

중장기 남북회담 체계 연구

2018년 8월

통 일 부
강 유 진

결과보고서 요약서

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훈련국	미국	훈련기간	2017.8.16.~201 8.8.15
훈련기관	남가주대학교 (University of S o u t h e r n California)	보고서 매수	100매
훈련과제	증장기 남북회담 체계 연구		
보고서 제목	증장기 남북회담 체계 연구		
내용 요약	<p>남북회담은 대북정책 추진에 있어 가장 중요한 정책 수단 중 하나이다. 본 연구는 과거 남북회담 분석을 통해 향후 남북회담 체계에 대한 정책 제언을 하고자 한다.</p> <p>먼저, Putnam의 협상이론인 Two Level Game Theory를 통해 지난 10년간의 정치·군사회담을 분석해 보았다. Putnam은 그의 이론을 통해 국내 정치 지형과 여론이 국가의 대외 협상에 미치는 영향을 연구하였다. Putnam은 winset이라는 개념을 통해 국제협상은 그 결과를 국내에서 때로는 법제화를 거쳐 이행해야 하기 때문에, 협상 단계에서부터 국</p>		

내에서 비준 가능한 범위 내에서 합의하게 된다고 주장하였다. 그는 winset의 크기를 결정짓는 요소로 국제협상에서 협상 대표의 전략, 국내에서 협상 주제에 대해 형성되어있는 선호와 연합(preferences and coalitions), 그리고 국내 정치 체제의 특성을 제시하였다. 이 연구는 지난 남북회담을 분석하기 위해 이 이론을 현실에 대입하였다. 분석대상은 2008년부터 2016년사이에 있었던 10회의 정치·군사 회담이다. 동 10회의 정치·군사 회담을 대상으로 Putnam이 제시했던 국제협상(Level 1)에서의 협상 대표의 전략, 국내(Level 2)에서의 여론 지형을 분석하여 각각 이를 X축, Y축으로 하는 그래프에 분포시켰다. 이를 협상의 성패와 교차 비교하여 본 결과, 지난 9년간의 남북회담에서는 국내의 여론 지형보다 협상장에서 협상대표의 전략이 더 유효했던 것을 알 수 있었다.

본 연구는 이 이론과 과거 남북회담에 대한 분석을 바탕으로 현재의 회담 상황을 진단하고 나아가 향후 남북회담 체계에 대한 제언을 담았다. 현재 남북회담 상황은 격변하고 있다. 작년까지 핵실험과 미사일 발사로 정세를 극한까지 긴장시켰던 북한은 올해 우리 정부의 평창 올림픽 초청을 계기로 남북관계 발전과 핵문제 해결을 위한 대화에 호응해 나오고 있다. 남북회담과 밀접한 관계를 맺고 있는 북미관계도 마찬가지로 작년까지 북미 정상간 'word war' 수준의 기싸움을 뒤로하고 우리 정부의 중재에 힘입어 올해 6월 최초의 북미 정상회담을 하기에 이르렀다.

이러한 상황은 앞서 과거 회담에 대한 분석 결과와 같은 선에서 분석해 볼 수 있다. 평창 올림픽에 북한을 초대하던 올해 초에는 국내 여론 지형이 북한

과 남북관계 개선에 우호적이라고는 할 수 없었으나, 우리 정부의 적극적인 추진으로 두 번의 정상회담 등을 통해 중요한 합의를 이끌어낼 수 있었기 때문이다. 미국의 상황도 이러한 면에서는 우리와 크게 다르지 않다. 트럼프 대통령의 대화 정책 추진이 국내 여론 지형의 지지를 바탕으로 한 것은 아니었기 때문이다. 트럼프 대통령은 공화당 출신이나 정치 경력이 매우 짧아 당내 지지가 공고하다고 할 수 없으며, 공화당은 기본적으로 대북 강경정책을 주장해왔다. 상대당인 민주당은 기본적으로 대화와 협상을 위한 문제해결을 주장하고 있으나, 지난 30여년간 북한과의 협상과 합의가 실패하여 북한에 대한 불신이 쌓여있으며, 문제 해결에 매우 회의적이다. 올해 초에는 트럼프 대통령에 대한 국민들의 지지도도 낮은 수준이었기 때문에 당시 상황에 비해 급진적인 정책 전환이 국내 여론 지형의 지지를 기반으로 했다고 볼 수는 없다. 그러나 남북미 정부가 강력한 의지를 가지고 상황을 주도해왔다. 그 결과 정상회담이 열리고 이를 통해 북핵 문제 해결과 남북관계 발전에 합의하게 되는 등의 가시적인 성과를 올릴 수 있었다.

북핵문제 해결과 남북관계 발전이 급물살을 타고 있는 현재, 우리 정부로서는 이러한 흐름을 안정적이고 지속적으로 관리해 나감과 동시에 급속도로 이루어진 합의를 충실히 이행해 나가기 위해 만전을 기해야 할 것이다.

미래를 대비하기 위해 과거를 되짚어볼 필요가 있다는 점에서 과거 합의 이행 경과를 리뷰해 보았다. 과거 제1차 북핵위기 이후 북미간 제네바 합의와 제2차 북핵위기 이후 6자회담을 통한 9.19 공동성명이 북핵문제 해결에 전격 합의하고도 이후 이행과

정에 여러 암초를 만났다. 1차 북핵 위기 이후 미북은 제네바 합의에 전격 합의하여 북한은 당시 핵프로그램과 핵시설을 폐기하는 댓가로 중유와 경수로 발전소 지원을 약속받았다. 그러나 합의 직후 고난의 행군으로 북한이 체제 존립 위기에 처하게 되었고, 이를 바라보았던 미국을 위시한 주변국들은 합의의 안정성을 의심할 수 밖에 없는 상황이었다. 또한 미국도 제네바합의를 타결했던 민주당 클린턴 행정부에서 공화당 부시 행정부로 바뀌면서 북한을 '악의 축'으로 바라보고 협상보다는 제재를 통한 북한 변화를 모색하게 되었다. 이러한 상황에서 제네바 합의는 이행이 순조로울 수 없었다. 이행 스케줄은 연기에 연기를 거듭했고, 그 과정에서 합의 당사자간 신뢰가 크게 손상되었다. 결국 2002년 제 2차 북핵 위기로 이어지게 되었다. 2002년 북핵위기 이후 6자회담을 통해 2005년 9.19 공동성명이 탄생했다. 북한이 핵무기와 핵프로그램을 포기하는 댓가로 여러 경제적 지원을 받는다는 내용이었고, 경수로 발전소와 장차 평화협정까지 폭넓게 수록된 합의서였다. 그러나 합의 몇일 뒤에 BDA 사건이 터지면서 합의 이행이 초반부터 지연되었고, 이후 동결과 불능화 합의와 이행을 거쳤지만 이미 신뢰가 손상될대로 손상된 상황에서 안정적인 이행을 담보하기는 힘들었다. 6자회담은 2008년 이후 중단되었고, 그간 북한은 6차에 걸친 핵실험을 진행하면서 핵능력을 고도화하였다. 이제 북한은 플루토늄 뿐만 아니라 우라늄 핵프로그램도 보유하고 있다. 우라늄의 경우 플루토늄과는 달리 시설과 핵물질에 절대적으로 한정되는 것이 아니라 향후 핵폐기시 기술적인 검증에는 한계가 있을 수 밖에 없다.

남북관계에도 70년대부터 600회가 넘는 회담이 있

었고 200개가 넘는 합의서가 체결되었다. 2000년대부터 본격적으로 발전한 남북관계는 2007년에 이르러 정치, 군사, 경제, 사회문화, 인도 등 전분야에 걸쳐 폭넓게 발전하였으나 2008년 이후 핵문제 악화와 남북관계 신뢰 손상으로 소강기를 맞이하였다. 이후 남북은 9여년간의 군사 대결 시대를 보냈다. 2007년 이전에 체결되었던 많은 합의들이 제대로 지켜지지 않았고, 군사적 충돌이 거듭되면서 북한은 공공연하게 합의 파기를 선언하기도 하였다.

남북관계와 미북관계의 역사를 돌이켜 보면 건설적인 합의가 없었던 것이 아니라, 안정적인 이행이 없었다. 그러므로 남북관계와 미북관계가 급속도로 가까워지고 한반도의 운명을 가를 수 있는 중요한 합의가 이루어지고 있는 지금, 향후 이 합의들이 제대로 이행될 수 있는지 짚어보고 안정적으로 이행될 수 있도록 대비하는 것이 중요하다.

Putnam의 이론은 이러한 면에서 향후 남북회담 추진체계에 합의를 가질 수 있다. 먼저 북핵문제 해결과 남북관계 발전이라는 주제에 대해 우리나라와 미국내의 winset을 분석해 보았다. Level 1의 경우 남북미 모두 최고 지도자를 위시한 권력의 핵심 당사자들이 협상에 임하고 있기 때문에 Level 1의 winset은 따로 분석할 필요가 없는 상황이다. 남북미 모두 Level 1의 winset은 매우 크다고 할 수 있다. 이 연구에서는 Level 2 preferences and coalitions를 분석해 보았다. Level 2의 경우 당장은 국내 여론 지형이 급박한 국제정세 변화에 미치는 영향이 제한적인 것으로 볼 수 있다. Level 1의 협상대표들과 그들을 파견한 정부가 즉각적이고 결정적인 영향을 미친다. 이 연구의 앞부분 결과에서 나타나듯이 협상의 경우 Level 2의 winset이 작더

라도 Level 2의 winset이 충분히 크면 Level 1이 Level 2에 영향을 미쳐 합의가 성사되었다. 그러나 과거 사례를 보면 합의의 비준과 이행과정에서 국내 여론 지형이 미치는 영향이 매우 컸다. 합의의 비준과 이행과정은 즉각적인 합의와는 달리 장기간에 걸쳐 일어나는데 이 경우 Level 1과 Level 2의 영향력은 일방적이지 않다. 국내에서 합의 이행에 반대하는 목소리가 커지거나, 합의를 체결한 행정부가 선거에 의해 반대 의견을 가진 행정부로 교체되는 것 등을 보면 알 수 있다. 이러한 점에서 이에 대한 분석을 통해 향후 남북회담 추진 및 이행 환경을 진단해 볼 필요가 있다.

우리나라의 경우 대북정책에 대한 지지도가 높은 점으로 미루어 보아 이행환경이 비교적 안정적이라고 볼 수 있다. 그러나 적대적인 대북관을 가진 여론층이 공고하게 존재하고 있는 점, 예측불가능한 북한의 행보로 자칫 여론이 반전될 수 있다는 위험요소가 있다. 미국의 경우 우리나라에 비해 행정부나 대북정책에 대한 지지도가 안정적이지 않은 상황이다. 중간선거와 여론 흐름을 계속 주시할 필요가 있다. 정상들간 합의에 대해서도 아직은 이행에 대해 회의적인 시각이 많은 바, 앞으로 합의를 차근차근 이행해 나가는 모습을 보여주면서 여론 주도층을 안심시키고 현재의 대화정책에 호응을 이끌어낼 필요가 있는 것으로 보인다.

앞으로의 남북회담과 북미회담은 최근 정상들간의 선언적인 합의를 구체적으로 이행해나가는 정책수단이 될 것이다. 빈번한 대화를 통해 국가간 신뢰를 쌓아 나갈 필요가 있다. 빈번한 대화를 통해 개별 회담의 무게를 덜어내고, 회담 대표간 허심탄회한 대화를 통해 상호 이해를 높이고 신뢰를 증진 할 수

	<p>있을 것이다. 이를 통해 합의의 안정적인 이행을 담보해 나가야 한다. 합의가 이행되어가는 모습을 보면서 과거 합의 파기의 불행한 역사 때문에 현재와 미래의 대화에도 회의적인 시각을 가지고 있는 국내와 미국내 여론층의 신뢰를 얻어내는 작업이 이루어져야 할 것이다.</p>
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차 례

1. 훈련 개요
 - 1) 국외 훈련 개요
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2. 훈련 결과보고서

2. 훈련 개요

1) 국외 훈련 개요

1. 훈련국 : 미국
2. 훈련기관명 : 남가주 대학교 (University of Southern California)
3. 훈련분야 :
4. 훈련기간 : 2017.8.16.~ 2018.8.15

2) 훈련기관 개요

1. 기관 정보

○ 주소 및 연락처

- 행정대학원 주소: 650 Childs Way, Los Angeles, CA 90089
- 행정대학원 MPA Program Administrator: Muranaka June, 1-213-740-0529, jmuranak@usc.edu
- 국제학생 사무실 주소 :Office of International Services (OIS), 649 W 34th St, Los Angeles, CA 90089, 213-740-2666

○ 인터넷 웹주소

- 남가주 대학교: <https://www.usc.edu/>
- Sol Price 행정대학원: <https://priceschool.usc.edu/>

2. 기관 소개

○ 남가주 대학교

- 남가주 대학교(University of Southern California)는 1880년에 설립된 사립 대학교로 LA 다운타운 중심부에 위치하고 있다. 전 임교원수 3,200명, 학생수는 대학 약 1만 7000명, 대학원 1만 8000여명으로 대형 종합대학교이다. 2018년 미국 전체 대학 순위는 21위를 기록하였으며(usnews), 수업료는 2017-18년 기준 \$54,259이다.
- 문리과 대학은 30개 학과, 20여개의 연구소와 교육기관으로 구성되어 있으며, 120개의 전공·부전공 과정을 제공한다. 그 외에 회계 대학, 건축대학, 영화예술대학 등 전문대학 17개 학부와 대학원 과정을 제공하고 있다. 경영, 의학, 법학, 공학, 예술 등 전 분야에서 두루 강점을 가진 학교이다.

