1, the majority of senior police officers consisted of officials who had served in the Japanese colonial government, which ensured the continuation of the negative public perception of the police, while frontline officers were often former soldiers from the Japanese army (Lee, 2005). After the establishment of the Korean government in 1948, moreover, Rhee Syngman, the first president of Korea, utilised the police force, which had a stigma of pro-Japanese activities, to maintain political power through control of all political meetings, in return for impunity of past crimes (Lee, 2005; Cumings, 2010).

Rank		Total number	colonial police officers	Proportion (%)
Superintendent	Senior level	1	1	100
Division Chief		8	5	63
Provincial Chief		10	8	80
Inspectors		30	25	83
Captains	Middle level	139	104	75
Lieutenants		969	806	82
Total		1,157	949	82

Figure 1. the proportion of colonial police officers in 1946. (Lee, 2005)

Comparisons with the police force in Taiwan

Korean police officers not only actively engaged in the suppression of natives in support of the Japanese but also held leadership positions in the post-colonial era. Compared with Taiwan, which was one of the Japanese colonise between 1895 and 1945, there were two main differences which influenced better public perception of the Taiwanese police, even though the police force in both countries supported the colonial government through excessive public authority. Firstly, contrary to the Korean police, the police in Taiwan had a unique function which could help their citizens (Edward, 1970). For example, the Taiwanese police not only administratively helped public facilities, such as schools and hospitals, to operate but also engaged in maintenance of roads and bridges for residents. Secondly, approximately fifteen percent of the police force in Taiwan were natives and they were only appointed below the rank of lieutenant (Edward, 1970), while nearly forty percent of police officers were recruited from the Koreans population in 1940, including high-rank positions (Lee, 2005). Moreover, the Taiwanese government reformed its police force through replacing inexperienced and corrupt police officers with many academic elites (Gingerich, Chu and Chang, 2011).

The KNPA under the authoritarian regimes (1953 - 1993)

After the end of the civil war, the Korean regimes not only excessively oppressed anti-government protests and pro-democracy activists but also illegally intervened in the process of elections, in order to hold their political power, until a civilian government emerged in 1993. In this period, political changes had a great impact on the KNPA due to the fact that the regimes utilised the police force as a vital tool of coercion against citizens. From these perspectives, in this section, the political context at the national level will be analysed and how the KNPA evolved under the influence of the political changes will be investigated. Furthermore, The Korean National Police University (KNPU) is going to be looked into because police officers, who graduated from this special university, played a critical role in organisational changes in the 1980s and the 1990s.

National context

The undemocratic regimes between the 1950s and the 1980s interfered with pro-democracy activities and amended the constitution to maintain despotic power, through authorities committing acts of illegal confinement and torture. In particular, Park Chung-hee and Jeon Doo-hwan took over the regime in 1961 and in 1980 respectively through their military coups, even though citizens continued to call for a democratic government elected by voters. Under these political circumstances, the regimes needed to be dependent on the criminal justice system to illegitimately suppress protesters who continued to oppose dictatorships (Moon and Morash, 2008). According to The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC, 2010), consequently, justice agencies and the military resorted to violence to force a spurious confession or obtain information about pro-democracy activists. In 2006, when the TRC investigated numerous suspicious cases in which the government fabricated evidence, 238 cases of human rights violations were revealed.

Notwithstanding the effort to suppress anti-authoritarianism protests, there were three key protests which succeeded in bringing about regime changes: 1) the protest against the Rhee regime regarding the election fraud in 1960; 2) the protest against the dictator, Park Chung-Hee, demanding democratisation in 1979; and 3) the protest demanding the amendment of the constitution to elect the president directly in 1987. When the opposition parties and citizens called for the latter, for example, the former president, Chun Doo-hwan, proclaimed that the government had no tolerance for discussion regarding the constitution, oppressing democratisation movements. When a torture case in which police officers killed an activist by water torture was revealed, however, over five million people participated in the protest and finally the Chun regime collapsed.

This protest influenced the assassination of the former president, Park Chung-Hee.

Through the democratic election, Roh Tae-woo, a politician with a military background from the ruling party, was elected with only thirty-six percent of the vote due to the fact that two strong candidates from opposition parties failed to agree on a single presidential candidate (Han, 1988). Owing to citizens’ high expectations of the democratic government and a low level of public support, on the one hand, the Roh government tried to distinguish themselves from dictator regimes, encouraging democratic reforms in the public sector (Lee, 2005). Under the pretext of anti-communism, on the other, President Roh’s regime utilised a large number of riot police to oppress many protesters who had anti-Americanism (shorrock, 1986). As a result, the number of arrested protesters during the Roh regime rose by 40 percent, compared with the dictatorship regime between 1980 and 1987 (Lee, 2005).

Institutional context

Through the reinforcement of national security functions and military culture in the KNPA, authoritarian regimes placed great emphasis on their policy of anti-communism in order to maintain focus on North Korea and divert public attention away from internal political concerns (Lee, 2005). The Park regime, for example, recruited over 100 military officers, including two generals in the early 1960s and established a riot police force in 1970 after thirty-one guerrillas in North Korea made an attempt to assassinate former president Park (Lee, 2005). Moreover, the Chun government enlarged two departments of national security and intelligence to a bureau with four departments in 1981 and created a new bureau of national security in 1985. As a result, the number of people prosecuted for violating the National Security Law surged from 93 in 1984 to 432 in 1987 (Lee, 2005).

In 1987, the government, politicians, civil organisations including student groups and trade unions, and the KNPA started to discuss the political neutrality of the police force as the deaths of activists by the police triggered a huge pro-democracy movement (Lee, 2005; Lee, 1999). Through a public opinion piece which appeared in a newspaper in 1988, a police officer, who graduated from the KNPU and was a platoon leader of the riot police force, argued that he had a sense of shame in standing against pro-democracy protestors owing to his conviction that the police should have paid more attention to citizens’ preferences rather than political will (Lee, 1999; Interview). Furthermore, he criticised that the regimes utilised the police force as a tool of political power, which worsened the negative perception of the police in a social atmosphere of democratisation. It triggered an official demand by the representatives of students and alumni in the KNPU to politically neutralise the police, arguing that independence of the police force from politics was the most significant issue in allowing the police force to pay great attention to the interests of the citizens (Lee, 1999; Interview).

In spite of raising this issue, the Roh regime continued to maintain the policy of anti-communism and strongly confront protests which demanded democratisation and the improvement of workers’ right (Lee, 2005). There were constant disputes between the police force and protesters since the KNPA tried to control those who criticised the president and demanded the improvement of social welfare through violent suppression and illegal surveillance. Under these circumstances, during students’ pro-democracy demonstrations, six police officers were killed by petrol bombs in Dong-Eui university in 1989, and a university student was killed by the riot police force in 1991 (KNPA, 2006). As a result of this conflict between the police force and protesters, negative public opinion towards the police force was exacerbated (Kim, 2000; Interview).

After a long discussion surrounding the independence of the KNPA, the National Assembly finally enacted The Police Act in 1991, which separated police institutions from The Ministry of the Interior and Safety (MOIS) and created the National Police Commission (NPC). There was an important argument about the status of the NPC since opposition parties claimed that the independent Police commission had to check the KNPA directly as a superordinate organisation (Lee, 2005). Due to opposition from the ruling party, however, the commission had a role in considering and deciding on policing policies under the MOIS. Although the KNPA has had discretion in human resources and budgets from 1991 onwards, the president has maintained his strong influence on the KNPA. One reason for this is the minister of the MOIS is legally able to exercise the power of veto over decisions made by the NPC, which has been shown to play a pro forma role in the decision-making process (Park, 2008; Moon and Morash, 2009). In fact, the government announced the appointment of a new chief of police in 2003 without approval of the commission, despite this approval being one of the most significant functions of this organisation. Hence, citizens believed that the change from government-driven policing to citizen-centred public services had not occurred, despite this legal effort for political neutralisation (Interview).

The name of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety has been changed since its establishment in 1945. For consistency, the MOIS was used throughout this research.

Korean National Police University

In 1979, the KNPA created a task force team which implemented the establishment of a special education institution to improve the ability to investigate due to the decline in the academic backgrounds of investigators (The National Assembly, 1979). In the committee of the National Assembly in 1979, the ministry of the MOIS explained that the government needed the KNPU as only twenty percent of new managers graduated from university as a result of lack of motivation and incentives, while crime became more advanced and intellectual (The National Assembly, 1979). From this necessity, the government provided a variety of benefits such as the exemption of all educational expenses, monetary support and an appointment as an inspector after graduation, so as to attract academically talented students. As a result, the average score in the college entrance achievement test of successful candidates became similar to those in top universities (Lee, 1983).