- 미국내에서 외국인 학생의 비중이 가장 높은 대학 중 하나로 특히 공과대 등에서는 과별로 90퍼센트가 외국인인 경우도 있다.
- 한국 유학생은 700여명으로 현지의 한인 2세 등을 포함하면 전체 한국 학생의 수는 많은 편이다. 학교 북쪽에 도산 안차호 선생이 살던 생가가 보존되어 있다. 현재는 한국학 연구소로 사용중이다.

○ 행정대학원

- USC Sol Price School of Public Policy는 90여년의 역사를 가지고 있으며, LA downtown과 California 주정부가 위치한 Sacramento에 각각 캠퍼스를 가지고 있다.
- 2018년 U.S.News의 미국 전역 대학 Public Affaris Ranking에서 2위를 기록하였다. 구체적으로 Urban Policy는 1위, Health Policy는 3위, Public management and leadership은 4위, Local government management는 4위, Public policy는 6위, National Security and International relations 부문에서는 3위를 차지했다.
- Sol Price에는 Public Administration 외에도 Nonprofit Leadership and Management, Public Policy Data Science, Global Public Policy, Urban Planning 등 다양한 공공정책 과정이 있다. 그중 가장 중심적인 것이 MPA(Master of Public Administration)이다.

○ MPA 과정

- 본 과정은 Statistics와 Undergraduate Social Sciences Courses 14학점을 이수해야 지원이 가능하다. 2년동안 총 41학점을 이수하게 되며, 필수 과목은 Public Administration and Society, Economics for Policy, Planning, and Development, Human Behavior in Public Organizations, Internship Seminar, Intersectoral Leadership 등이 있다.

3. 훈련 결과 보고서

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1. Introduction

Inter-Korean relations faced a sharp transition in 2008 with the launch of Lee Myung Bak government. Conservative party took power in 10 years based on reflection on engagement policy to North Korea, so called 'Sunshine policy', for previous ten years. Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye government targeted the sincere attitude change of North Korea, and thought Inter-Korean Talks must contribute to the change of the North. Otherwise, Inter-Korean Talks were considered not helpful to development of Inter-Korean relations.

In conclusion, the number of meetings between Two Koreas sharply decreased. 25.1 Inter-Korean Talks were held in annual average from 1998 to 2007, but from 2008 to 2017, the number decreased to 5.8. There are controversies over Lee and Park government's North Korean policy. Hasty decisions must be avoided on long-term policy. However, it is meaningful to analyze last decade's Inter-Korean talks at this point. First, in cooling-off period, the flow of talks is different from the period when the conversation is active. Second, South Korea had went through political change recently, and North Korea policy changed accordingly.

Personally, I started my career at the Special Office of Inter-Korean Dialogue in 2009, and spend most of my time in the departments that related Inter-Korean Talks directly or indirectly. Working for the Special Office of Inter-Korean Dialogue, I have realized that my team must negotiate not only with North Korean officials in the meeting, but also with people in South Korea including related ministries, press, and congress. When South Korean government involves in

Inter-Korean talks, they do not deal with North Korean government, but also concern South Korean public. South Korean delegation team to the talks must have domestic situation in mind when they are faced with North Koreans. Moreover, the delegation tends to feel much more pressure than other international negotiation.

This is originated by unique operating system of Inter-Korean talks. In Inter-Korean talks, the contents of the talks are reported to headquarter of Seoul and Pyongyang in real time and every general meeting is live-broadcasted to each headquarter. Even worse, the detailed meeting schedule, the outline and the mood are disclosed to the media every day during several days of talks. In this situation, the pressure felt by delegation is enormous. Some say that representatives can do nothing but as an actor not as a negotiator. In this regards, domestic situation has a huge impact in Inter-Korean talks.

Understanding complexity about the relation between domestic situation and Inter-Korean talks is crucial not only to draw an agreement but also to implement the agreement successfully. In these reasons, the study about the dynamics of domestic politics and Inter-Korean talks is needed. This study examines the reality of Inter-Korean talks based on Robert Putnam's Two-Level Game theory.

The purpose of research is to improve the understanding on political and military Inter-Korean talks of past decade. Many factors affected Inter-Korean talks. Based on Putnam's theory, this study will categorize the factors and find out interaction among them. First, this study will analyze the South Korean winsets of each meeting. Winsets are the possible range of compromise and determine the success of negotiations. According to Putnam, the determinants of winsets

are level 1 negotiator' s strategy and level 2 preferences and coalitions. This study will then analyze how the level 1 and level 2 winsets affected the success and failure of the talks.

Based on this analysis, we can find that which factors are more influential than others are. This study also will draw implications of Inter-Korean talks in political and military fields since 2008, and make proposals for improving Inter-Korean talks in the future.

2. Two-Level game theory by Robert Putnam

This study will take a closer look at Robert Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory and its developments. Putnam published his thesis 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics - The Logic of Two-Level Game' in 1988. According to Wikipedia, this theory views "international negotiations between states as consisting of simultaneous negotiations at both the domestic level and the international level" .

Level 1 - international level - refers to the negotiation table between the representatives. Their agreement is usually tentative, needing for domestic ratification. In addition, he presumes the chief negotiator as an individual who has no independent policy preference, but "seeks simply to achieve an agreement that will be attractive to his constituents" . (Putnam, 1988)

Level 2 - domestic level - is the stage of discussion among domestic groups about whether to ratify the agreement. Through the domestic negotiations, the chief negotiator can be informed and he/she accepts the domestic situations and sometimes builds coalitions with them. With those domestic concerns, the chief negotiator tries to make an agreement that is in the range of the possible 'wins' in his domestic 'win-set'.

"Winsets are the possible outcomes that are likely to be accepted by the domestic interest groups who either must ratify the agreement or provide some other form of government backing." (Putnam, 1988) International agreements can be achieved when the negotiators share the each domestic winsets in the international negotiations.

After Putnam published the thesis, there have been

numerous studies to develop the theory. Many researchers have suggested strategies that can enlarge the opponent's winset, and shrink mine to maximize my interest.

Putnam says that the size of the winset is very important in the negotiation. The first reason is that larger winsets make Level I agreement more likely. And the second reason why winset size is important is that the compared size of the Level II winsets will affect the result of the international bargain.

"The larger the perceived winset of a negotiator, the more he can be pushed around by the opponent. Conversely, a small domestic winset can be a bargaining advantage." (Putnam, 1988)

Putnam suggested three factors that affect winset size. They are the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level 2 constituents, Level 2 political institutions, and Level 1 negotiator's strategies.

First, the distribution of power, preference, and possible coalition among constituents is important. For example, if the congress supposed to ratify the result of the negotiation, the position of major party, the possibility of coalition among parties, and preferences of each party affects the process of ratification. In addition, the interest group and public sentiments of civil society can also influence on the ratification. Putnam compares between homogeneous and heterogeneous topics. If the result of the negotiation affects people homogenously, there would be minimal conflict among people. However, if there were winners and losers according to the negotiation result, the conflict would be serious.

Second, the size of winset rely on the political institution. The ratification process is complicated and takes time in

democratic system. However, in the authoritarian government, political leader can push on the ratification. In some authoritarian countries, the result could not disclose to the public. In addition, unofficial ratification including political and cultural acknowledgement is also important in some counties.

Third, negotiator's strategy determines the size of the winset as well. The negotiator could make an effort to draw consensus among people by compensating the domestic loss due to the international agreement. Whereas, the negotiator can serve his/her own interest of belief. If the negotiator personally believe that certain agreement is needed for the sake of his/her country, he/she would use the discretionary power to the maximum to achieve it.

Although this well-known negotiation theory effectively examine the mixture of factors that affect international negotiation, there are also limitations on this theory.

First, Putnam's theory may oversimplify the negotiation process. Chun(2002) well pointed out that South Korea is facing multi-level game on North Korean issue. However, it seems that Chun did not deny the value of theory itself. He rather used the basic concept and diverted it into "multi-level game". The theory has oversimplification issue actually. However, it also has potential power of the expandability.

Second, Schoppa(1993) pointed out that Putnam's theory is "underdeveloped", because the theory dose not inform about the practical strategy on particular instances. Putnam himself admit that there can be various strategy based on his theory and just exempld some. This theory is definitely not about ready-made tactics for negotiator. Therefore, we cannot undervalue this theory for the practical reasons.

Lastly, many scholars have been questioning on the role of the chief negotiator. Putnam considers the chief negotiator as an agent with no personal preference. However, Koo(2013) argues that the chief negotiator's autonomy plays important role in negotiation. The powerful chief negotiator can enlarge the Level 2 winset. Furthermore, Jacobson(1996) pointed out that the chief negotiator is the product of domestic politics. He argues that there is no two level at all, but only one level of domestic politics that deal with both domestic and international issue at the same time.

These critics helped this study to have deeper look on this theory. Based on the various aspect of the theory and it is clear that Two-Level game theory has its integrity. Among the various literature, this study took Koo's point of view to elaborate the assumption.

Above all, this theory is a useful frame to see the reality of Inter-Korean talks. First, each factors that affects Inter-Korean talks can be identified. We can pick out the influential factors in the complicated environment of Inter-Korean talks. Second, we can compare the influential power of each factor to negotiation by measuring the size of the winset.

Other Studies who worked on Putnam's theory in Inter-Korean relations

Many studies used this theory to analyze specific negotiation cases in reality. Especially many of them studied Inter-Korean relations. Although the South and North both admit that reunification is needed, there are extreme

differences in methodology since they have different political and economic system and social atmosphere. Negotiators of two Koreas have struggled to make consensus in this hostile environment.

About this reality of Two Koreas, many researchers have suggested interesting opinions. Kim(2010), Chun(2002) applied Putnam's theory into the reality of Korean Peninsula. Kim analyzed the progress of six party talks through this theory and Chun explained The South, The North and U.S.'s position with this theory.

Interestingly, Chun explains the three actor are facing different arena of game. The North is playing one-level game, U.S. is two-level, and The South is facing multi-level game. North Korea only concern negotiation strategy itself, because domestic disagreement is negligible. U.S. has to concern negotiation strategy and domestic politics at the same time. However, South Korea has to face with many countries related including U.S. and North Korea and has to deal with domestic politics also. Kim(2011) and Park(2016) applied Putnam's theory into specific cases. Kim(2011) explains the progress the second summit meeting in 2007, and Park(2016) analyzes Mt. Geumgang Tourism Project with the theory.

Meanwhile, many researches do not advert Putnam's theory directly, but include the factors of Two-Level Game Theory. Studies by Yoon and Gu(2013), Cha(2012), Yee(2014), and Kim(2007) are about the relationship between domestic politics of the South and Inter-Korean talks(or relationships). These researches also give implications to this study.

In addition, Koo(2013) applied Putnam's theory into the

FTA negotiation between South Korea and United States. He compared negotiations in 2000s with those in 1990s and pointed out that strengthened chief negotiators' autonomy, combined with their free-trade ideas as well as with their own institutional interest, made the domestic constituency's winset as perceived by chief negotiators larger than Putnam's two-level game analysis would have predicted. His research gave much implication to this study because there are similar cases in Inter-Korean talks.

There are two major differences between the precedent studies and this one.

First, compared to this study, the precedent studies applied the theory too broadly or too narrowly. Chun(2002) and Ahn(1997) used Putnam's theory as one among many negotiation theories they applied to Korean peninsula. Therefore, they just mention some special features based on the theory. On the other hand, Kim(2011) and Park(2016) explained just one single talks or cooperative business with the theory. Koo(2013) and Kim(2010)'s study is similar to mine in terms of the range, but the research field was different.

Second, most of the studies are about the situation before 2008. The South and the North were in active conversation in the early years of 1990 and 2000s. Therefore, the studies about Inter-Korean Talks are concentrated to these periods. After 2008, the Two Koreas' relationship was getting worse, and Two Koreas could not hold talks frequently as before. However, since 10 years have passed from 2008, we need to look at this period. Moreover, it is necessary to see the relationship between domestic politics and Inter-Korean talks because the cooling-off season itself was caused by the domestic situation of Two Koreas.

Regarding the actual situation of Inter-Korean talks since 2008; this study refers to the memoirs of President Lee Myung Bak and white papers published by the Special office for Inter-Korean dialoue of the Ministry of Unification. The booklet 'Inter-Korean Dialogue' published by the Ministry of Unification described not only the background of the talks but also the some contents of the talks between the North and South Korean delegates, which helped to grasp the actual atmosphere of the talks. However, About the President Lee Myung Bak's memoirs, the Government of the Republic of Korea has not officially recognized its full contents. Therefore, this study considers the memoirs to be one of among countable scenarios rather than a solid fact.

3. Analytical Framework

This research will analyze political and military Inter-Korean Talks from 2008 to 2017 based on Two-Level Game theory. This study chose to analyze political and military field of Inter-Korean Talks. Since it is too wide to study all of them for decade, and political and military talks drive other part in the Inter-Korean relations. Political and military talks come forth and lead other issue, so it will be good for us to see overall Inter-Korean relations.

There were ten talks in this field for last ten years, and this study got the basic data of each talks from Special Office for Inter-Korean Dialogue website and white papers published by Ministry of Unification. About domestic situation of the South and the North, this study referred weekly and monthly report on North Korea provided by Ministry of Unification and press releases.

This research takes a form of case study design. This study uses multiple cases and embeds case study method. At first, this study analyzed the Putnam's two level game theory thoroughly. With detailed content of the theory, the critics were introduced as well. In addition, this study talked about the meaning of the theory in the context of Inter-Korean talks. Putnam's theory was modified so it can fit well in the Inter-Korean talks.

Robert Putnam suggested three determinants of winset - level 1 negotiation strategies, level 2 preferences and coalition, and level 2 institutions.

1) Level 1 negotiation strategies

The concept of level 1 negotiation strategies was modified as level 1 autonomy. This study will focus on the chief negotiator's bargaining power. Actually, Putnam said that it is 'Level 1 negotiator's strategies' that affects winset size and he presumed the chief negotiator as "has no independent policy preferences, but seeks simply to achieve an agreement that will be attractive to his constituents." However, Putnam himself admitted that it is simplification for clear logic of theory.

Though Putnam presume the chief negotiators as passive reflector of domestic situation, it is natural and realistic that each chief negotiator has different bargaining power and preferences as well as negotiation tactics. Putnam also says that the chief negotiator considers side payment of his own and his political standing in domestic society. However, in the field of political and military Inter-Korean talks, representatives cannot get any economic benefits from the result. Of course, he/she could gain some level of public awareness of political benefits concerning people's interest on Inter-Korean talks domestically and internationally. However, with the same reason, there is a certain limit to seek the chief negotiator's own interest as an individual in this field.

In this study, the chief negotiators are considered to have certain power to lead the talks and persuade domestic people.

'Negotiator's autonomy' was set as determinant of winset, and the autonomy is determined by the rank of the chief negotiator, negotiation skill of the chief negotiator, and comparison value of the chief negotiator's ability and agenda difficulty.

Higher the rank is more bargaining power he/she has. We should note that unofficial rank is as important as official one. The distance to the highest power - the president - is important. Therefore, special envoy and officials of Blue House are more powerful than others are.

In addition, negotiation skill of the chief negotiator cannot be ignored in negotiation. There have been representatives who made consensus eventually with clear logic, improvisation and persistence. Therefore, negotiation skill must be considered in negotiator' s autonomy.

Lastly, comparison value of the chief negotiator' s ability and agenda difficulty is important to determine autonomy of the chief negotiator. If top rank negotiator dealt with easy agenda such as holding next meeting, it would be easy to lead the negotiation. However, low rank negotiator dealt with difficult agenda such as Cheonan sinking, it would be very hard to lead the conversation.

2) Level 2 preferences and coalition

Level 2 preferences and coalition were thoroughly analyzed by main agendas of each talks. In order to do that, this study classified talks by major agenda, followed the course of discussion about the agenda and find a position of each talks in the stream. Furthermore, the positions and the situations of the South and the North were concerned respectively. Therefore, winset of level 2 represents not the possibility of ratification, but acceptance by government, parliament, press, and ordinary people. It can be not clear to tell 'the acceptance' , but we can tell the public sentiments about main agendas in

Inter-Korean relations as time went by.

Putnam suggested three criteria that can analyze level 2 preference and coalitions. First, the characteristic of the issue, in other words, whether it is homogeneous issue or heterogeneous issue. Second, the degree of politicization of the issue in the country. Third, the trade-offs across different issue.

The issues related to Inter-Korean relations are fractional because of the duality of the Inter-Korean relations. Public sentiments are extremely divided on each case, and there is little room for compromise. In addition, the Inter-Korean problem is much politicized in South Korea. Unification is an important task that determines the fate of the nation. In addition, almost all politicians want to get public attention in relation to North Korean issues. Finally, the trade-offs between issues is often seen in past Inter-Korean talks. However, the conservative government has given each agenda its own value and meaning, making it difficult to trade off issues.

This study examined Level 2 preferences and coalitions on each agendas considering Putnam's theory. Four main agenda suggested that dealt with in the Political and Military Inter-Korean talks for last decade: North Korea's military provocations, Calumny and Slander to each other, Mt. Geumgang Tourism Project, and Preparation for main talks

3) Level 2 institution

Level 2 institution is important determinant also but it is a fixed variable in Inter-Korean talks. Putnam says that

ratification procedure and state autonomy from domestic pressure are two main factors to tell political institution of the country. This study analyzed political institutions of two Koreas. It appeared that though two Koreas have different political system, they have not changed for decades so their influence have not dramatically changed on each talks. Therefore, this study set Level 2 institution as a fixed variable in this study.


4) Graph design for comparative analysis

Putnam says these three determinants can increase or decrease the size of winset. For the convenience of the analysis, this study assumed that each of determinants also have winsets - kind of sub winsets - that affects the winset of negotiation. If the size of sub winset is large, it makes the winset size larger too. And it would be easy to make consensus in the international negotiation because the winset - the range of compromising - is large. In contrast, if the size of 'sub winset' is small, it makes the winset size smaller. Accordingly, it is difficult to make consensus in the negotiation.

In order to do the clear comparative analysis, the graph was introduced with the size of winset of level 1 as the x-axis and the size of winset of level 2 as the y-axis. Level 1 winset is about the chief negotiator's autonomy. If the chief negotiator has great autonomy, the Level 1 winset size is large, and vice versa. Level 2 winset is based on the preferences and coalition of level 2. If the agenda is homogeneous issue and less politicized, the level two winset is large. In contrast, if the agenda is heterogeneous issue and highly politicized, the level 2 winset is small. This study assumed level 2 institution as a fixed variable, so it is not

counted into this graph.

< Concept >



Considering each characteristics of meetings, each meetings were place on a graph. Based on the graph, each quadrant and each talks can be analyzed. In this process, this study could find common point among talks as well as different points. Furthermore, this study classified talks by consensus success and failure cases and analyze success and failure factors of each talks. To do this, this study look into strategy of the South and the North. Based on each case studies, this study drew cross case conclusion and developed policy implications.

To achieve the validity of research, this study tried to

follow several principles: to use multiple source of evidence, to maintain the chain of evidence and to create a case study database.

4. Analysis on Inter-Korean Talks

1) Inter-Korean talks Overview

2008~2012: Working level military talks on North Korean provocation

Outline

Date	Name	The Chief negotiator	Agenda
2008.10.2	The 37th Working level Military Talks	South: Lee Sang-chul (Colonel, MND) North : Park Lim-soo (Senior colonel, KPA)	Calumny and Slander (leaflets by South Korean NGOs)
2010.9.30	The 38th Working level Military Talks	South: Moon Sang-kyun (Colonel, MND) North: Ri, Sun-kwon (Senior colonel, KPA)	North Korea's military provocation (The sinking of the Cheonan)
2011.2.8-9	The 39th Working level Military Talks	South: Moon Sang-kyun (Colonel, MND) North: Ri, Sun-kwon (Senior colonel, KPA)	North Korea's military provocation (The sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeng Island)

Source: Ministry of Unification (South-North Dialogue in Korea No. 74 and No. 75)

During this period, Inter-Korean talks was held 4.2 times in average in a year, sharply reduced from the 34.2 times

annually in 2003–2007. During this period, North Korea had expressed a strong resentment to the North Korea policy by the Lee Myung Bak government. Accordingly, Inter–Korean relations had been crushed right after the angulation Lee Myung Bak. In addition, North Korea repeated the large and small military provocations throughout the Lee Myung Bak administration and these made the Inter–Korean relationship uneasy.

On March 29, 2008, the North Korean government unilaterally called off all Inter–Korean talks. Accordingly, the Inter–Korean talks that had continued until February 2008 could not be in progress any more. In July 2008, the Inter–Korean relations became more dismal after the shooting incident on Mt. Geumgang.

South Korea demanded to take thorough investigation on incident and measures to prevent recurrence, but North Korea refused. Rather, North Korea blamed the South and demanded an apology the next day. The tourism was suspended. However, blaming the South, the North expelled South Korean personnel in the Mt. Geumgang.

In September, North Korea criticized the South on South Korean civic group' s scattering of leaflets into the North. In this regard, the 37th Working– level Military Talks was held on October 2, 2008. The North focused on rebelling on the scattering of leaflets by civic organization. The North demanded an apology from the South.

Moreover, North Korea declared on November 12, 2008 that they would restrict the pass through the Military Demarcation Line from December 1, and closed the Panmunjeom Liaison Office.

In 2009, North Korea took hard position continuously. North Korea declares that it will enter into a confrontation with North Korea on Jan. 17, and on March 30, detained Korean workers who worked in Kaesong Industrial Complex. After North Korea launched a missile on April 5 and a second nuclear test on May 25, Inter-Korean relations got darker. However, the Inter-Korean talks for the repatriation of South Korean internees were held and the detainees were repatriated on Aug.13. On August 21, the tensions between South and North Korea were eased by avis it by a senior North Korean delegation to former president Kim Dae Jung's demise.

According to the President Lee Myung Bak's autobiography, a channel for private negotiations between South and North Korea was opened on the visit of this delegation. In the second half of 2009, The Red Cross talks on August and October, the reunion of separated families, and working-level meeting regarding the Imjin River flood control issue were held. At the end of 2009, the South provided with the H1N1 pandemic to the North, and the Inter-Korean talks on the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Geumgang tourism were continued until early 2010.

However, as the Cheonan sinking incident occurred on March 26, 2010, the South-North relationship rapidly cooled down. After Cheonan sinking which led to the deaths of 46 South Korean soldiers were revealed to be done by North Korea, the South Korean government urged the North to take responsible measures. In addition, the South announced 5.24 measures including suspension of Inter-Korean trade. However, the North denied the results of our investigation.

The North declared a cut off all Inter-Korean talks. In

August of this year, after the South Korean government announced its urgent support for the North Korean floods, talks between South and North Red Cross were resumed and continued until October, but on November 23 North Korea again raided the South Korean territory of Yeonpyeong Island. Inter-Korean talks were stopped once again.

In early 2011, out of sudden, North Korea suggested to hold Inter-Korean talks. North Korea proposed to discuss various agendas in various fields at the same time. The South Korean government made it clear that it should resolve the nuclear issue and the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents first, and proposed to hold talks for these matters. The working level military talks for solving the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong problems were held on February 8, but were dismissed unanimously. After that, academic-level Inter-Korean contact has continued.

In June of this year, North Korea disclosed that there were confidential meetings between the two Koreas to resolve the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong issue and blamed the South Korean government for failing to do so. North Korea's unilateral disclosure of confidential contact has irreparably damaged North-South trust. By the end of 2012, intermittent private level Inter-Korean exchanges had repeatedly stopped and gone, but no official Inter-Korean talks were held.

Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, and Kim Jong Un succeeded to the North Korean regime. In 2012, North Korea continued its belligerent attitude by unilaterally destroying the 2.29 agreement with the United States and continuing the missile launch experiment.

2013~2014: High-levels talks to restore relationship

Outline

Date	Name	The Chief negotiator	Agenda
2013.6.9-10	Working level meeting for Inter-Korean Authorities Talks	South: Chun, Hae-sung (Assistant minister, MOU) North: Kim, Sung-hye (Senior Official of the Secretariat of the CPRF)	Preparation for the ministerial level talks
2014.2.10, 12	High-level Meeting	South: Kim Kyou-hyun (First Deputy Director, National Security Office) North: Won Dong-yeon (Deputy Director, united Front Department)	Calumny and Slander Reunion of Separated Families
2014.10.4	High-level talks in Incheon Asian Games	South: Kim Kwan-jin (Director of the National Security Office) North: Hwang Pyong-seo (Director of the General Politics Bureau of the KPA)	North Delegation visited Incheon Asian Game Agreed to hold the 2 nd High-level meeting
2014.10.15	Military Authorities Meeting	South: Yoo Jeh-seung (Assistant Minister, MND) North: Kim Yong-chol (Director, General Reconnaissance Bureau)	North Korea's military provocations (NLL Invasion)

Source: Ministry of Unification (South-North Dialogue in Korea No. 76 and No. 77)

In February 2013, President Park Geun Hye began her term. At first, it was difficult to talk with North Korea. North Korea had escalated tension on the Korean Peninsula

conducting a third nuclear test on February 12, 2013. The North disconnected the Inter-Korean hotline in March. Following this, the North suspended the operation of the Gaesung Industrial Complex withdrawing North Korean workers on April 8. As a result, all of the Inter-Korean communication channels were shutdown.

However, the two Koreas tried to resume talks and to improve their relations. The South government suggested Inter-Korean authorities' talks for the normalization of the Gaesung Industrial Complex consistently. In reply, North Korea responded to South Korea's proposal for Inter-Korean authorities' talks on June 6.