The KNPU was established in 1981.

In terms of education and livelihood in the KNPU, there were some unique characteristics compared to other universities (KNPU, 2001). Firstly, a large part of the KNPU’s system emulated the Korean Military Academy, which highlighted leadership training, the education of public ethics and military exercise. In this system, students formed several autonomous organisations by elections to monitor and enforce campus rules and regulations. Secondly, lecturers were a combination of thirteen civilians, who taught general subjects such as law and public administration, and some qualified police officers, who would be replaced with other people regularly, as lecturers of police studies (KNPU, 2001). Finally, there is a strong regulation that restricts when students are allowed to leave university grounds however they are permitted to participate in internal activities.

Due to these characteristics of the KNPU, young and professional students were able to aim for the democratisation of the police force, which finally led to the declaration of political neutralisation of the police in 1988 (Interview). Whilst university students were one of the largest groups in pro-democracy protests under the authoritarian regime (Kim, 2000), the KNPU students had difficulties participating in movements on account of strict university regulations. On the other hand, they had opportunities to readily gather like-minded individuals together in all areas of campus, such as accommodation, lecture rooms and clubs, and discuss how the Korean police could overcome current challenges to transform a political police force into a citizen-focused one (Interview). Thus, when a consensus developed between students, the KNPU student union sometimes tried to rebel against unacceptable decisions of the executives in university. For example, the students declared a boycott of lectures when the university compelled them to prepare a ceremony, in which the former president Chun attended (Interview).

In fact, some studies showed that the KNPU had a great impact on the improvement of policing and the decrease in corruption (Lee and Choi, 2005; Tark, 2007). According to a survey conducted by Lee and Choi (2005), the majority of citizens responded that the KNPU contributed to anti-corruption, the fairness of work processes and the improvement of policing performances in the KNPA. Moreover, they believed that there was a certain distinction between the curriculum of the KNPU and other universities (Lee and Choi, 2005). A survey conducted by Tark (2007) of 430 police officers who had experience on working with alumni of the KNPA indicated a similar perception on the KNPU. Nearly half of respondents considered integrity and respectful treatment as the merit of the KNPU, even though over 80 percent of officials thought that they had difficulty attaining senior positions due to the KNPU (Tark, 2007).

The KNPA under the democratic regimes (1993 – 2001)

In contrast to the authoritarian regimes, under the complex changes in politics, economics and the ICT from 1993, the democratic regimes tried to reform public institutions to differentiate their governments from previous ones and satisfy citizens’ needs. Meanwhile, the Korean police also demonstrated their efforts to reform their operations in line with political will despite several challenges, such as low motivation and top-down organisational culture. In this section, this paper will explain significant changes at national level to help to understand internal and external elements which contributed to police reforms at that time in terms of corruption and the democratisation of organisational culture. In particular, as one of the key outcomes in these reforms, the improvement of crime investigation will be analysed.

National context

Kim Young-Sam, who had strived for democratisation against dictator regimes for over twenty years without a military background, was elected president in 1993. The civilian government named by the regime tried to break with the past regimes and punished all people concerned with the coup in 1980, including two former presidents, in order to demonstrate their difference from the previous regime (Lee, 2005). Furthermore, the Kim government stated that they struggled with widespread corruption and military culture in the public sector, and covert financial transactions in the market. According to a survey of public perception of corruption (H. Kim, 1993), in fact, over 85 percent of the people surveyed responded that power-related corruption and impunity prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s. Under the pressure of the regime’s priorities, therefore, public institutions had great focus on reformation of their organisations and the implement of anti-corruption.

On the other hand, the Kim regime still suppress pro-North Korean protesters, especially student groups, as in the previous regime (Lee, 2005). In 1996, the National Council of University Student Representatives (NCUSR) tried to march to the border between the two Koreas to welcome a returning deputation of two students, who were illegally dispatched to an Independence Day Ceremony in North Korea. During an attempt to restrain the NCUSR from marching to the North and arrest leaders of the protest, one riot police officer was killed and over 800 officials were wounded by protesters, which brought about a decrease in members of social movement groups owing to citizens’ criticism against these organisations (Kim, 2000). As a result, the government classified some groups as ones which benefited the enemy and communicated with North Korea. During this time, the number of people prosecuted for violating the National Security Law increased by over twenty percent, from 1,529 in the previous regime to 1,861, even though the democratic regime did not proclaim martial law and emergency measures, contrary to the authoritarian regimes (Lee, 2005).

In 1999, one of the strong pro-democracy activists in the dictatorship, Kim Dae-Jung was elected in the presidential election from the opposition party. In the foreign exchange crisis caused by the ruling party, the government put great emphasis on the restoration of the Korean economy and the improvement of efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector under the intervention of The International Monetary Fund. In this situation, the government carried out a large-scale restructuring of insolvent enterprises and oppressively coped with strikes of trade unions, utilising the riot police force (Lee, 2005). In terms of the relationship with North Korea, however, the government launched a North Korea friendly policy, called ‘the Sunshine Policy’. As a result of the tolerance of Marxist ideology, the number of people prosecuted for violating the National Security Law slumped from 1,861 in the previous regime to 1,136 (Lee, 2005).

Institutional context

Under the political will of the Kim Young Sam regime, the KNPA had to demonstrate to the regime and citizens how they made an effort to eliminate corruption cases, in the situation of almost all street level officers in the KNPA being involved in corruption cases. The executives focused more on showing how much they exerted efforts to overcome these problems, achieved through reform catchphrases and public relations, which stated they had reinforced internal inspection procedures (Interview). However, the anti-corruption policies failed to change the organisational culture in the local context, in which there was no shame among employees in receiving bribes. When a police officer arrested a drunken driver, for example, police officers received bribes as rewards for low salaries and hard work, allowing the person to be released, whilst the criminals also benefited as they were able to avoid punishment. Even though inspection officials discovered these corruption cases, moreover, they requested money from corrupt officers to conceal the cases (Interview).

Notwithstanding this organisational culture, qualified and diligent officers who wanted to receive respect from citizens, voiced their disapproval within their offices, individually criticising corrupt colleagues and irresponsible decision-makers (Interview). Even though they worked hard and focused more on the interests of residents rather than regime’s request, criticising power abuse and corruption of the KNPA, citizens regarded them as problematic officials on account of the negative perception of police officers (Interview). Under the influence of this political change to the democracy, these police believed that it was a great opportunity to change people’s negative perceptions with the aim of citizens regarding the KNPA as a fair and citizen-friendly police force (Interview). Even though these reformers rarely spoke out against other officers through official channels, they strongly refused bribes, creating a strained atmosphere among colleagues (Interview). A number of officers who graduated from the KNPU as managers tried to change the culture at management level within their teams due to the fact that they valued reputation above illegal monetary incentives (Lee and Choi, 2005; Interview)

However, individual efforts to change the organisational culture and public perception were inadequate due to lack of motivation of frontline officials within the organisation, even though diligent officers tried to change the culture and improve their skills such as investigation and evidence analysis by themselves for citizens’ safety (Interview). Particularly, high ranking officials had less motivation to change their attitudes. There were two main reasons: 1) senior officers put their energy and time into the needs of politicians who had the power to influence the promotion decision process (Interview), while there was no system through which citizens could have an impact on them directly; and 2) they received a portion of the bribes from street-level officials in the field in exchange for overlooking the corruption. On the other hand, there was no incentive for reformers in spite of their endeavours.

The Korean public institutions placed a great emphasis on the press, which played a vital role in public opinions towards the regime (Whang et al., 2012; Lee, 2003). As a result of compulsory merger of the press in 1980 by the Chun regime, some major newspaper and broadcasting companies had a strong influence on the government regarding the drawbacks of public services such as corruption and illegitimacy (Lee, 2003), whilst there was no official complaint system in the public sector. The government, therefore, made an attempt to appease critics of the regime and promote their ‘good’ policies through working closely with journalists (Whang et al., 2012). Among the public organisations, the KNPA particularly had a close relationship with journalists, as they resided within pressrooms of police institutions to obtain information regarding crimes and accidents (Lee, 2010). Under these circumstances, the KNPA attempted to appease reporter critics through complying with their requests such as covering up incidents and crime (Interview).