The two Koreas held working-level meetings for Inter-Korean authorities' talks, and achieved an agreement to hold Inter-Korean authorities' talks on June 12-13 in Seoul. However, two Koreas failed to make a consensus on the rank of the head of delegation. Therefore, the Inter-Korean authorities' talks was called off.

After the breakdown of the Inter-Korean authorities' talks, South Korean government continued to try to resume Gaesung Industrial Complex and succeeded. South Korea proposed Inter-Korean working-level authorities' talks for Gaesung Industrial Complex considering bad conditions for tenant companies in the Gaesung Industrial Complex. Accordingly, the first Inter-Korean working-level talks for the Gaesung Industrial Complex were held. After six more rounds of talks with a view to restarting the Gaesung Industrial Complex, The Agreement on the Normalization of the Gaesung Industrial Complex was adopted on August 14. This agreement prevented further suspension of the Gaesung Industrial Complex by North Korea, and promoted the Gaesung Industrial Complex as an

international industrial complex. At the same time, the South suggested Red Cross talks to hold the reunion of the separated families, but this attempt was failed.

From August to September, Red Cross talks for the reunion of separated families and talks for the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism were promoted. The two Koreas agreed to hold a family reunion event through Red Cross talks, but failed to hold a planned reunion family reunion, as they did not agree on the date of the talks for resuming tourism on the Mt. Geumgang.

In early 2014, the two Koreas once again tried to promote Inter-Korean relations through holding the reunion of separated families. First, the Red Cross talks were held. High-level meeting was then held on February 12 and 14 for more comprehensive consultations including suspension of the calumny and slander to each other. In the high-level meeting, the Blue House personnel in the South and the defense committee members in the North, who can directly convey the opinions of the top leaders of both sides, participated. In this talks, the two Koreas agreed not to slander each other and to promote the reunion for separated families as planned.

Immediately after the Inter-Korean high-level meeting, however, North Korea heightened military tension by firing ballistic missiles. Moreover, the North criticized the South, claiming that statements by the president and other government officials were a “violation of the agreement on the cessation of slander.” South Korea expressed displeasure and urged the North to stop criticizing the president and government of the South.

In spite of the threatening atmosphere between the two

Koreas, Inter-Korean talks went on. The Kaesong Subcommittee was held in March and Inter-Korean talks was held in July to discuss the North Korean athletes' participation in the Incheon Asian Games. On August 11, South Korean government proposed second High-level talks to the North.

On October 3, a day before the closing ceremony of the Incheon Asian Games, the North said that they would send High-level delegation to Incheon to the closing ceremony. The delegations were Hwang Pyong-so, the Director of the General Politics Bureau of the Korea People's Army (KPA), and Choe Ryong-hae and Kim Yang-gon, both Secretaries of the Workers' Party. The South accepted their offer, soon October 4, Inter-Korean High-Level Talks on the occasion of the Incheon Asian Games took place. The two sides agreed to hold the Second Inter-Korean High-Level Meeting that the South had proposed.

However, on October 7, North Korea provoked the South by violating the Northern Limit Line. Then, the Inter-Korean Military Authorities' Meeting were held to discuss the issue, but it broke up without agreement. Two Koreas talked about this issue in Military Authorities' Meeting on October 15th, but failed to make consensus. The North demanded to stop spreading anti-DPRK leaflets continuously and the South argued that the leaflets were from NGOs and were nothing to do with the government. Two Koreas could not hold talks but argued about the leaflets.

2015–2016: Brief success of high–level authorities’ meeting

Outline

Date	Name	The Chief negotiator	Agenda
2015.8.23–24	Inter–Korean High–level Authorities’ Meeting	South: Kim Kwan–jin (Director of the National Security Office) North: Hwang Pyong–seo (Director of the General Politics Bureau of the KPA)	North Korea’s military provocation (Landmine explosion in DMZ) Calumny and Slander (Loud speaker broadcasting in DMZ)
2015.11.26	Working–Level Meeting for the Inter–Korean Vice–Ministerial Level Talks	South: Kim Ki–woong (Assistant Minister, MOU) North: Hwang Chol (Senior Official of the Secretariat of the CPRF)	Preparation for the vice–ministerial level talks
2015.12.11–12	The 1 st Inter–Korean Vice–Ministerial Level Talks	South: Hwang Boo–gi (Vice Minister of MOU) North: Jon Jong–su (Deputy Director, Secretariat of the CPRF)	Mt. Keunmgang Tourism, Reunion of the separated families

Source: Ministry of Unification (South–North Dialogue in Korea No. 77)

In the first half of 2015, two Koreas continued to argue in a harsh atmosphere. The North repeated their requirements including to stop ROK–US military exercises and to prohibit the dissemination of anti–DPRK leaflets to the South. The

North argued that these were a prerequisite for improving Inter-Korean relations and Inter-Korean talks. South Korea urged the North to respond to its proposal that it enter into South-North talks. In July, the Sixth South-North Joint Committee Meeting for the GIC was held.

However, the meeting ended without agreement due to the difference in positions between the two parties. However, South-North relations faced dramatic change on August. Amidst military tensions heightened by North Korea's wooden-box land mine provocation on August 4 and its firing on loudspeakers on August 20, North Korea urgently proposed an Inter-Korean meeting. From August 22 to 24, an Inter-Korean High-Level Authorities' meeting was held. During the talks, the North explicitly expressed regret about its landmine provocation, and the two parties agreed to activate Inter-Korean talks and non-governmental exchanges.

In the second half of 2015, the two Koreas undertook to implement the agreement reached at the Inter-Korean High-Level Authorities' Meeting. From September 7 to 8, an Inter-Korean Red Cross working-level meeting was held, resulting in both sides' agreement to hold a reunion for separated families on Chuseok. From October 20 to 26, the reunion took place at Mt. Geumgang.

On November 26, at the working-level meeting preparing for Inter-Korean Authorities' Talks, the South and North agreed to have the First Inter-Korean Authorities' Talks, at which the chief delegate of each side would be a vice-ministerial level official. At the First Inter-Korean Authorities' Talks held in Gaeseong from December 11 to 12, the South and North exchanged opinions on pending issues about Inter-Korean relations, such as the resolution of the

issue of separated families. However, the North insisted that the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism should be a prerequisite for further discussion, and the meeting ended without agreement.

On January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test. Since then, all of the Inter-Korean talks were suspended, and two Koreas continued confrontation during the Park Geun Hye administration. South government criticized North Korea's nuclear test. In addition, as part of sanctions against North Korea's nuclear development, on February 10, South government closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Against this measure, North Korea declared to disconnect communication channels between South and North Korea on February 11. The South continued to urge North Korea to suspend its nuclear development and the North had demanded the South to change its policy toward the North. North Korea conducted another nuclear test on September 9, raising concerns of the South and the international community. In the South, corruption scandal of the president and people who are close to the president had been revealed.

President Park Geun Hye 's office was suspended from December 2016 and imposed impeachment on March 2017. North Korea's nuclear tests and the political situation of South Korea including president' s impeachment and early president election did not create an environment to promote Inter-Korean talks.

2) Inter-Korean talks Operating system

The inter-Korean talks are very formal in every way. The

two Korea's relationship have a dual nature of being a military counterpart and a companion moving toward unification together at the same time. For this reason, North and South Korea always have a certain degree of tension. In such a situation, it is very important to minimize unexpected happenings and unnecessary misunderstandings. Inter-Korean relations should be taken step by step as if they were walking on a cheek board. Therefore, it is important to make sure that distractions besides negotiation agenda do not mislead the talks. In the case of the South, important matters in the operation of the talks are stipulated in the Act on the Development of Inter-Korean Relations.

Preliminaries

Inter-Korean talks is held when the two sides agree to hold the meeting at the previous meeting, or when one party suggests to have certain meeting and receives a favorable response from the other party.

After agreeing to hold the talks, the two Korea's will advance consultations on matters for holding the talks. In some cases, separate preliminary talks are held for this purpose. In the case of simple talks, consultations are conducted through inter-Korean liaison office at Panmunjom. At the preliminary consultation stage, negotiation will be held on the date, schedule, agenda and attendance. In some cases, negotiations at this stage may take a long time, and if pre-consultations fail, talks may be discontinued. The two Korea's endeavor to ensure that the talks are held smoothly without unnecessary misunderstandings. Of course, the two Korea's make an effort to hold talks in their own favorable circumstances from the pre-consultation stage.

In addition to prior consultations, the two Koreas set each goals for the current talks and formulate strategies to achieve them. The decision making process of the North is unknown. In the case of the South, the negotiation strategy is established through consultation among related ministries that are charging of agenda of current talks. In this process, the South Korean government receives expert advice and reflects public opinion through media.

Another important point at this stage is to appoint the representative of the talks. The delegate of the talks shall be appointed in accordance with the Act on the Development of Inter-Korean Relations.¹⁾

1) Development of the inter-Korean Relations Act

Article 15 (Appointment, etc. of Representatives of South-North Korean Summit)

(1) The representatives of the South-North Korean summit, who participate in negotiations or summits with North Korea concerning important matters or who have the authority to sign or initial important South-North Korean agreements, shall be recommended by the Minister of Unification, in consultation with the heads of the relevant agencies, and shall be appointed by the President via the Prime Minister.

(2) The Minister of Unification shall be the representative of the South-North Korean summit, in attending negotiations or summits with North Korea and signing or initialing South-North Korean agreements.

(3) The representatives of South-North Korean summits shall be appointed by the Minister of Unification, excluding cases falling under paragraphs (1) and (2)

(4) Special envoys to North Korea shall be appointed by the President.

(5) When two or more representatives of South-North Korean summit or special envoys to North Korea are appointed, they

Once the negotiation goals and strategies have been established and representatives are appointed, the representatives make effort to be well-acquainted with them and practice to communicate clearly.

The process of setting up a negotiation strategy and practicing the remarks of representatives is the most important process for win the negotiation. Each party anticipates what kind of position opponent will have in the talks and try to figure out the right response. The two sides proceed with this process very carefully to be successful in the talks.

Progress of Talks

The inter-Korean negotiations begin by confirming the position of the other party through the general meeting. At the first plenary session, the North and South release keynote speeches. Through the keynote speech, the South and the North can understand how the other party is embracing the current situation, and what opinions they have in particular about the agenda of the talks. Since the keynote speech is an official document that has been prepared by each government, it has a much bigger weight than the representative's remarks of the negotiating table. The usual keynote speech is filled with rituals, but it is important to look beyond the ritual to penetrate the other party's heart. In order to make a full-scale

shall be ranked and a senior representative of South-North Korean summit or a senior envoy to North Korea shall be nominated.

(6) Other necessary matters concerning the appointment of the representatives of the South-North Korean summit or special envoys to North Korea, etc. shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

bargaining, it is necessary to determine what the other party wants from the talks and how far the other party can make concessions.

In the first plenary session, representatives announce each position through the keynote speech, confirm the position of the other party, and add a brief stance on the other party's keynote speech. It is a simple and ritual meeting, but there are cases where this meeting does not go well. For example, there can be a case that one party declares that it is unable to continue the conversation unless the other party cancels the certain statement in the keynote speech. Since the keynote speech is an official document through careful consultation within the government, it is impossible to modify some of the contents on the spot. Representatives know this very well. We can assume the reason why the other party makes an unreasonable demand. It may be to suppress the opponent's initiative, or to strongly express their position rather than agenda negotiation at this meeting.

After the whole meeting is over smoothly, a chief representative meeting and a representative meeting are followed. The chief delegations usually conduct full-scale bargaining. In this session, the chief representatives persuade with the other party or accept the other's depending on the judgment of the severity of the matter. Sometimes the third opinion is agreed upon. In addition to bargaining, the chief delegates will also discuss issues that are important to the progress of the talks. If the talks continue too long, they can decide that the meeting to be terminated and they can meet again in the near future.

The representative meeting usually takes place after the bargaining is done to some extent in the chief representative

meeting. In general, the chief delegate has the highest rank, and the other delegates are lower than the chief delegate. Based on the agreements of the chief delegates, representatives make concrete agreements. The inter-Korean agreement is an important milestone in shaping inter-Korean relations in the future. It is also important to clearly express what they have agreed to and to minimize any room for controversy in the future.

Once the agreement is complete, a general meeting is held to confirm the agreement officially. If necessary, this meeting may have the signing ceremony of the chief representative.

In addition, there can be events such as reception, luncheon, dinner, or a brief visit to the memorable places for goodwill among the delegation. These events can help the delegations of both sides to understand each other and reach a satisfactory agreement. In addition, the inter-Korean talks are held in the interest of all the residents of North and South Korea. Looking at the peaceful representation of the delegates, the residents of the two Koreas can accept the other side from the heart and have a positive view of unification.

Post-work after Talks

When the talks are over, the delegations return to their countries and explain the results to the people. In the case of the South, the delegation reports to the President and the National Assembly and conducts media briefing. North Korea also reports on the results of the talks through major media. The briefing included an evaluation of the talks and an interpretation of the agreement. It is also important to look closely at how the other party reports on the outcome of the

talks.

In addition, the agreement is officially certified according to national laws. In the case of the South, the concerning matters are specified in the development of inter-Korean relations act. Article 21 of the Act specifies the Conclusion or Ratification of South-North Korean Agreements.²⁾ If necessary, the Presidential Assistance or Parliamentary approval process are pursued according to law. In addition, two Koreas carry out the agreed contents and prepare for the next meeting, if any.

3) Winsets analysis for each talks

Level 1: Chief negotiator' s autonomy

2) Development of the inter-Korean Relations Act

Article 21 (Conclusion or Ratification of South-North Korean Agreements)

(1) The President shall conclude and ratify South-North Korean agreements, and the Minister of Unification shall assist the President in performing his/her duties related thereto.

(2) The President shall undergo deliberation by the State Council, before ratifying each South-North Korean agreement.

(3) The National Assembly shall have a right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of South-North Korean agreements which place heavy financial burdens on the State or nationals, or South-North Korean agreements concerning legislative matters.

(4) South-North Korean agreements, which determine simple technical or procedural matters concerning the implementation of South-North Korean agreements already concluded or ratified by the President, may take effect only with the signatures of the representatives of the South-North Korean summit or special envoys to North Korea.

As for the chief delegates, it is necessary to analyze their rank first. In the past nine years, there were 10 political military talks. Among them, two talks were the minister level, two were the vice minister level, three were assistance secretary level, and three was the sectional chief level. Usually, in the South Korean government, above vice minister level is called “High-level” , and below vice minister level is called “working level” .


As expected, the higher the level of the chief delegate, the easier the consensus was drawn. In particular, the Chief Security Officer Kim Kwan-jin, who served as chief delegate to the 2014 and 2015 talks, was in fact a most powerful authority among ministers in his position as the chief of the ROK's foreign and security policy.

In terms of bargaining power, the chief delegates were public officials who were recognized for their highest expertise in their field. Most of the chief representatives were Inter-Korean relations experts who have been engaged in Inter-Korean talks for a long time, and there were experts in defense and international negotiations. All of them were good bureaucrats, but the negotiation with North Korea was unique, so the delegates who attend the Inter-Korean negotiations for the first time in his life would have to face with an unfamiliar environment.

In the case of military talks, all the talks were a working-level meeting, but the agenda was very difficult to solve, including the Cheonan incident and the NLL issue. In comparison, the high-level talks between South and North Korea during the closing ceremony of the Incheon Asian Games were a kind of good will talks among top-ranking officials. It can be easily guessed that talks and consultation were smooth

at this meeting.

Level 1 winset size comparison



Level 2: preferences and coalitions

Level 2 preferences and coalitions vary among agendas. Here are four main agendas that were on the Political and Military Inter-Korean talks from the year of 2008 to 2017.

(North Korea's military provocation)

Since the military provocation of North Korea has been frequent for the past nine years, Inter-Korean talks have also addressed this issue. These include the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong events, DMZ landmine incidents, and NLL involvement.

The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong events occurred in March and November 2010, respectively. North Korea attacked South Korean territory and territorial waters, causing 50 deaths, including soldiers and civilians. Naturally, the South Korean government wanted to address this issue first before discussing other agendas. South Korea continued to urge North Korea to take responsible measures, including punishment of those responsible.

North Korea's attack on our territory and territorial waters caused a massive casualty and shocked both at home and abroad, because it was the first territory attack since the Korean War. Of course, the people of the South were very angry and thought that the North must take reasonable measures. Some people questioned the Cheonan incident, but in the case of Yeonpyeong Island, people saw the attacking situation on air. The South Korean people were very surprised by the militancy of North Korea, and became very negative about North Korea. Many people got to recognize North Korea as an enemy, not a friend who goes to unification together.

In October 2014, North Korean troops invaded the NLL and received warnings from our troops. In fact, the NLL invasion of the North Korean army was not usual. However, North Korea proposed to the South to hold talks to discuss the case. The offer for the talks was rather surprising. North Korea seems to have wanted to discuss the NLL issue in some way. The NLL problem has been a longstanding problem between the two Koreas and has been discussed in the Inter-Korean talks for more than 30 years. The NLL is an issue that cannot be easily compromised because it is boundary issue.

The NLL problem prompts immediate opposition from conservatives of the South. Some argue that, given the complex

historical background of the NLL, it must be acknowledged that it is a problem to be resolved in the course of unification. Although, it is true that the boundary issue is very sensitive.

In August 2015, two South Korean soldiers were seriously wounded by North Korea's mines buried in the DMZ. The people who were angry with the past military provocation of North Korea were angrier with this incident. Nearly all the people condemned North Korea 's actions, and soldiers put off their discharges until the case was resolved and defended the front line. It is presumed that the North Korean government, which constantly monitors the South's public sentiment through the media, would be upset by the anger of the South Koreans.

In the past, there have been several provocations of North Korea's armed forces. Military clashes in the NLL have killed soldiers and North Korea have sent spies to South Korea. Depending on the case, North Korea expressed regret to the South, but it used to use ambiguous expressions and mainly through informal channel.

However, Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye government wanted North Korea to recognize its own fault and to apologize properly. This problem requires political commitment and corresponds of the highest leader level. It is over the authority of the working level talks.

In fact, according to Lee Myung Bak's autobiography, the special envoy of president for the Cheonan has conducted a secret meeting to resolve the issue. Unfortunately, the talks broke down. In the period of President Park Geun Hye, High-level authorities meeting was held in 2015. At this meeting, two Koreas reached the agreement to solve the DMZ provocation problem. At this meeting, the top officials in the

field of diplomacy and security in North and South Korea met. North Korea expressed regret over the DMZ provocation here. At the time, the South Korean media interpreted the result that the South Korean government had reached a consensus by giving up some of its stance.

(Calumny and Slander to each other)

Historically, North Korea reacted sensitively to the comments about its regime and supreme leader. This is because the maintenance of the regime itself was difficult due to the economic collapse and the losses of the solidarity of socialist countries. In addition, the social atmosphere inside North Korea, which is banned from criticizing the government, seems to be a reason. It is a very important task for the North Korean government to control its residents to obey the North Korean government's policies. The voice of objectively evaluating the North Korean regime is very uncomfortable for the North Korean government.

The North Korean government has urged the South Korean government and the media to stop to refer on the North Korean situation. Moreover, the North calls it “calumny and slander” . Related articles are also included in the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, which was created in the early 1990s. In particular, in 2004, a North-South agreement was made in North Korea's request to dismantle all the national propaganda that was installed in the military demarcation line.

For the past nine years, North Korea has been very sensitive to leaflet issues, particularly from the South Korean civilian organizations on the north and south boundaries. This leaflet pointed out the contradictions of the North Korean regime, and the North Korean dictatorship. The North asked

the South Korean government to sanction the activities of these NGOs through talks. After the North Korean mine strike in August 2015, South Korean government resumed the propaganda broadcast on the military demarcation line. Against on this measure, the North Korean government proposed to hold talks to stop it immediately. North Korea also responded very sensitively to the statements of our press and government personnel that are the demand for North Korea's nuclear dismantlement, the state of human rights in North Korea, and reports on Kim Jung Eun, the highest leader in North Korea.

The North' s demands are not well understood by people in South Korea. In South Korea, where freedom of expression is guaranteed, the blame for the South Korean government is not banned. On the contrary, if someone does not talk about the reality, he/she would be criticized as being insincere. In order to achieve unification, it is very important that the North Korean people should know precisely about the reality of the North Korean government and the international reality. On the other hand, there is some opinion that the need to regulate the level of criticism of the North Korean regime in order to improve the relations between the two Koreas, while fully acknowledging the need.

The South explained the South Korean situation in the North at the talks and persuaded them that the government cannot restrict the freedom of expression in the Republic of Korea. However, the North had not accept this argument.

(Mt. Geumgang Tourism Project)

In July 2008, a South Korean tourist was killed by the gunshot from a North Korean soldier at Mt. Geumgang. The South Korean government immediately stopped touring Mt.

Geumgang and demanded responsible measures from the North, but the North denounced the South rather than respond to the South 's demands. Although the North–South working–level talks have been held, it has been confirmed that there is a great difference in opinion between the two Koreas. Since then, skeptical voices on large–scale business projects with North Korea increased in the South.

Since Mt. Geumgang tourism was the source of the cash flow, North Korea hoped to resume this project. They had urged the South to resume the tourism of Mt. Geumgang. At the vice–ministerial level talks in December 2015, the North strongly demanded the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism. The meeting was supposed to discuss on the various pending issues. However, the North strongly emphasized the resumption of tourism on Mt. Geumgang and did not actively participate in other discussions. When the South prioritize separated families issue, the North proposed to resolve the disputed family problems and resume the tourism of Mt. Geumgang at the same time. However, South Korea decided that they could not pursue two issues in parallel.

(Preparation for main talks)

The high–level talks between the two Koreas will discuss the overall Inter–Korean relations and hold large–scale related events. Therefore, it is common to hold a working level meeting to prepare for the high–level talks. At the working–level talks, some important issues such as which delegates will be present at the main talks and what agenda to discuss will be agreed upon. In addition to this, representatives discuss various events to hold talks such as the event schedule and preparatory procedures.

In 2013 and 2015, working-level talks were held to prepare high-level talks. Political talks have never been held throughout the Lee Myung Bak administration, so the Inter-Korean inter-government talks that was scheduled for 2013 were high-level political talks in a quite long term. The two Koreas held preliminary talks to hold successful talks.

Domestic expectations for high-level Inter-Korean talks held in a long time were high in the South. There were many people hoping that Inter-Korean relations would improve again. However, as a result, high-level talks failed to narrow the differences between South and North Korea on the rank of the chief delegate. Of course, it was an important issue for the same rank-and-file delegation, but there was a domestic controversy about whether it was important enough to cancel the talks itself. Many people were saddened about the breakdown of the high-level talks in 2013.

These failures and regrets have contributed greatly to the success of the 2015 working-level talks. Two Koreas have made every effort to ensure to hold the talks smoothly. The people also understood the difficulties of the negotiations and hoped not to repeat the disappointing results of 2013. As a result, the level 2 winset in 2015 is much larger than in 2013.

(Size of the Winset)

The level 2 winset size depends on the issue. The South Korean people were very angry about the deaths or injuries of the South Koreans due to the North's attack, so it was difficult for the government to present a different position from the people. In this case, the winset is very small. The same is true of the boundary line, such as the NLL. The winset is very small because the South people have a unified attitude toward


this problem.

The South government can take a more flexible stance on the so – called calumny and slander problem than the North Korean military provocation problem. Whereas South Koreans are very interested in North Korea's military provocation issue, there is little interest in so-called calumny and slander related issues. However, the conservatives have a very negative view of making compromise on this issue to the North, so the winset is not big.

Mt. Geumgang tourism is a problem that the South Korean government can exercise more flexibility. Opinions differ among South Koreans about resuming tourism. There are many opinions that the conservative party should not resume the business because it contains a cash inflow into the North Korean regime. However, it is highly persuasive to argue that, in spite of some problems; the government should promote and expand Inter-Korean cooperation projects in order to develop Inter-Korean relations. Depending on the way that resume the tourism and North Korea's attitude, South Koreans can accept the resumption of tourism in Mt. Geumgang.

As for preparatory talks before the high-level talks between the two Koreas, the level 2 winsets in South Korea are quite large. Most South Koreans have a positive perception of Inter-Korean talks. Even people who dislike North Korea could not deny the need for peaceful ways to improve relations and achieve unification through talks. Some people in South Korea, however, think that they should carry out the South' s argument from the preparatory talks. This is a matter for the South Korean government to persuade North Korea and its people at the same time.

Level 2 winset size comparison



Level 2: Institutions

(Institutions of the South and the North)

As for the South Development of the Inter-Korean relations Acts stipulates that “The National Assembly shall have a right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of South-North Korean agreements which place heavy financial burdens on the State or nationals, or South-North Korean agreements concerning legislative matters” in article 21. And constitution of the ROK stipulates that “the attendance of a majority of the total members, and the concurrent vote of a majority of the members present, shall be necessary for decisions of the National Assembly” in article 49.

The issue of Inter-Korean relations often arise controversy in the South, and such conflicts are reflected in the National Assembly, so ratification of the Inter-Korean agreement is not easy. For example, parliamentary ratification process of the 2007 summit and the prime ministerial agreement was discontinued at the debate before the vote.

So far, more than 200 Inter-Korean agreements have been signed, but the National Assembly has ratified only 11 of them. This disproves the difficulty of ratifying the National Assembly. In the past nine years, no agreement has been signed that requires ratification of the National Assembly by the law. Therefore, there is no agreement that has passed the parliamentary approval process. However, in the case of future agreements that place heavy financial burdens on the State or nationals, the process of ratifying the National Assembly is likely to be a challenge.

South Korea is a democracy that guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of expression. The power of the state is also divided according to the divide spirit of three volumes. Therefore, the state autonomy from the domestic pressure is not high. The press and experts continue to monitor and evaluate the government's North Korea policy. Because they reflect public sentiment, the Korean democratic government elected by the vote cannot ignore their voices.

Compared with South Korea, North Korea has very high state autonomy. Although there are constitutions and laws in North Korea, it is not certain whether they are functioning properly in the situation of the Labor Party taking control of all state organs. Therefore, it seems that there is no reason to discuss the ratification procedure set by the law.