In the late 1990s, widespread internet usage in Korea had a large impact on the concealment of iniquitous practice within police institutions (Interview). When citizens and reformers in the KNPA faced the rejection of their complaints and suggestions, they started to utilise internet community services and individual homepages to create groups of like-minded people and share their opinions with the public (Interview). Internally, using the Internet, some police officers not only encouraged others to reform, so as to receive widespread support from citizens, but shared their expertise to improve policing services which were appropriate to the specific local context (Interview). Externally, moreover, citizens decried corruption and incompetence on the internet communities, based on their unacceptable experiences (Interview). When the critic became an issue among the users of the internet, citizens criticised the police on the website of a relevant police institution and the inspection officials had to internally investigate, which forced police officers to abstain from illegal practice (Interview).

In particular, the emergence of online newspapers frustrated the conventional complementary relationship between the government and the press (Lee, 2003; Interview). When a drunken journalist in a major broadcasting company was arrested for violence against detectives and damage to public property, for example, three detectives, who executed law legally, had to move to other positions as a disciplinary action as a result of negotiations between executives in the KNPA and in the broadcasting company. When a police officer, as a ‘citizen reporter’, disclosed this case through an online newspaper called ‘ohmynews’ the journalist finally had to accept proper punishment (Interview).

At that time, regionalism, which is defined as homogeneity of the residents within a particular area (Nardulli, 1989), became a significant political problem (Horiuchi and Lee, 2008; P. Kim, 1993). Under the authoritarian regimes, there was a huge amount of support from their own regions for two pro-democracy leaders, a Gyeongsang native Kim Young-sam and a Jeonla native Kim Dae-jung, as citizens in Korea tend to support candidates from their hometowns (Horiuchi and Lee, 2008). When they competed in two presidential elections in 1987 and 1993, moreover, they asked voters in the town of birth for support and the majority of voters in each region elected those who had the same hometown (National Election Commission, 2018). This regionalism extended to the appointment of senior positions in the public sector such as ministries and chiefs of justice agencies. Before Kim Dae-jung was elected in 1997, therefore, nearly forty percent of the chiefs in the government had been Gyeongsang natives the same as former presidents since the 1960s (P. Kim, 1993).

From these perspectives, a general police commissioner was appointed by the first elected president from the opposition party. Until the Kim Young-Sam regime, there were a majority of senior officers in the KNPA who were born in Gyeongsang, while the new chief of the KNPA had a hometown in Jeonla. Because of this, he had a weak support foundation compared with other executives who had a close relationship with previous regimes (Interview). In this situation, the police chief decided to assign skilled reformers to significant positions in the headquarters and allowed them to implement a ‘grand reform’ to eliminate police malpractice and corruption, and to improve their poor working conditions and the institutionislans prescriptive culture (Interview; Moon and Morash, 2009). Externally, policy-makers emphasised citizen-oriented policies through a cooperative relationship with residents, so as to create a fair and trustworthy perception of the police (Pyo, 2001). Hence, the extensive reform consolidated his leadership within the organisation on the basis of strong support from field officers and citizens (Interview).

Meanwhile, prior to having the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes in 2000 and 2001, many champions of police reforms with sufficient experience and expertise started to create the online space to network. Through websites and internet communities, these reformers constantly discussed what they needed to change in the local context and how they improved their effectiveness by following the advice of others. On the largest internet community website called ‘Polnetian’, in particular, a large number of police officers argued that all police officials had to change themselves to gain the confidence of citizens, criticising their corrupt colleagues and political police executives. Looking into some posts on the Polnetian in 2000, for instance, several officers criticised corrupt co-workers and distortive reporters, encouraging whistle-blowers and strict anti-corruption policies. Until the KNPA informally forced this internet community to close due to their continuous and strong criticisms against police executives in 2001, the members of this website were key supporters of the citizens and frontline workers-oriented reform (Interview).

The improvement of crime investigation

In terms of effectiveness, the Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) and cyber-crime investigation team were the best examples of the improvement of police performance. In 1997, the KNPA established the cyber-crime investigation team in the headquarters on the suggestion of a skilled officer, who became a team leader. He had the discretion to recruit well-known skilled officials from the internet communities into his team and make plans for the improvement of cyber investigation (Interview). Through a special employment programme, moreover, the team recruited qualified people who were able to help each other to develop their competence (Interview). As a result of self-motivation based on their discretion and strong teamwork, the prime minister praised the quality of the team, when they successfully investigated serious cyber-attacks against companies and the press in 2000 despite a lack of equipment and staff.

In contrary to the cyber-crime investigation, the KNPA improved the quality of CSI based on the necessity of evidence in the investigation (Interview). Under the undemocratic regimes, the police proved crime cases through the confession of criminals and testimony of witnesses, utilising coercive power. In the democratic regimes, however, the police had to change their investigation ways owing to two reasons: 1) Through official channels, such as the complaint centre in the KNPA and the National Human Rights Commission, citizens started to complain about oppressive methods against criminals (KNPU, 2006), and 2) there were high expectations of the quality of CSI in the KNPA, particularly when the CSI in developed countries became widely known among citizens through the media (Interview). As the CSI was recognised as the most vital method to investigate and collect evidence, moreover, police officers in CSI teams had high self-esteem, receiving compliments from citizens (Interview). Hence, the KNPA directed a huge budget and energy into the improvement of this area (KNPU, 2006).

Finding and implication

Looking into the Korean police between the 1980s and 2000, there were several meaningful attempts to reform, some successful and some not. Comparing the democratic regimes with the authoritarian regimes, strong political will and leadership in the police were critical factors influencing reform in Korea, as mentioned in the literature review. On the one hand, the democratic regimes tried to reform the police force, which previous regimes had utilised as a tool to maintain their political power, under the pressure of citizens’ pre-democracy expectations. On the other, executives of the police demonstrated their efforts to reform in the light of political will, with politicians having the power to appoint individuals to these positions.

Notwithstanding widespread corruption and government-oriented policies in the public security sector, some officers wanted to implement citizen-focused policing and perform better to receive respect from citizens. When the dictationship regime collapsed in 1987 through large scale pro-democracy movements, citizens had high expectation of the democratisation of the government including the police force. As Tendler (1997) argues, citizens’ new trust and expectations toward the police became strong motivation to enable reformers to criticise their corrupt colleagues and irresponsible executives.

Through advanced ICT infrastructure in Korea, furthermore, these officers gathered into internet communities and websites, as a way to network with fellow reformers. Until the emergence of the online space in the late 1990s, reformers had individually demanded the elimination of political police force and corruption in the field within the organisation. Compared with that, the internet allowed a large number of police officers to discuss the solutions to current problems, and shar their expertise to improve policing services, supporting reform for citizens and frontline workers.

The internet strongly influenced the press, civil society and citizens who criticised police conduct (Interview). Through the creation of the online press, these independent media outlets uncovered culpable performance without any interference. Moreover, citizens were able to easily speak out against corruption and incompetence of the police through the internet communities and online complaints system (Interview). As critics raised sensitive issues to the users of the internet, problematic officers started to pay more attention to their performances and attitudes towards citizens (Interview).

Another significant element in the police reforms is the KNPU. Through careful selection of applicants in the KNPU based on age and other factors, the police university recruited over a hundred young, professional students. While university students led democratisation protests, the KNPU students discussed political neutralisation of the police and transition from a government-focused police force to a citizen-oriented one with the campus providing a space to network with each other. When students graduated from the KNPU, moreover, they became a group of reformers. Without the influence of the existing organisational culture, they utilised their discretion, as managers, to operate adaptively to solve problems in the local contexts for citizens. When some of them moved to the headquarters of the KNPA, they were able to produce solutions to locally perceived problems.

Despite many attempts to reform over a long period, there were rarely remarkable success cases due to several constraints, such as the military organisation culture and lack of motivation. In these circumstance, policy windows opened when a new chief with a weak organisational support foundation decided to implement grand reform for citizens and frontline officers in light of the regime’s will. Hence, the chief recruited qualified officers, who understood contextual constraints in the local context, into the headquarters of the KNPA. He had supported them to discover proper solutions to their malpractice and corruption problems until the policy windows closed after several successful reforms, through tacit pressure to close the internet website of Polnetian, in which reformers constantly criticised current problems including politicalised organisation (Interview).

One interesting finding is the cyber-crime investigation team as the ‘islands of effectiveness’. When a manager, who had the discretion to operate his team, created his team, and recruited skilled officers, he built their capacity through peer learning, and encouraged their team to have a sense of accomplishment through solving difficult cases. Although some officers moved to other departments due to insufficient support from the KNPA, the team became famous when they solved serious and complex cyber-crime cases at the national level. This result is in agreement with Crook’s (2010) research which showed five key elements for the effectiveness in poor governance, such as teamwork, pride, specificity and managerial autonomy.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to examine the factors which contributed to the Korean police reform so as to understand how the Korean police succeeded in their reform in the 1990s. Even though a large range of reforms were implemented in 2000, investigating meaningful movements and attempts to reform in the 1980s and the 1990s is also prominent to understanding these reforms in detail. The dramatic political changes from authoritarian to democratic regimes, moreover, had a great impact on the policies and performances of the KNPA due to centralised structures and presidential authority to directly appoint executives in the public sector.

This study has shown how reform champions were actively motivated to change their organisation, under the influence of politicians, citizens and the press. Through the space to communicate with each other, these officers were able to improve their professionalism and leverage to support reform. Although their criticism regarding corruption and political performance had been ignored within the organisation, they had opportunities to solve serious problems in the local context, when the policy windows opened in the complex situation. In particular, the KNPU produced young and professional managers, the new emerging forces in existing problematic circumstances. They had the expertise and capacity to lead the police force toward greater effectiveness and responsiveness, change military organisational culture as they focused more on being held in high esteem by citizens and their colleagues. Similarly, the emergence of the internet also resulted in reforming corruption and malpractice. When the police had difficulties ignoring complaints and criticism from citizens and independent online media owing to the strong influence of the internet communities, police officers started to change their performances.

The major limitation of this study is that it only analysed changes in the 1990s and the early 2000s, while the Korean police has continuously changed in different ways. Although the KNPU was referred to as one of the dominant elements which contributed to reform, for example, many street-level officers argue that the KNPU should be abolished because the Korean police has had enough qualified employees in 2010s recruited through an open system and privileges of the university creates disharmony between police officers. When the cyber investigation team became a bureau with three departments in the headquarters of the KNPA, furthermore, this bureau has been filled with inexperienced and non-professional people, who want to receive promotions and rewards, and has become a rigid and inflexible organisation.

In addition, the findings may not be applicable to all police forces in developing countries as this study has only considered the context of Korea, in terms of economic development and ICT infrastructure. According to the Korean Institution of Public Finance (2012), citizens have demanded the improvement of social welfare and stability including citizen-oriented policing since Korea had enough tax revenue to increase the welfare budget and public officers’ salaries, through unprecedented economic development in the late 1980s. On the basis of the enlargement of ICT infrastructure in the late 1990s, moreover, Korean people were easily able to gather their opinions and access to ‘decision-making’ and ‘complaints’ process in the public sector (Karippacheril et al., 2016).

In the future, it will be important to explore how the KNPA has constantly improved their policing ability and struggled with corruption and malpractice since 2000, to understand ongoing Korean police reforms. On the basis of a grand reform in 2000, the KNPA developed their effectiveness and implemented many citizen-oriented policies, such as the introduction of e-government system and performance evaluation based on citizens’ perception. Throughout these reforms, politicians, citizens and the press have continually influenced the police institutions, following both different and similar patterns.

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제3절 한국 경찰 시스템의 개발도상국 전수 분석 예시

Ⅰ. KICS 시스템의 과테말라 전수를 가정으로 한 분석

Introduction

In 2003, the Roh Moo-hyun government announced an electronic government (e-government) policy with 31 detailed projects for the enlargement of the participation in the policy-making process. In this period, South Korea (hereinafter ‘Korea’) laid emphasis on the promotion of three modalities: opening public information from government to citizen, question or suggestion from citizen to government, and rapid communication among public institutions. One of the e-government projects in the security and justice sector is Korea Information system of Criminal Justice Services (KICS) which can deliver digital information on criminal cases among the relevant institutions and provide the citizenry with their case information. Although there were many obstacles to open the system because of the disagreement among the agencies, this system was selected as one of the best practice cases of e-government in 2013.

There were police agency, prosecutors’ office, court, and Ministry of Justice. From 2014, Ministry of public Safety and Security has participated.

In this paper, I will analyse the KICS to see how it can improve accountability within the criminal justice sector by the lenses of the two basic concepts - answerability, enforcement - which will be explained below. Furthermore, I will explain how the KICS can be introduced into Guatemala, where it has success factors even though the government will face expected challenges in the process of the reform.

The improvement of accountability by the KICS

There are two notable concepts to understand accountability: answerability, and enforcement. Schedler (1999) explains that answerability is defined not only the duty of public servants to inform and explain about their decisions but also the obligation to be exercised in transparent ways. In addition, he expresses that the meaning of enforcement is interpreted by the power of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on an improper behaviour of powerholders. In reference to the concepts of accountability, there are two main functions of the KICS: the connection between citizen and accounting agencies with transparency (answerability), and containment between horizontal agencies for legal justice (enforcement). Although the KICS has other strengths such as efficiency and paper saving, the KICS will be analysed by these two concepts.

Answerability

The most vital function of the KICS is that the persons who are involved in a criminal case such as the accused and the victim can access the information of their case anywhere and at any time. On the one side, the KICS texts the relevant people regarding the progress of the case automatically, on the other side, it provides them with the space called ‘criminal justice portal service’ to view the information and complain about their case on the website and mobile application. In addition, the KICS shows a police officer or a prosecutor who has the responsibility to answer and explain the questions about the decision from a citizen. These characters of the KICS are in accord with the Scheddler’s view of answerability which focuses on the monitoring and justification.

Before the opening of the KICS, however, the governments in the security and justice sector had regarded an investigation field as an exception of answerability. Firstly, the investigative agencies have no legal responsibility to inform about the case information, while the court ought to send the notice with the result of a case to the relevant people. Secondly, public officers are reluctant to talk with other people regarding the criminal case because of the legal liability to keep investigation secret by Criminal Act. Hence, the relevant people had difficulties to monitor and track their progress of the case under these situations.

Although there was the customary practice to curb answerability in the justice sector, the Roh government had a strong political will to change it for the citizen. In the beginning of the project, there were many resistances from public officers because they had concerned two problems: excessive complaint about the unwanted result and invasion of independence which the judicature contended. Since the key policy of Roh Moo-hyun administration focused on the civil participation, the government moved ahead with the KICS project, revising the plan from using one integrated system to linking each independent system with the same platform. Notwithstanding the huge effort of the government, this project took five years for the enactment of the relevant laws and the opening of the KICS.

The KICS also can help to improve transparency which is one of the aims of answerability. Fox (2007) states that the concepts of transparency and accountability are tightly connected: transparency is supposed to engender accountability. The police officer who is in charge of a criminal case, heretofore, should input the case information into a case management system directly. The problem of the previous system was that nobody including a supervisor knows whether this information is correct or not, except on the scrutiny, and the opacity of the system generates many problems. For example, a police officer did not input 160 cases of traffic accidents into the Traffic Accident Management System (TAMS), concealing over 200 public document in his house because a victim of the traffic accident pays less attention to the result of the case after he/she received insurance (Lee, 2008). For this reason, in the KICS, a person who receives a report has the responsibility to input the information and when an investigator is assigned the case, the relevant people and the supervisor can access the case information.

Enforcement

The second significant function of the KICS is that the agencies can proceed their investigation and judgment process without any disturbance. Before the establishment of the KICS, when other officers provided an investigator with field reports, scene inspection reports, and evidence, the investigator was able to destroy evidence and official papers. In particular, with victim’s consent, the senior officer can force a detective to stop the progress of the criminal case which the police have authority to investigate without reference to victim’s intent. In order to prevent the elimination of the relevant papers and evidence, on the one hand, the KICS saves every digital record such as connect history, inputted data, and evidence with the restriction on eliminating the data. On the other hand, police officers in different department input the information into one case to prevent fudge data by the investigator. Therefore, the superordinate office and audit and inspection officials can find an illegal behaviour readily through the verification of the KICS’s server record.

Linking the criminal cases between the agencies is another factor to promote enforcement. The previous process of a criminal case had two crucial problems: the agencies leave the investigation to officer’s discretion that influences the result of the case; a prosecutor and the judge have the power of suspension indictment which has great potential to abuse for the impunity of powerholder. In the KICS, a police officer not only sends all the document and evidence of a criminal case to a prosecutor but accesses the case result of the prosecution. On the contrary to this, a prosecutor checks all the process of investigation in the police sector and judges fair or unfair. In this kind of formal horizontal containment among the agencies, the government has enforced the law against powerholders.