In terms of national autonomy, North Korea is incomparably higher than South Korea. The decision-making process of the North Korean government is not exposed to the outside. It is hard to find any criticism of the government in the North Korean media. Therefore, the North Korean government will be able to pursue the policy without worrying about the public opinion as compared with the South Korean government.

(Level 2 institutions as a fixed variable in Inter-Korean Talks)

The South and the North have such a contrast political system. Of course, they affect Inter-Korean talks. South Korean delegates are more concerned about the public sentiment in the talks, but they can lead the talks in a liberal atmosphere compared to the North Korean delegation. However, the North Korean delegation should pay more attention to the dictatorial government, which is constantly monitoring them, rather than paying less attention to the opinions of the North Koreans. Therefore, their behavior can be more rigid.

In addition, the system of the two Koreas has a great influence on the talks. However, this study will exclude the analysis of the influence of the North and South Korean political institutions. This is because the political institutions of the two Koreas is a fixed variable that does not change. The political system of the two Koreas has not changed much since the 1970s when the Inter-Korean talks began. As the democracy of the South develops over time, the situation changes, but the democracy itself does not shake in a big way. In North Korea, new political lines such as Songun politics, Kim Il Sung-ism, and Kim Jong Il-ism are being proposed, but it

has not changed from a large framework to be a socialist dictatorship state.

Among the three determinants of winset that Putnam suggested, level 1 negotiator' s strategies and the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level 2 constituents change depending to the talks but the Level 2 political institutions is applied equally to all the talks. Therefore, this study excluded the Level 2 political institutions from the analysis.

4) Comprehensive Analysis of winsets


This study is an analysis of inter-Korean talks over the past decade. Based on Putnam' s Two-Level game theory, this study examined public sentiment on each talks as well as negotiation strategies of representatives. In order to do this, this study overviewed inter-Korean talks and relationship, and drew the determinants of winset in each talks. In addition, this study compared the size of level 1 and level 2 winset relatively. Now, it is time to make a comprehensive approach based on previous analysis.

According to Putnam, the size of winset decides the result of the negotiation. If the winset size is large, it is more likely to make an agreement and if the winset size is small, building consensus is very hard because the one part has to compromise unilaterally. Putnam says that the size of winset is determined by three factor. They are level 1 chief negotiator' s autonomy, level 2 preferences and coalitions, and level 2 institution. This study put level 2 institution as a fixed variable in inter-Korean relation and examined level 1 chief negotiator' s autonomy and level 2 preferences and coalitions

thoroughly in each talks.

Now, this study introduces two-dimensional graph, setting level 1 chief negotiator's autonomy as X axis and level 2 preferences and coalitions as Y axis. Based on previous analysis on last decade's Inter-Korean talks, each talks can find its coordinates. According to Putnam's theory, if the x-axis and y-axis are high, then the talks must have agreement. Ten inter-Korean talks are located on the graph. A half of them made consensus, and the other half failed. On graph 4, one can tell that the reality of the inter-Korean talks is consistent with the Putnam's theory.

Level 1 - Level 2



Double square: Consensus success cases / Single Square: Consensus failure cases

Graph 4 tells that the reality is consistent with theory in many ways. However, there are some exceptions. Before drawing implications, this study will discuss the talks in each quadrant in detail.

Quadrant 1: Both Level 1 and 2 have relatively large winset

The chief representatives of three talks had high bargaining power, and agreements of the talks were about holding next talks. Therefore, achieving consensus was relatively easy.

Especially, top-level representatives of both side met in High-level talks in Incheon Asian Games. The chief representatives were very close to each supreme leader, so literally they could talk and make consensus about anything. However, two side agreed to have other political talks since it was just a goodwill visit.

However, working level meeting in 2013 was difficult to negotiate. Since it was the first political talk of Park government, so the South and the North fight for pride to tame others. Eventually it led to failure of implementation. Based on this failure, the South and the North well knew about winset of the other. It made negotiation of working level meeting in 2015 much easier. Although the two talks were working level, the chief negotiators of the two talks - Cheon Hae Seong in 2013 and Kim Ki Woong in 2015 - were the two top working-level veterans in political Inter-Korean talks in the South.

They participated in political Inter-Korean talks for

decades, and were well known for their experienced and logical talks not only in the South but also in the North. Therefore, though their official ranks were not relatively high, their bargaining power from good strategies and negotiation tactics were very high.

Quadrant 2: Winset of Level 2 is large but Level 1 has small winset

The main agenda of the vice-ministerial talks in the second quadrant was the tourism of Mt. Geumgang and the reunion of separated families. Originally, this meeting was supposed to deal with the overall pending tasks of Inter-Korean relations, but the agenda was reduced as North Korea became obsessed with the resumption of tourism in Mt. Geumgang. As stated above, South Koreans have an open attitude toward on the tourism issue of Mt. Geumgang compared to North Korea's military provocation or so-called calumny and slander problems. However, North Korea tries to solve this problem urgently in connection with the issue of separated families, which has reduced the scope of negotiations for the South Korean delegates.

South Korea's chief delegate, Vice Minister Hwang Bu-ki, was an Inter-Korean relations expert who worked in the Unification Ministry for decades especially in the field of Inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. He was the first South Korean government official to have lived in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and had negotiations with North Korean officials. Although the personal capacity of the chief delegate was excellent, the task given to him was too difficult. North Korea wanted to accept its demands fully and promptly. In such a situation, the negotiating power of the chief delegate is

supposed to be weakened. Eventually, the talks ended without agreement.

Quadrant 3: Both Level 1 and 2 have relatively small winset

There are four talks in quadrant 3, and these were very difficult talks. These talks were all working level talks. However, the agenda of the talks was very difficult. In the case of the 37th working level military talks, the chief delegate was the director. At the talks, North Korea strongly demanded that the leaflets be stopped. At the time, this was a tricky issue in South Korea, so it was not an issue that could be handled by the director level. The 38th and 39th military talks were more serious. At the talks, the director level chief delegate discussed on Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents with the North. However, neither of them could compromise on these agendas.

As noted earlier, two Koreas were failed to make an agreement on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong problems even in secret meetings of the president's special envoy according to Lee Myung Bak's autobiography. Throughout the talks, the South and the North had to reiterate their claim.

The chief representatives who attended these three talks were experts in Inter-Korean relations who have been engaged in the military talks for a long time. Although their personal expertise, the challenges were beyond their capabilities.

The situation in the case of military authorities meeting was not much different. At the talks, the North Koreans seriously raised the NLL issue and the so-called calumny and

slander problem. The NLL issue was related to the border issue. There was a related discussion on the 2007 summit, but the South had a domestic controversy about the agreement even the agreement had been done by president. Naturally, there was no discretion to the Chief Negotiator.

In these four talks, the two Koreas continued their sharp confrontation. The talks broke up without consensus.

Quadrant 4: Winset of Level 1 is large but Level 2 has small winset

The two talks in the fourth quadrant were very high-level. In the South, representatives from the Presidential Office attended, and in the North, high-level officials from the Labor Party and the National Defense Commission attended.

In the case of high-level meetings, the South's chief delegate was an expert on international affairs who had been in the ministry of foreign affairs for a long time. He was an experienced international negotiator, but it was the first Inter-Korean talks for him. At the talks, the North raised the issue of so-called calumny and slander. It was a difficult issue to compromise, but the chief delegate persistently negotiated and led the agreement. However, this agreement was not properly implemented. The two Koreas agreed on the next round of talks, but no follow-up talks were held because of North Korea's rejection.

In the case of High-level authorities' meeting, both chief delegates were considered to be top officials of both sides, and the press was considered to be the representative of the summit. The talks held shortly after the provocation of North


Korea 's landmines, so it seemed to have little chance of successful agreement between the two Koreas. However, both chief delegates were in a position to directly communicate with the top leaders, and the chief delegates of both sides scrambled for four days to solve the problem. As a result, the two Koreas succeeded in a dramatic agreement.

5) Implications and Evaluations

Level 1 is more influential to make consensus.

Based on the graph 4, this research could draw implications. The first one is that level 1 is more influential to make consensus. It is clear when we consider the results of the talks.

Consensus Success/Failure cases



Blue square: Consensus success cases /

Yellow Square: Consensus failure cases

In this graph, the talks in big blue square are talks that succeeded to draw agreement. As mentioned before, the reality is quite consistent with the theory. All of the talks in quadrant one, succeeded to make an agreement as expected. On the contrary, all of the talks in quadrant three failed. Quadrant two and quadrant four is gray area in the theory. This study found that all of the talks in quadrant four had succeeded to make a consensus, and the talks in quadrant two had not. In other words, we can see that the consensus was achieved when the level 1 winset was relatively large. In this case, small level 2 winset did not interrupt to make consensus. On the other hand, the talks with relatively small level 1 winsets ended without agreement. Even though the level 2 winsets were relatively large, they could not contribute to success. As a result, level 1 has had a greater impact on reaching consensus.

Especially the talks on quadrant three and four dealt with agendas including North Korean military provocation and slander that had the least winset in both side and were so the chronic issue in Inter-Korean relations. Arguments from both side were contradict on these agendas.

Moreover, the position of leading party and others were very different and so the public sentiments were. Of course, most of the South Koreans blame North Korea for its provocation, and could not highly appreciate the North. However, in the aspects of negotiation strategy, progressive party argued that the government has to solve this matter quickly for the sahe of promoting inter-Korean relations. On the side of leading party, they argued that the North has to apologize sincerely before we promote other cooperative business. Likewise, South Korean public were divided into two camp on this issue. The agreements were not necessary to be ratified by parliament, but they clearly affected the negotiation.

Accordingly, it was very hard to make consensus on working level. All of the talks on quadrant three is working level and we can see they all failed. Working level chief negotiators just had to repeat the each side' s original position, and had no discretionary power to convert it. However, High-level chief negotiators could achieve consensus with very difficult agenda. The reason is that they divert their original strategy to make a room for compromise or bypass the agenda to achieve the bigger goal.


As for the Vice-ministerial talks on quadrant two, the agenda was relatively easy to compromise, but they failed to achieve consensus. There could be many reasons why they failed, but many people agreed that main reason was not South Korea. The North repeated their argument unilaterally, and made it hard to compromise. In addition, when the South Korean chief negotiator mentioned about North Korean nuclear issue in the dialogue, the North rebelled harshly and did not continue to talks about the issue. After the talks, the North radically changed their policy direction from negotiation to nuclear experiment after this talk. We can assume that they had hard strategy for this talks with the option of future policy change.

Small domestic winset can be enlarged by Chief Negotiator' s power.

Second implication from graph 4 is that small domestic winset can be enlarged by chief negotiator' s power. It is related to 'the gray area' of the theory. Putnam said that it is more likely to make consensus when the winsets are large.

Then, what would happen when level 1 winset is large but level 2 winset is small? The graph 4 shows certain result.

Impact of Powerful Chief Negotiator



High-level meeting and High-level authorities' meeting in quadrant three had small level 2 winset in the South. The agenda was calumny and slander and North Korean provocation. Park Geun Hye administration had a principle that they should reveal North Korean reality as it is, but North Korea took it as calumny and slander. Especially, in High-level authorities'

meeting, North Korean military provocation agenda was entangled with calumny and slander agenda. Therefore, the negotiation expected to be difficult.

However, they succeeded to make an agreement in both cases. They even agreed on to hold the next round of talks. This study could find its reason in the chief negotiators. From the South, the chief negotiators in both talks were from presidential office. North Korean negotiators were close to the supreme leader's office also. They could directly received the direction from the top leaders of both sides. In particular, in the case of High-level authorities' meeting, the chief representatives were high-ranking officials who were capable of direct conversation with the top leaders of both sides. In this case, despite the small winset of level 2, representatives drew the agreement. When the chief representatives explained the results of the talks to the people after the talks, the people accepted the results positively.

There is a saying that "Political will of top leader is the most important in inter-Korean relationship." Every presidents in South Korea has wanted to improve inter-Korean relations, and tried to do so. However, North Korea has been always unpredictable. They are masters of brinkmanship and sometimes they had done military provocations. Facing the difficulties to deal with North Korea, some leaders had lose their interest and had gotten anger to the violation. In this situation, political leader's strong will and patience are necessary. North Korea has never been easy game to the South. However, they are definitely not negligible because they are the partner to pursuing unification. Therefore, strong political will and tight strategies are needed in the inter-Korean relations. This study shows that political will produced achievement even in the difficult situation.

In addition, we have to focus that these talks were held in conservative governments in South Korea. Political will is more powerful in the conservative administration because they tend to be pessimistic about inter-Korean talks originally. Whereas progressive party argues that two Koreas should meet and talk frequently, Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye administration set the principle that inter-Korean talks is meaningful only when the talks contributes to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the inter-Korean relations development. In this reason, the number of inter-Korean talks decreased.

However, the agendas to discuss had not the misunderstanding were accumulated. Public sentiments toward North Korea had gotten to be bad also. Even in this situation, when political leaders of two Koreas had will to solve the issue, they achieved what they wanted. Since the conservative government had strict standard to North Korea, the government making progress was considered genuine and sincere. In this reason, even when the level 2 winsets were very small, the chief representative empowered by president could enlarge them. Unfortunately, these developments had not lasted long. South Korea did not lower the bar and North Korea frequently closed the door of dialogue blaming the South. As mentioned before, two administration cared for the genuine progress of inter-Korean relations, not the talks itself. However, resuming the talks was constant issue during two administration paradoxically.