The chances for the introduction of the KICS in Guatemala

Many developing countries that need to enhance accountability in the justice sector have not tried a reform until now whilst the KICS has the success to improve accountability in the public sector of Korea. In particular, Latin American countries have the weakness of accountability: an ineffective internal system of checks and balances, mistrust of judicial institutions, and corruption of the public administration (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006). However, Guatemala has essential advantages to introducing the KICS: political situation against impunity, a sufficient budget, and an infrastructure.

Political situation

In 2015, a lot of Guatemalan people had demanded greater government accountability: the resignation of the president and punishment of politicians who were implicated in the corruption scandal. This large-scale corruption of tax revenue associated with a network of high-ranking officials including the president, Otto Pérez Molina, was revealed in 2015 by the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (known by its Spanish acronym, CICIG). According to the CICIG, the importers who want to bring their products into Guatemala could pay only roughly 40 percent of standard import taxes and deliver 30 percent – an estimated $120 million - to the high-ranking officials (Daugherty, 2015). After the announcement of the CICIG, mass protests forced the president to resign and participated in the presidential election in 2015 which have the highest voter turnout in the first round at 71.33 percent (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2015).

Under this political circumstance, Jimmy Morales who was inaugurated as president of Guatemala in 2016, has presented a strong will about anti-corruption and accountability. In the case of Korea, the project of the KICS has many obstacles to implementing due to the complex relationship with relevant agencies and the opposite of the Establishment. However, the agencies had no choice but to accept this project because the president had aggressively promoted it. Furthermore, national attention about accountability is what makes political situation in Guatemala better than in Korea with relation to the project, and “the accountability of political power can be established on legal or political grounds” (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006, page 5).

The existence of the CICIG as a neutral and righteous institution has significant chances for success in the new reform. For the management and maintenance of the system, the state should make a distinct organisation from the agencies. In Korea, the government launched a joint team of KICS within Ministry of Justice which is composed of 23 public officers from each relevant agency with mutual cooperation and containment in 2010. In undemocratic countries, however, it is apprehended that a regime misuses the KICS by manipulating the information of a criminal case. For this reason, the Guatemalan government can set up an independent office within the CICIG which has downgraded their country’s long-standing problems of insecurity and impunity with CICIG-trained justice sector bureaucrats.

A sufficient budget

Since the budget for developing and maintaining the KICS system is a vital ingredient, a developing country which attempts to introduce this system needs a sufficient budget like Guatemala. The budget depends on the scale of the system such as storages and servers, however, the Korean government had spent a huge budget at over 70 million USD to develop the KICS and appropriated over 7 million USD for the maintenance of the KICS in 2017. Under the fiscal pressure, the rapid growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Guatemala that has increased from 41billion USD in 2011 to 63billion USD in 2015 is appropriate for the condition of the project.

An infrastructure

The state requires high-speed broadband infrastructure for communication of the digital information between the investigation, prosecution, judicial and execution agencies. In Korea, there is a huge scale of national basic information network linking among every public institution for electronic government systems. Although Guatemala does not have the national broadband infrastructure, the government can lease the infrastructure such as a certain amount of bandwidth from the private sector. According to the Internet World Stats (2012), the penetration rate of the Internet in Guatemala has multiplied from 6.1% in 2005 to 16.2% in 2012. This advance of the network infrastructure facilitates the establishment of the KICS in Guatemalan justice sector.

The challenges against the reform

On one hand, Guatemala has the advantages introducing the KICS, the other hand, there are expected obstacles: a prevailed corruption and impunity, a long period of the development of the system, and an imbalance between the relevant agencies.

Firstly, the Guatemalan government may face the strong resistance of the widespread corruption and impunity in connection with elites who have contravened their public duties. According to the corruption perceptions index 2015, the perceived levels of public sector corruption in Guatemala was ranked 123rd out of 167 countries (Transparency International, 2015). In addition, there are powerful criminal organisations that have supported electoral fund to most politicians (Freedom House, 2012). Under low accountability of the agencies, many powerholders try to maintain the situation: only under 30 percent of homicide cases and under 10 percent of legal cases were punished in 2012 (Central American Institute of Fiscal Studies, 2012). Moreover, the corruption politicians and organised criminals has threatened the media (Freedom House, 2012) which influences social accountability through monitoring public officials and exposing the misdeed of a government (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006).

Secondly, the term length of the president in Guatemala, 4 years, is shorter than the period of the development of the KICS. In order to establish the system, the procedures - business process reengineering, system development, network setting, and test operation - are required for over 4 years. Therefore, there is a peril in the project to be run aground by next government which will be indifferent to the improvement of accountability, even if the Morales regime has the great emphasis on the reform of the justice sector.

Finally, imbalanced agencies in the justice sector may lead to complex conflict. In Guatemala, there is a serious problem of impunity of committing crimes of security forces. According to United State Department of State (2016), there were nearly 210 arrested police officials, 31 complaints of police extortion, and 856 cases of power abuse in the police agency. Because of the problem of police forces which is one of the participants in the project, other agencies may be reluctant to integrate and communicate with the troubled agency. Practically, the judicature in Korea disagreed the combination with Ministry of Justice for an independence of the court, and the project was postponed for nearly one year.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Guatemalan government has the chances to introduce the KICS which has a positive influence on accountability in Korea, in terms of political situation, economic growth for the budget, and advanced network infrastructure. In contrast with the chances, there are resistances to the project by powerholders who have a desire for the power of impunity and complex conflict among the agencies.

Although we can expect that the reformer faces those challenges, the present is most opportune for the promotion of accountability. On the one hand, the CICIG has affected the justice sector substantively through training the officials and effective corruption investigations. On the other hand, the citizenry has a vast aspiration for the high level of accountability of the government due to the corruption scandal involving the former president. With the obligation to reform of the justice sector, the Morales government can struggle against opposition forces for accountability with the people.

References

Central American Institute of Fiscal Studies (2012). A Path to Justice. Available from: http://icefi.org/sites/default/files/contamos_11.pdf (Accessed: 3 January 2017).

Daugherty, A. (2015) ‘Guatemala's Big Corruption Scandal, Explained’, Insight Crime, 20 July, Available from: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/guatemala-la-linea-customs-scandal-explained (Accessed: 3 January 2017).

Fox, J. (2007). The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability.
Development in Practice, 17(4-5), 663-671. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
pdf/10.1080/09614520701469955?needAccess=true (Accessed: 3 January 2017).

Freedom House (2012). Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Guatemala. Available from:  https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Guatemala%20-%20FINAL_0.pdf (Accessed: 3 January 2017).

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2015). Election Guide. Available from: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/90/ (Accessed: 3 January 2017).

Internet World Stats (2012). Central America Internet Stats: Guatemala. Available from: http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/gt.htm (Accessed: 3 January 2017).

Lee, J. M. (2008) [S Korea finds $1.3bn accounting hole at Daewoo Shipbuilding] in Korean, Yonhapnews, 10 July, Available from: https:// http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=
LSD&mid=sec&sid1=102&oid=001&aid=0002169073 (Accessed: 3 January 2017).

Peruzzotti, E., and Smulovitz, C. (2006). Social accountability. Enforcing the rule of law: Social accountability in the new Latin American democracies, Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing accountability. The self-restraining state: Power and accountability in new democracies. London: Lynne Reinner, pp. 13-28.

Transparency International (2015). Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. Available from: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 (Accessed: 8 January 2017).

United States Department of State (2016). 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.   Available from: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2015/wha/253017.htm (Accessed: 3 January 2017).

World Bank (2017). World Bank Open Data: Guatemala. Available from: http://data.world
bank.org/country/guatemala (Accessed: 3 January 2017).

Ⅱ. D-Brain 시스템 전수를 위한 분석

Introduction

All public institutions in the world need their budget to implement their policies. In general, a finance ministry reviews and distributes the budget to other organisations because the total amount of budget proposals from all public institutions in a country, exceeds the entire revenues of the state. During the process of reviewing the budget proposal, this ministry needs a high level of capability to analyse all budget proposals on the basis of state policy prioritisation, ‘cost-benefit’ ratios, and evaluation of past performances. Moreover, this ministry has many economic-related duties, such as responding to the financial crisis, funding global issues, and establishing a welfare state (Krause et al., 2016).

In South Korea (hereinafter ‘Korea’), the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) is a strong economic institution. In a study investigating East Asian economic policies, Evans (1998) argues that economic bureaucracies in East Asia, which are similar to the ‘Weber’s ideal bureaucracy’, play a vital role in economic success. Although the MOSF has a high level of capacity to manage public finance, they find it difficult to control the budget of all public institutions as ‘principal-agent’ relations, defined as the principal can assess a performance based on only partial information of the agent (Stoker, 1998). For example, a small proportion of a budget can have its original purpose changed and be exempted from procurement procedures without approval of the MOSF.

Under these circumstance, the MOSF introduced the Digital Budget and Accounting System (D-Brain) in 2007, which enhances the ability of public financial management through offering the functions of gathering and analysing a huge amount of data on budget expenditure at a small cost. In recent research, Bird and Zolt (2008) argue that technology has improved the effectiveness of tax planning and administration while Ali et al. (2015) reported that there was a limited amount of empirical evidence on the outcomes of information technology (IT) regarding the tax reform. From these perspectives, this study aimed to address the following research questions: firstly, why the MOSF introduced the D-Brain; secondly, how the D-brain system improves the MOSF’s capacity for public financial management; and thirdly, what factors contribute to the success of the D-Brain.

In this paper, I will analyse the D-Brain in Korea as a case of reform of the ‘public financial management’ (PFM), defined as “the way governments manage public resources (both revenue and expenditure) and the immediate and medium-to-long-term impact of such resources on the economy or society” (Andrews et al., 2014, page 2). The following sections will analyse the background of introducing the D-Brain and the three key functions of the PFM process; sufficient information, a transformation of accounting method, and performance budgeting, in order to understand why the Korean government should introduce this system. Then I will present the factors of success in the PFM reform, compared with the unsuccessful cases of the PFM reforms in developing countries. Due to practical constraints, this paper cannot provide discussions on the initial problems of the PFM after the introduction of D-Brain, such as system troubles and lack of education for financial officials.

The background of introducing the D-Brain

The MOSF has a key role in economics, implementing a large number of works such as long-term national growth strategies, fiscal policy coordination, budget planning and monitoring, and establishing international financial policies. Until the introduction of the D-Brain, the MOSF implemented public financial policies without notable reform of the PFM, relying on the ability of public officials. With the changed in circumstances in the public financial sector, however, the MOSF faced four kinds of pressures on the reform of the PFM.

Firstly, the total amount of national revenue in Korea has been increased dramatically due to the effects of unprecedented economic growth and an enlargement of welfare programmes since 1961. According to the MOSF (2017), for example, the Korean government has increased the amount of revenue at the national level from 109 billion won in 1966 to 269 trillion won in 2017. As a result of the expansion in the scale of public finance in Korea, the MOSF find it difficult to control and manage public implementation while the total number of public officers in the MOSF has been only slightly increased.

Secondly, when Korea suffered a foreign-exchange crisis in 1997, the president decided to request a bailout programme from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which included reforms of fiscal policy. The Korean government borrowed 19.5 billion USD from IMF on the understanding that the government accepted all demands of the IMF. In terms of the PFM, the IMF forced the MOSF to not only reduce the total amount of national revenue but also increase transparency of national budget and accountancy (Kim, 1998). Without sufficient information on budget performances and public financial statistics from all public bureaucracies, however, the MOSF found it difficult to meet IMF’s demands. Moreover, the IMF pointed out problems of methods unique to Korea of calculating and managing the national budget, insisting on the transformation to international standard methods (Kim, 1999). In fact, international organisations including the IMF debated all economic indicators which the Korean financial institution calculated without regard to global criteria.

Thirdly, after accession into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Korea made efforts to fulfil global standards in the public area. In terms of the PFM, there were new dynamics brought about by international changes to public financial management (Guthrie, 2005). The reforms of the PFM in developed countries have five different characteristics: financial reporting systems, private sector oriented management, evaluation of performance, integration of finance and accounting, and reviews of the public sector (Guthrie et al., 1999). In this global circumstance, the MOSF needed to conduct the PFM reform through an electronic budget and accounting system due to insufficient and questionable information on the revenue expenditures, which all public institutions submitted. Despite poor performances and unnecessary budgets for past projects in public organisations, for instance, they requested both the same amount of previous budget and additional budget for new policies due to a lack of control by the MOSF.

Finally, the former president, Roh Moo-hyun, placed a great emphasis on electronic government (e-government) with thirty-one detailed projects including the D-Brain to encourage civil participation in public policies. The Roh government had three main objectives: Ensuring the availability of public information to citizens, obtaining suggestions from citizen and developing faster communication within public institutions (Ministry of Public Administration and Security, MOPAS, 2007). Moreover, the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, which had a central role in the e-government, examined the progress of e-government projects, reporting to president Roh frequently. Under this strong presidential will, the MOSF and relevant financial institutions could pay great attention to the introduction of the D-Brain, spending a huge amount of revenue, over 77 billion won.

The functions of the D-Brain in the PFM process

Through the meeting of all financial institutions in 2014, the government decided to introduce a new financial system, the D-Brain, as the PFM reform. The PFM, however, has a large range of aspects such as the law, institutions, systems, and effective, efficient, and transparent expenditure (Allen et al., 2013). In a study investigating the PFM, Andrews et al. (2014) simplify a typical PFM system into four steps: first, the government formulates a strategic budget based on socio-economic context; second, a legislative body approve the budget; third, the government executes it with resource management systems and internal control processes; and fourth, independent bodies evaluate annual financial activities. From this perspective, the PFM process of the D-Brain will be focused on the conceptual framework as explained above and manage how governments can regulate public resources (both revenue and expenditure) to affect economy and society effectively with short-, mid-, and long-term strategies.

The D-Brain aimed to establish an infrastructure that can support the reform of the PFM. Firstly, the D-Brain strengthens information delivery from all public organisations to the MOSF to make mid-term financial strategies (Kim et al., 2007). In previous the PFM system, relevant projects in each public agency had the risk of being overlapped due to a lack of information exchange within public institutions. In particular, only central administrative agencies became objects of the PFM process by the MOSF. Through the introduction of the D-Brain, however, the MOSF reconstructed budget structures clearly, linking between grouped projects and financial resources systematically on the basis of budget proposals involving municipalities and public enterprises (Hwang, 2010). For example, when the MOSF tries to spend more national revenues for education as a mid-term strategy, the MOSF will be able to find all education projects of public institutions with linked national resources and past performances.

In addition, through the function of collecting sufficient information, the new budget and accounting system facilitated budget transparency. The budget transparency, a prerequisite for sound fiscal policy, improves the efficiency and effectiveness of the PFM through the pressures on a government for better budget planning by the private sector (Koh et al, 2004). The MOSF collected all public financial indicators and statistics through the D-Brain, while they released financial data on its website to enhance civic participation in budget decisions (MOSF, 2017). As a result of the transparency function, Korea was ranked 19th of 102 countries in the world as a country providing substantial information in the Open Budget Index 2015 (International Budget Partnership, 2016).

Secondly, there was a transformation in accounting methods, from single-entry bookkeeping to double-entry bookkeeping. The previous accounting method recorded only revenues and expenditure under the cash basis, while the new one extended the recorded information to connected assets and debts under the accrual basis. Through double-entry and accrual accounting, the MOSF aims to not only improve the reliability of generated information but also anticipate realistic mid- and long-term financial risks (Kim et al., 2007). In the budget execution of the PFM process, moreover, the new accounting method enhances the ‘internal control and audit’ process because financial officials in public organisations should input all information with official documents of the e-government system into the D-Brain, which can systematically prevent inaccuracy or omission of financial information in public accounts.

The final function of the new system is ‘performance budgeting’, defined as “public sector funding mechanisms which use formal performance information to link funding to results (outputs and/or outcomes), with the aim of improving performance” (Robinson, page 237). The MOSF evaluates public expenditures, using all the information regarding a project in the D-Brain such as objects, processes, executed national resource, and outcomes, which public institutions inputted into the system (Hwang, 2010). Furthermore, although public agencies can execute only a small amount of a project budget in contrast with its proposal, it can affect next year’s budget through an assessment of the MOSF. As a result of performance budgeting, the government try to not only execute their budget for its purpose but also improve the outcomes of their projects to secure more budgets for the following year.

Causes of success in the reform of the PFM

The Korean government played a leading role in the reform of the PFM due to diverse pressures of the reform as discussed above. However, they had no experience regarding this PFM reform even though Korean financial bureaucracy has a high ability to implement their financial policies. For example, the MOSF has changed the Framework Act on National Taxes over 70 times to match socio-economic contexts in Korea since this law was enacted in 1974, while the PFM structure was maintained at a low level. Among the members of the OECD, moreover, Korea was a late reformer of the PFM, while other OECD countries generally started to reform in the 1980s (Wanna, 2010). Therefore, the MOSF decided to request the World Bank share their experiences on introductions of the latest PFM structure and the electronic budget system (Kim et al., 2007).