Some argues that the North Korea policy is an act of the state. It is distinct from other policies that are strictly enforced within the framework of established laws. Of course, the North Korean policy should be enforced in accordance with the Constitution and laws, but it is often difficult to predict and

need to urgently respond. Therefore, people say that it is very important to show the will and direction from the Presidential Office in the progress of Inter-Korean talks. This research confirms those kinds of beliefs. This research found that the influence of the top leaders of the two Koreas shown through the chief representative heavily influences the success or failure of the talks.

The two Koreas are enemies in a military confrontation, and at the same time, are a companion to go toward unification together. The contradictory duality of Inter-Korean relations makes it dynamic. The South Korean government should use this dynamic wisely to improve Inter-Korean relations and achieve unification.

Considering the duality of Inter-Korean relations, the view of the people of the two Koreas about each other may change according to the situation. South Koreans have a mind to think that North Korea is an enemy and a friend at the same time. Depending on the attitude of North Korea and the situation of Inter-Korean relations, the proportion of enemy increases or the proportion of friend increases in the minds of South Koreans. In this respect, level 2 winsets can be expanded according to the capacity of the chief delegate.

5. Talks in 2018 and Prospect

1) Overview

Inter-Korean relations

We can find that this conclusion is valid in the series of Inter-Korean talks in 2018 by Moon, Jae In administration. Despite of the negative public sentiments and suspicious prospects at the beginning, South Korean government promoted successful inter-Korean talks with the President Moon Jae In' s strong will.

Until the year of 2017, the tension between two Koreas were heightened. The communication between U.S. president and Kim, Jeong Un of North Korea was the 'word war' level. South Korean government had struggled between two. Accordingly, public sentiment to the North was quite hostile in South Korea. However, the situation had dramatically changed from the early 2018.

Since his inauguration, Moon Jae-in had continuously suggested North Korea to the talks for easing tensions and promoting peace. In response, Kim Jong Un expressed his will to improve Inter-Korean relations at the New Year Speech in 2018. Pyeongchang Winter Olympics provided the chance for improving Inter-Korean relations.

The two Koreas held high-level talks in January and agreed on North Korea's participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games. North Korean athletes participated in the Olympic Games successfully. At the opening and closing ceremony of the Olympic Games, a high-level delegation from

North Korea visited the president. After that, President Moon Jae In sent special envoys to North Korea. Through the special envoy meeting, the two Koreas agreed to hold the Inter-Korean summit.

In the Inter-Korean summit, two leaders announced “Panmunjeom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula”

**< Panmunjeom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification
of the Korean Peninsula >**

During this momentous period of historical transformation on the Korean Peninsula, reflecting the enduring aspiration of the Korean people for peace, prosperity and unification, President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea held an Inter-Korean Summit Meeting at the ‘Peace House’ at Panmunjeom on April 27, 2018.

The two leaders solemnly declared before the 80 million Korean people and the whole world that there will be no more war on the Korean Peninsula and thus a new era of peace has begun.

The two leaders, sharing the firm commitment to bring a swift end to the Cold War relic of longstanding division and confrontation, to boldly approach a new era of national reconciliation, peace and prosperity, and to improve and cultivate inter-Korean relations in a more active manner, declared at this historic site of Panmunjeom as follows :

1. South and North Korea will reconnect the blood relations of the people and bring forward the future of co-prosperity and unification led by Koreans by facilitating comprehensive and

groundbreaking advancement in inter-Korean relations. Improving and cultivating inter-Korean relations is the prevalent desire of the whole nation and the urgent calling of the times that cannot be held back any further.

- ① South and North Korea affirmed the principle of determining the destiny of the Korean nation on their own accord and agreed to bring forth the watershed moment for the improvement of inter-Korean relations by fully implementing all existing agreements and declarations adopted between the two sides thus far.
- ② South and North Korea agreed to hold dialogue and negotiations in various fields including at high level, and to take active measures for the implementation of the agreements reached at the Summit.
- ③ South and North Korea agreed to establish a joint liaison office with resident representatives of both sides in the Gaeseong region in order to facilitate close consultation between the authorities as well as smooth exchanges and cooperation between the peoples.
- ④ South and North Korea agreed to encourage more active cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts at all levels in order to rejuvenate the sense of national reconciliation and unity. Between South and North, the two sides will encourage the atmosphere of amity and cooperation by actively staging various joint events on the dates that hold special meaning for both South and North Korea, such as June 15, in which participants from all levels, including central and local governments, parliaments, political parties, and civil organizations, will be involved. On the international front, the two sides agreed to demonstrate their collective

wisdom, talents, and solidarity by jointly participating in international sports events such as the 2018 Asian Games.

⑤ South and North Korea agreed to endeavor to swiftly resolve the humanitarian issues that resulted from the division of the nation, and to convene the Inter-Korean Red Cross Meeting to discuss and solve various issues including the reunion of separated families. In this vein, South and North Korea agreed to proceed with reunion programs for the separated families on the occasion of the National Liberation Day of August 15 this year.

⑥ South and North Korea agreed to actively implement the projects previously agreed in the 2007 October 4 Declaration, in order to promote balanced economic growth and co-prosperity of the nation. As a first step, the two sides agreed to adopt practical steps towards the connection and modernization of the railways and roads on the eastern transportation corridor as well as between Seoul and Sinuiju for their utilization.

2. South and North Korea will make joint efforts to alleviate the acute military tension and practically eliminate the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula. Alleviating the military tension and eliminating the danger of war is a highly significant challenge directly linked to the fate of the Korean people and also a vital task in guaranteeing their peaceful and stable lives.

① South and North Korea agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, including land, air and sea, that are the source of military tension and conflict. In this vein, the two sides agreed to transform the demilitarized zone into a peace zone in a genuine sense by

ceasing as of May 1 this year all hostile acts and eliminating their means, including broadcasting through loudspeakers and distribution of leaflets, in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line.

② South and North Korea agreed to devise a practical scheme to turn the areas around the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace zone in order to prevent accidental military clashes and guarantee safe fishing activities.

③ South and North Korea agreed to take various military measures to ensure active mutual cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts. The two sides agreed to hold frequent meetings between military authorities, including the Defense Ministers Meeting, in order to immediately discuss and solve military issues that arise between them. In this regard, the two sides agreed to first convene military talks at the rank of general in May.

3. South and North Korea will actively cooperate to establish a permanent and solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Bringing an end to the current unnatural state of armistice and establishing a robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is a historical mission that must not be delayed any further.

① South and North Korea reaffirmed the Non-Aggression Agreement that precludes the use of force in any form against each other, and agreed to strictly adhere to this Agreement.

② South and North Korea agreed to carry out disarmament in a phased manner, as military tension is alleviated and

substantial progress is made in military confidence-building.

- ③ During this year that marks the 65th anniversary of the Armistice, South and North Korea agreed to actively pursue trilateral meetings involving the two Koreas and the United States, or quadrilateral meetings involving the two Koreas, the United States and China with a view to declaring an end to the War, turning the armistice into a peace treaty, and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.
- ④ South and North Korea confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. South and North Korea shared the view that the measures being initiated by North Korea are very meaningful and crucial for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and agreed to carry out their respective roles and responsibilities in this regard. South and North Korea agreed to actively seek the support and cooperation of the international community for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The two leaders agreed, through regular meetings and direct telephone conversations, to hold frequent and candid discussions on issues vital to the nation, to strengthen mutual trust and to jointly endeavor to strengthen the positive momentum towards continuous advancement of inter-Korean relations as well as peace, prosperity and unification of the Korean Peninsula.

In this context, President Moon Jae-in agreed to visit Pyongyang this fall.

April 27, 2018

Done in Panmunjeom

Moon Jae-in
President Republic of Korea

Kim Jong Un
Chairman State Affairs Commission Democratic People's
Republic of Korea

This is very broad and ideal agreement rather practical. Since the nuclear problem has not been solved yet, development of inter-Korean relations has clear limit. It is appeared to be containing other issue while the nuclear negotiation going on. However, this agreement mentions the agreement of the second inter-Korean summit in 2007 which contains very broad economic cooperations between two Koreas.

< Summary of Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity (October 4, 2007) >

1. The South and the North shall uphold and endeavor actively to realize the June 15 Declaration. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of "by-the-Korean-people themselves."

The South and the North will work out ways to commemorate the June 15 anniversary.

2. The South and the North have agreed to firmly transform inter-Korean relations into ties of mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences in ideology and systems.

The South and the North have agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs

The South and the North have agreed to overhaul their respective legislative and institutional apparatuses in a bid to develop inter-Korean relations in a reunification oriented direction.

The South and the North have agreed to proactively pursue dialogue and contacts in various areas, including the legislatures of the two Koreas

3. The South and the North have agreed to closely work together to put an end to military hostilities, mitigate tensions and guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The South and the North have agreed to designate a joint fishing area in the West Sea to avoid accidental clashes.

4. The South and the North both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime.

With regard to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the South and the North have agreed to work together to implement smoothly Agreements achieved at the Six-Party Talks.

5. The South and the North have agreed to facilitate, expand, and further develop interKorean economic cooperation projects including investments, pushing forward with the building of infrastructure and the development of natural resources.

The South and the North have agreed to create a “special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea” encompassing Haeju

The South and the North have agreed to complete the first-phase construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and go on. Each side will promptly complete various institutional measures, including those related to passage, communication, and customs clearance procedures.

The South and the North have agreed to discuss repairs of the Gaeseong-Sinuiju railroad and the Gaeseong-Pyongyang expressway for their joint use.

The South and the North have agreed to establish cooperative complexes for shipbuilding in Anbyeon and Nampo.

The South and the North have agreed to build a Joint Committee for InterKorean Economic Cooperation.

6. The South and the North have agreed to boost exchanges and cooperation in the social areas covering history, language, education, science and technology, culture and arts, and sports.

The South and the North have agreed to carry out tours to Mt. Baekdu and open nonstop flight services between Seoul and Mt. Baekdu for this purpose.

The South and the North have agreed to send a joint cheering squad from both sides to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.

7. The South and the North have agreed to actively promote humanitarian cooperation projects. The South and the North have agreed to expand reunion of separated family members and their relatives and promote exchanges of video messages.

Two Koreas had over 600 talks since 1970s and had over 200 agreements. The range is very wide, from politics and military agreements to economic and humanitarian agreements. Their relationship developed from 2000s in earnest and reached the limit in 2007. Afterwards, North Korean nuclear problem got worsened and trust between two Koreas was seriously damaged so the agreements so far could not be implemented. North Korea even declared destruction of past agreements.

In these reasons, some people say that it is useless to make another agreement while past agreements were destroyed. However, we cannot sit in the failure any longer because the peace of Korean peninsula is so urgent to the people who live in Korean peninsula. We can take this as another precious opportunity, and must do our best not to repeat past mistakes.

US–North Korea relations

The progress in inter-Korean relations led to North Korea–US summit. On June 12, Kim Jong Un and President Trump met and agreed on the complete denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. President Trump had to go through hostile public sentiment and pessimistic critics domestically. Compared to South Korea, President Trump had to face even more hostile environment domestically.

First, reviewing past 25 years of negotiations with North Korea, almost all of US professionals concluded that negotiation with North Korea would never succeed or last long. In the past, North Korea and USA had two opportunities to resolve the nuclear problem and to promote relations. They achieved

Agreed framework in 1994 and Joint Statement of the six party talks in 2005. However, they failed to implement the agreements and the situation have been worse. In the year of 1993, the first North Korean nuclear crisis happened, North Korea was suspected to have primitive level of nuclear program. However, North Korea apparently has nuclear weapons of advanced level 25 years later. Most of the US professionals have blamed North Korea to they have never stopped the nuclear development during the negotiations, and they cast suspicious look on future negotiations.

Second, the Republican Party, which is home to President Trump, had considered North Korea as a bad nation and had argued for tough policies. The Democrats had been in a position to resolve this problem by negotiations rather than sanctions, but they became skeptical of negotiations with North Korea for the reasons above. Besides that, they seemed not to trust President Trump as a leader.

Third, President Trump' s approval rating had scored historic low recently.³⁾ He had a short career as a politician and few people had expected him to win the presidential election, President Trump had been suffered from low approval rating during his angulation. It is hard to get public support on any policy in this situation.

However, President Trump had a strong will on North Korea issue, and he had been very active in this work in his unique style. In spite of small domestic winsets, North Korea and USA succeeded in making consensus and revving up the engine for denuclearization. This is quite consistent with the

3) According to polls by NBC/WSJ, 39% of American approve of President Trump in April 2018.

findings of this research.

President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held a first, historic summit in Singapore on June 12, 2018.

President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un conducted a comprehensive, in-depth, and sincere exchange of opinions on the issues related to the establishment of new U.S.-DPRK relations and the building of a lasting and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Convinced that the establishment of new U.S.-DPRK relations will contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and of the world, and recognizing that mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un state the following:

- .1~The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.
- .2 The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
- .3 Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- .4 The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of

those already identified.