In the process of the PFM reform, governments in developing countries faced four main challenges: a low level of capacity in public institutions; weak finance ministries; the appointing of unqualified people as chiefs of public organisations; and insufficient human resources and information systems (Allen, 2009). Although many donors supported the PFM reform in these countries, there are significant contextual differences between underdeveloped and developed countries regarding selected PFM tools and adaptation of local conditions (Wescott et al., 2009). In fact, a study by Schiavo-Campo (2007) found that post-colonial countries, which had an efficient budget system, experienced a decline in the authority of financial institutions, technical skills and the capacity of the PFM due to a lack of strong political will and a strong donor presence.

Compared with these challenges in low- and middle-income countries, in Korea, president Roh laid great emphasis on the introduction of the D-Brian, which was one national core business out of thirty-one in the Roh regime. Various stakeholders of the PFM reform cooperated with the MOSF since the president had the power to affect all areas through appointing the chiefs of all public institution. In fact, financial officials in the MOSF launched a task force team called Budget and Accounting Reinvention Office (BARO), which consisted of experts from all financial institutions, professors of economics, and technical experts. Furthermore, the MOSF played a central role in the reform, coordinating the process of budgeting and accounting with other public institutions. Due to the importance of economic growth in Korea, a chief of the MOSF is appointed as the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, which has the legal authority to control and manage all public organisations in connection with economic policies.

Another factor of success in the reform is that the MOSF had both sufficient information over a long period and an understanding of socio-economic contexts in Korea. In order to develop the D-Brain, the government implemented a private sector technique, ‘Business Process Reengineering’ (BPR), defined as “the implementation of deliberate and fundamental change in business processes to achieve breakthrough improvements in performance” (Grover, 1995, page 111). At the beginning of the BPR, the Korean governments had to analyse all processes of the PFM such as working structures within the governments, flows of information and national resources, and the fragmented tasks of all public institutions at a specific time, criticising past performances on the basis of a large amount of financial information (Dodaro and Crwley, 1997). In fact, the public financial institutions including National Tax Service, Bank of Korea, and Statistic Korea have collected and analysed all economic indicators for the last five decades. In addition to valuable information, the experts in BARO were qualified to implement the BPR of the D-Brain due to their understanding of financial processes with vast experience in the financial sector.

Conclusion

This paper set out to investigate the introduction of the D-Brain in the PFM. Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this paper, it is now possible to state clearly through the findings in each section. The findings clearly indicate that the MOSF introduced the D-Brain under the high pressures of internal elements such as the expansion of fiscal scale and presidential will, and external factors such as the IMF bailout programme and international context. Although Korea was a late reformer of the PFM among member countries of the OECD, there were strong merits for the reform. The research has shown that the MOSF organised the BARO as a task force team which was consisted of qualified experts from public financial institutions, the economics field, and the private sectors. Moreover, the members of the BARO had a great deal of experience and knowledge of the PFM gained through long-term public financial information, which public financial institutions collected.

The second aim of this study was to investigate the effects of the D-Brain in the PFM. On the basis of the understanding of the problem in the PFM, the MOSF reformed three main issues. On the one hand, the finance ministry enhanced collection of sufficient information, which facilitated not only the formulation of mid- and long- term fiscal policy but also evaluation of the performance of public projects. On the other, the MOSF transformed from the basic accounting method of single-entry bookkeeping, to the complicated accounting method of double-entry bookkeeping, in order to develop the accurate financial risk management necessary for sound fiscal policy. In particular, the key functions, sufficient information and the evaluation of the performance, have a great impact on transparency, efficiency, and anti-corruption.

The scope of this paper was limited to the main functions and positive outcomes of the D-Brain. Although the system has a diverse impact on the public sector such as state property management, we only focus on the impact of the PFM process. Moreover, this research does not evaluate the other public institutions’ aspects of the reform even though we can expect that they also underwent many changes in the policy-making process.

References

Allen, R. (2009). The challenge of reforming budgetary institutions in developing countries (No. 9-96). International Monetary Fund.

Allen, R., Hemming, R., & Potter, B. (Eds.). (2013). The international handbook of public financial management. Springer.

Andrews, M., Cangiano, M., Cole, N., de Renzio, P., Krause, P., and Seligmann, R. (2014). This is PFM. CID Working Paper no. 285.

Bird, R. M., & Zolt, E. M. (2008). Technology and taxation in developing countries: from hand to mouse. National Tax Journal, 791-821.

Dodaro, G. L., and Crwley, B. (1997). Business process reengineering assessment guide. United States General Accounting Office-Accounting and Information management Division, 3rd Version.

Dohyung, K. (1999). IMF bailout and financial and corporate restructuring in the Republic of Korea. The Developing Economies, 37(4), 460-513.

Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S. and Tinkler, J. (2006). New public management is dead—long live digital-era governance. Journal of public administration research and theory, 16(3), pp.467-494.

Grover, V., Jeong, S. R., Kettinger, W. J., and Teng, J. T. (1995). The implementation of business process reengineering. Journal of Management Information Systems, 12(1), 109-144.

Guthrie, J. (2005). International public financial management reform: progress, contradictions, and challenges. IAP.

Guthrie, J., Olson, O., and Humphrey, C. (1999). Debating developments in new public financial management: the limits of global theorising and some new ways forward. Financial Accountability & Management, 15(3‐4), 209-228.

Hwang, H. (2010). [Evaluation of Korea’s Integrated Financial Information System (dBrain)] in Korean. Research Report of Korea Institute of Public Administration, 20.

International Budget Partnership. (2015). The Open Budget Survey 2015. Available from: http://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBS2015-Report-English.pdf (Accessed: 21 May 2017)

Kim, D. (1998). [IMF bail-out programme for one year] in Korean. Yonhapnews, 2 December. Available from: http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=101&oid=
001&aid=0004354478 (Accessed: 20 May 2017)

Kim, D., Dorotinsky, W., Sarrf, Feridoun., and Schick, A. (2007). Paths toward successful introduction of program budgeting in Korea. From Line-item to Program Budgeting: Global Lessons and the Korean Case. Korea Institute of Public Finance. 23-134.

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제5장 치안한류 확산방안

제1절 정책적 측면

Ⅰ. 경찰청을 포함한 범정부 차원의 국제개발협력 중장기 전략 수립

주요 공여국에서는 SDGs 16 관련 치안 분야 국제개발협력이 중요한 비중을 차지하고 있고 전체 SDGs 또는 국제개발협력 중장기 전략 등에 이러한 내용을 포함하고 있다. 특히 일부 국가에서는 치안 분야만을 특별히 한정하여 매년 단기 계획 및 중장기 비전들을 밝히고 있다.  특히 영국의 경우 주변국과 동맹국의 치안 안정은 자국의 이익에 밀접한 관련을 가지고 있는 중요한 요인으로 판단하고 가장 우선되는 목표로 수립하는 등 이에 대한 관심이 크다.

이와 달리 한국의 경우 공적개발원조를 주요 업무로 수행하는 일부 기관들과 총리실 산하 국제개발협력 위원회를 중심으로 전반적인 국제개발협력 사업들에 대한 계획을 수립하고 있으나, 치안 분야에 대한 비중이 적고 해당 분야만을 다루고 있는 구체적인 계획도 미흡하다. 특히 전체 공공행정분야의 사업 중 대부분 전자정부 등 행정서비스 개선과 공무원 역량강화에 치중하고 있어 실제로 평화와 사법 정의 등과 관련한 사업의 비중이 낮은 편이다.

이에 따라 경찰청 뿐만 아니라 주요 공적개발원조를 주관하는 기관들과 국방부, 검찰청, 법무부 등 관련 기관을 망라하는 범정부 차원의 치안분야 중장기 전략을 수립할 필요가 있다.

Ⅱ. 명확한 목표를 설정

치안한류 사업에 대한 내용을 살펴보면, 해당 사업을 통해 교민 보호와 경찰기관 간 네트워크 구성의 효과를 강조하고 있다. 실제로 공적개발원조의 관점에서 보면 인도주의적 관점에서 경제적, 정치적 목적이 아닌 순수한 인류애 차원의 정의 구현에 초점을 맞추고 있는 국가들도 있지만, 문화 인류학적 관점에서 정치적 우호국을 구축하고 구식민지와의 연계 강화를 위한 목적을 가지고 있는 국가들도 많다. 또한, 자원이 풍부한 개발도상국의 분쟁의 경우에는 해당 자원의 확보를 위해 적극적으로 평화 구축에 앞장 서는 경우도 있다.

이와 같이 대부분의 선진국은 치안 분야 평화, 정의, 인권 등의 프로그램을 통해 공여국이 얻고자 하는 목표를 명확히 설정하고, 이에 따라 중요 대상국들을 선정하고 있다. 영국의 경우에는 자국의 이익을 우선하는 원칙하에 불법이민 등의 문제를 일으킬 수 있는 주변국, 영연방 등 주요 동맹국 그리고 자국민이 많이 살고 있는 국가들의 분쟁에 우선적이고 광범위하게 개입하고 있다.

따라서 치안사업에 대한 요청이 들어온 국가들을 대상으로 해당 사업만을 분석하여 프로그램을 운영하는 것이 아니라 주도적으로 목표와 어느 관점에서 공적개발원조 예산을 운용할 것인지 설정한 후 이러한 기준에 따라 선제적으로 공적개발원조 프로그램들을 운영해 나가는 것이 필요하다.

제2절 예산적 측면

Ⅰ. 별도 기금의 운영

현재 공적개발원조 예산은 예산 심의 전에 국제개발협력 위원회를 통해 개별 사업에 대한 심의를 거치고 이후 기재부를 통한 심의를 실시하고 있다. 하지만 이러한 예산 배정 과정은 개발 사업의 분석에 치우쳐 종합적이고 중장기적인 치안 안정을 위한 사업을 수행하기에는 한계점이 있다.

영국, 스웨덴의 경우 각 부처별로 필요한 예산들을 모아 하나의 기금을 운영하고 이 기금에 맞춰 UN 기부금을 비롯하여 전 세계 분쟁국가들을 대상으로 다양한 프로그램을 운영하고 있다. 이에 따라 중장기 전략에 따라 기금의 총액을 선정하고 그 이후 분쟁국가 별로 개입 필요성, 대상 국가의 중요성, 효과성 및 효율성 등을 고려하여 사업 예산을 배정할 수 있다.

실제 치안 분야는 단순히 경찰기관의 역량강화만을 의미하는 것이 아니라 내전 등 분쟁의 단계에서는 군사적 개입이나 훈련 또는 장비의 지원 등을 수행하고, 정치적 안정과 치안 간의 관련성, 거버넌스와 치안 간의 연관성 등으로 단순히 경찰 뿐만 아니라 정부 전반적인 거버넌스 향상, 정치적 안정성과 각 기관들의 역량 강화 등이 복잡하게 얽혀서 진행하게 된다.

이에 따라, 한국의 경우에도 영국 CSSF와 같은 치안 분야의 별도 기금을 구성하고 관련 있는 부처들과 민간 전문가까지 포함하는 범정부 차원의 조직 운영과 예산 관리가 필요하다. 또한 효과적인 예산 운영을 위해 외부 조직에 이에 대한 모니터링을 실시하도록 함으로서 투명성과 책무성도 강화할 필요가 있다.

Ⅱ. 국민의 안전을 위한 예산 확보

한국의 경우 갑작스러운 정세의 불안, 내전 발발 뿐만 아니라 천재지변과 위기 발생 시 자국민을 안전하게 대피시키거나 보호하기 위한 체계적인 대응 시스템이 미흡한 상황이다. 물론 예비비를 통해 예산을 집행할 수 있지만 주요 선진국의 경우 이러한 위급상황에서 자국민을 안전하게 보호하기 위한 별도 예산들을 확보하고 이를 위한 조직들을 훈련시키고 필요한 장비들을 구비하고 있다.

외교부에서는 사전에 여행객들을 위한 경고나 위험에 대한 통보를 실시하고 있지만 최근 지진이나 화산 폭발 같은 기상이변도 잦은 만큼 경찰청과 국방부를 중심으로 긴급하게 국민의 안전을 보호할 수 있는 예산을 배정하고 체계적인 시스템을 구축해둘 필요가 있다.

제3절 조직적 측면

Ⅰ. 범정부 및 민간 전문가 차원의 별도 조직 구성

현재 치안 분야 공적개발원조 사업은 각 부처별로 별도의 전담팀을 구성하거나 국제협력팀의 여러 업무 중 부차적인 업무 수준에서 조직이 운영되고 있는 경우가 많다. 또한 이러한 부처 간의 사업을 지속적으로 연계시켜 줄 수 있는 체계도 부재하여 개별 사업에만 치중할 수 밖에 없는 구조이다.

영국의 경우 내전이나 테러조직과의 전쟁에 군사적 개입을 하는 경우 이러한 중장기간 현장에서 활동한 군사 전문가들이 습득한 정보와 경험들을 관련 기관들과 공유하고 있다. 특히 군사적 활동이 종료되고 평화 구축과 거버넌스 구축 등의 과정에서 이러한 전문가들의 조언과 실질적인 지원활동들은 사업 기획단계부터 운영까지 가장 중요한 요소로 인정받고 있다.

이에 따라, 한국의 경우에도 특정 기관에서 특정 국가를 대상으로 사업을 수행하면서 습득한 지식과 정보, 경험 등이 대상 국가를 대상으로 다른 사업을 수행하는 기관과 공유할 수 있다면 보다 효과적이고 효율적인 사업 수행이 가능할 것이다. 특히 치안 분야의 공적개발원조의 경우 분쟁 종식 후 정치적 안정, 국가 거버넌스 강화, 공공기관 역량강화, 지방정부 역량강화 등 일정한 프로세스를 가지고 있고, 사전 프로세스에 참여한 기관과 전문가들과 지속적으로 정보를 공유하고 조언을 받음으로서 중장기적 관점에서 지속개발 가능한 사업 운영이 가능할 것이다.

뿐만 아니라, 공공기관 중심이 아니라 민간 분야의 전문가도 광범위한 인력풀을 구성하여 필요한 때에 즉시 투입하고 활용할 수 있는 체계 마련도 필요하다. 사업이나 개인적인 목적으로 수원국에 오래동안 체류했거나 경찰 사법기관과의 인적 네트워크가 있는 경우 혹은 퇴직자 등 민간 부분에서도 다양한 전문가가 필요하다. 특히 IT와 관련해서는 해당 분야의 전문가를 함께 투입하여 필요한 조언들을 받고 계획 단계에서 보다 실질적인 기획이 가능하게 될 것이다.

Ⅱ. 개발학적 전문성 강화

현재 한국에서도 개발학을 전공으로 하는 대학과 대학원이 점차 늘어나고 있으나, 개발학의 오랜 역사를 가진 미국, 유럽 등 주요 선진국과 비교하면 양적인 측면이나 질적인 측면에서 부족한 부분이 많다. 또한 주요 선진국들은 UN 등 국제기구에서 근무한 경험을 바탕으로 치안 분야 국제개발협력 사업을 수행하는 경우가 많은데 한국의 경우 실질적으로 국제기구에 취업하고 근무할 수 있는 대상자가 적은 편이다.

문제는 치안 분야의 국제협력사업은 단순히 한국에서 사용하고 있는 우수한 시스템을 그대로 copy and paste 하는 방식으로 이루어져서는 안된다는 것이다. 이미 많은 국제기구와 공여국들이 자신들이 사용하고 있는 좋은 제도, 시스템, 기자재를 제공함으로서 그들과 같은 수준의 개선 효과들을 기대했었지만 해당 국가에 대한 깊이 있는 개발학적 입장의 분석이 없었던 대부분의 프로그램들은 예산만 낭비한 채 실질적인 효과를 거두지 못한 경우가 대부분이다.

한국의 공공행정 분야의 공적개발원조 사업들의 경우에도 대부분 전자정부를 중심으로 하는 사업들이고 한국의 전자정부 시스템의 우수성이 널리 인정받고 있으나, 그 나라의 정치, 문화적 요소를 비롯하여 IT 기반의 인프라, 해당 기관의 조직문화, 부패와 비효율성, 취약계층의 IT 접근성, 지속가능성 등을 고려하지 않는 경우 대부분 실패로 끝날 가능성이 높다.

이에 따라 개발학적 전문성과 치안 분야의 필요한 전문지식, 경험, 역량을 가진 전문가들을 육성하는 시스템이 필요하다. 또한 국제기구 등에서 활동할 수 있는 기회를 확대하여 실제 주요 공여국과 국제기구에서는 어떠한 방식으로 이러한 치안사업을 수행하고 있는 지 보고 배울 수 있는 기회를 제공할 필요가 있다.