Having acknowledged that the U.S.-DPRK summit—the first in history—was an epochal event of great significance in overcoming decades of tensions and hostilities between the two countries and for the opening up of a new future, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un commit to implement the stipulations in this joint statement fully and expeditiously. The United States and the DPRK commit to hold follow-on negotiations, led by the U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, and a relevant high-level DPRK official, at the earliest possible date, to implement the outcomes of the U.S.-DPRK summit.

President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have committed to cooperate for the development of new U.S.-DPRK relations and for the promotion of peace, prosperity, and security of the Korean Peninsula and of the world.

DONALD J. TRUMP

President of the United States of America

KIM JONG UN

Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

June 12, 2018

Sentosa Island Singapore

This agreement is declarative and has been criticized on ambiguity. However, this is the start of the long way of denuclearization, so I think this agreement can be a good start.

So far, North Korea and USA had tragic history of negotiations. After the first nuclear crisis of North Korea in 1993, North Korea - US had negotiated to solve the crisis and made the Joint Agreement in 1994. They both agreed to denuclearize North Korea and provide North Korea with energy and power plants.

< Summary of Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea >

- I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the D.P.R.K.'s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.
 - 1) the provision to the D.P.R.K. of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.
 - The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the D.P.R.K..
 - As necessary, the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
 - 2) The arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the D.P.R.K.'s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.
 - Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.

-- Deliveries of heavy oil will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually

3) The D.P.R.K. will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.

-- The freeze will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this Document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze.

-- Dismantlement of the D.P.R.K.'s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.

-- The U.S. and D.P.R.K. will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor.

4) U.S. and D.P.R.K. experts will hold two sets of experts talks.

-- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.

-- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

- 1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
 - 2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular, and each side will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.
- III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
- 1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the D.P.R.K., against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
 - 2) The D.P.R.K. will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and will engage in North-South dialogue.
- IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.
- 1) The D.P.R.K. will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
 - 2) Ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the D.P.R.K.'s safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. And the D.P.R.K. will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403)

However, North Korea had the march of suffering right after the agreement. Everybody was suspicious on their survival. Naturally, US and related countries had doubt that

North Korea could keep the agreement sincerely. In addition, Clinton administration who made the joint agreement had changed to Bush administration. President Bush said the North Korea is an axis of evil and did not believe their sincerity. In these circumstances, the Joint Agreement could not implemented as scheduled.

The schedule had delayed over and over, and the trust among countries fell down. In this situation, the second North Korean nuclear crisis had happened in 2002. To solve this problem, 9.19 Joint declaration was achieved through six party talks in 2005.

**< Summary of Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the
Six-Party Talks Beijing 19 September 2005 >**

1. The goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.

The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons and the ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons.

The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK.

2. The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies. The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations.
3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.
4. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.
5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action".

However, this agreement faltered in few days because of BDA crisis. The implementation was delayed more than one year, and during the year, North Korea had the first nuclear experiment. The trust among nations were seriously damaged. Afterwards, the freezing and dismantlement stage of denuclearization had conducted, but it could not stop the failing trust. Six party talks were suspended since 2008.

Based on past failure on implementation, professionals are very suspicious on North Korea. They believe that North Korea provided with the reasons that broke past agreement. However, there are other side of the story always. We cannot say that North Korea solely has a problem. The problem is the distrust among actors. It is important to think how to improve the trust

among actors.

2) Winsets Analysis

As I mentioned before, Putnam said that there are three determinants of winset. They are Level 1 negotiators strategy, Level 2 preferences and coalitions and Level 2 political institutions. In this study, I conceptualized the sub-winset and used them in analysis of inter-Korean talks. I set the level 2 political institution as a fixed variable, because political institution of two Koreas are never changed. As for USA, political institution had never changed either.

In addition, I think we don't have to consider the relative size of level 1 winset for now. Because the top leaders are coming to the fore right now. Comparing the winset size is meaningless. Each countries are conducting their best forces. Therefore, I will analyze level 2 preferences and coalition on the North Korea policy and current flow of dialogue mood.

Inter-Korean relations

From the High-Level talks on January 9 2018, there have been 14 times of political and military talks so far (as of June 25, 2018). Most of them were related to preparation of Inter-Korean Summit meeting and its followings. All the talks were held with the President Moon Jae In's strong will, so none of them broke down.

At the beginning of the year, there was substantial public opposition to progress in Inter-Korean relations; some even opposed North Korea's participation in the PyeongChang Olympics.⁴⁾ However, President Moon Jae - in promoted

Inter-Korean talks with a strong will. As a result, the Inter-Korean summit were held and made great achievement in the denuclearization of North Korea and peace building of Korean peninsula. Accordingly, South Korean public sentiment have changed favorably to Inter-Korean talks.

Recently, public opinion on North Korean policy is very high. On may, 84% of Korean people answered that they support the current North Korean policy.⁵⁾ Besides, President Moon Jae In' s approval rating is very high too. In this situation, North Korean policy can be supported by people and smoothe implementation could be guarateed.

However, there are few things we have to look on. First, Putnam said if the issue is polarized, the negotiation is hard because the winset size is small. In this context, there are solid disagreement on North Korean issue in South Korea, who believes that North Korea is not believable, and prefer sanctions rather dialogue. They have their solid theory, so it is very hard to change their mind.

In addition, North Korean issue is highly politized in South Korea. Depend on parties, the position to North Korea is contrast. This is the threat to the implementation too. It the level 2 winset is small, the negotiations for implementation of summit agreements is getting harder.

4) According to polls by Real Meter, only 54% of South Koreans agreed on supporting North Koreans to join in PyungChang Olympics on January 8. On February 15, 62% agreed on holding Inter-Korean Summit. However, 78.7% of South Korean were for Peace Treaty in Inter-Korean Summit on April 19, 2018.

5)
<http://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=201805040107062130600>
1

Second threat is that North Korea is highly unexpected. In the past, North Korea conducted many military provocations. Some of them were conducted while two Koreas were having dialogue. Recently, North Korea attack South Korean territory and South Korean soldiers were killed. And North Korea launched missiles and conducted nuclear experiment till last year. South Korean public sentiment raged on these provocations. For now, people are touched by summits and promises that two Korea is making. However, if North Korea break the promises and do the things that is not expected, people let down on North Korea once again. This kind of distrust is very hard to revive.

Therefore, we cannot say that current situation is stable. For now, level 2 preference and coalition has large winset, so there would be public support when the government promotes North Korean policy. However, the situation could be changed any time. This could be temporary support. The government must notes these aspects and manage public opinion very carefully. At the same time, the government must watch North Korea not to do the threatful conduct to Korean peninsula.

North Korea–US relations

The situation is quite different in U.S.A. Professionals cast very doubtful look on what President is doing on North Korea. People support his North Korean policy than before, 43% of US people answered that they support current policy.⁶⁾ However, only 10% of democrats answered that they support the policy.

6) <https://www.voakorea.com/a/4296880.html>

In this situation, President pushed to get involved with North Korea. His strong will is the only power to make this happen. Therefore, the winset size of level 2 preference and coalition is not large and unstable.

There will be the middle election on November. People pay great interest in this election because this is a kind of evaluation to President and the composition of Representative and Senate can be changed according to the result of the election. Parliament is very important because they make law and ratify the international agreement.

Right now, Republican party is dominant in the number of Governors, Senates, and House.

	Number	Republican	Representatives	Etc.
President	1	1		
Governor	50	33	16	1
Senate	100	51	47	2
House	435	239	193	3

IPSOS report, July 2018

In this middle election, the positions to be elected are as below, and their current parties also.

	Number	Republican	Representatives	Etc.
Governor	36	26	9	1
Senate	35	9	24	2
House	435	239	193	3

IPSOS report, July 2018

It is important to win the majority in the Senate. If the republic party wins the majority in the Senate, President can gain the legal support of parliament. And as I revealed above, republicans needs nine seats in this election, and democrats needs 28 seats. It is unfavorable election to democrats party. But if the democrats win the majority in this election, President will lose his power and his North Korean policy and current negotiations will lose power also because current President cannot guarantee the implementation.

People answered that the 4th most important issue in this election is the situation with North Korea. In detailed, republicans answered that the situation with North Korea is the most important issued in this election.

(%)	Whole population	Democrats	Republicans	Etc.
Health care	29	39	13	32
The economy and jobs	27	30	25	26
Immigration	24	22	27	24
The situation with North Korea	24	23	31	20
Taxes and tax reform	19	22	16	14
The federal budget deficit	17	17	14	16
Climate change	12	19	1	11

IPSOS report, July 2018

Since people have great interest on North Korean issue, it is likely that the government wants to show people some

progress in the negotiation with North Korea. As for our government, it is necessary to take a close look at the related situation. And for stable implementation, level 2 winset in US society must maintain to be large.

3) Implication and Evaluations

Reviewing the past, we can see that the trust is the most important thing in the long way of implementation. One time event is relatively easy than long term implementation. If the promise is not keeping, it is meaningless.

We can see that the main reason why past implementations failed is lack of trust. When the distrust prevails, implementation schedule is delayed and the problem got even worse. In order to build trust between level 1 negotiators, they have to meet frequently. Former South Korean administration pointed this trust issue correctly. They promoted trust building policy. However, I think their method to achieve purpose is wrong. Former South Korean government argued that inter-Korean dialogue for dialogue itself is not necessary. The dialogue that can solve nuclear problem and improve inter-Korean relations is matter.

However, in the trust-building view, this is unrealistic. In order to build trust between two, they must meet as frequently as they can. The prestigious negotiation specialist once said that two Koreas need to meet ten times before they talk about the pending issue. Interestingly, he suggested that two Koreas should talks about soccer game when they meet. In this way, each side can be generous to each other and can avoid unnecessary misunderstandings.

In addition, frequent meeting is good for practical negotiations. When inter-Korean talks are scarce, each talks is weighed more than needed. People pays excessive attention to working level talks. In this situation, representatives cannot negotiate because their actions and mentions are reported to the public. Discretionary power is very important in negotiation, because the real negotiation is based on ample understanding on each other. If negotiators just argue from each own point of view, they can not make consensus. They must be able to find solution that is good for both of them.

However, when people pays too much attention to each talks, negotiators get to act to protect their side's own interest. They have to show public how well they can fight with other, compromising can be dangerous to representative in this situation. However, we cannot force people to get away from the issue. The reason they pay attention is the talks is scarce. Therefore, if the talks happens very frequently, people will slowly lose their interest and representatives can feel free to real talks.

Of course, people have to watch over what the government is doing and the government must be transparent. I am talking about excessive open including on air broadcasting of the meetings. I know the inter-Korean summit was on air live and people liked it. Summit and other ceremonial high level meetings can be opened. It is good for improving transparency and advertising what the government doing with North Korea and drawing people's attention. I am talking about the low level meeting below the vice minister level. If we go on air in working level talks they cannot negotiate. This is not good for working level.

As for level two, they have power to change the authorities

but do not react immediately. In current situation, domestic people are suspicious if this negotiation is different from past ones. No one doesn't like denuclearization and peaceful Korea. They just don't want to fool by North Korea again. Their anxiety is understandable. Therefore, related government need to earn their trust by showing them improvement from current situation. In this way, level 2 winset can be larged in the future negotiations.

6. Conclusion

Inter-Korean talks are one of the most useful policy tool to achieve unification. In this study, I analyzed past inter-Korean talks based on Putnam' s theory. Inter-Korean talks are not for the government only, but domestic public opinion has some level of impact on talks. Putnam said there are three determinants that affects winset size which is decisive effect to success or failure of talks. They are level 1 negotiators strategy, level 2 preferences and coalition, and level 2 political institution.

As for past ten times of political and military inter-Korean talks, level 1 negotiators strategy was more powerful than level 2 preferences and coalitions. We could find that when level 1 winset is large, the talks succeeded to makt consensus even if level 2 winset is small. Otherwise, when level 1 winset is small, there was no consensus even if the level 2 winset is relatively large.

Policy environment have changed a lot after Moon Jae In administration had started. President has a strong will to resume the dialogues and to promote inter-Korean relationship. Even though the pubic sentiment toward North Korea was not good since North Korean military provocation and nuclear experiment, South Korean government actively promoted the talks from this year and had a great result. Two Koreas had two times of summits and this summits led to North Korea-US summit for the first time in the history.

In these summits, two Koreas and US had agreed on denuclearization and promoting peace in korean peninsula. This is a outstanding progress compared to last years harsh mood

among nations. However, this is not the first attempt to solve the problem. There were two agreements on denuclearization of North Korea. And Two Koreas had promoted various of cooperative business before. However, the implementation process did not work well in the past, and the agreement went nothing.

The reasons of failure would be various, but the most serious problem was the lack of trust among nations. We can say that related situation led to distrust. The related situation includes the original relationship that had war among them and a series of national event that are administration change and national calamity like march of sufferings. and threat to survival that is caused by demolition of communism countries.

These are old and rigid problems that can not solve at once. Therefore it is quite understandable that professionals and ordinary people cannot be confident to solve. However, this is one of the most important matter to the people of Korean peninsula, so we cannot ignore the problem but must study on the way to do it. In this study, I suggested that frequent dialogue among countries, and in the way of implementing the agreement, we can enlarge the level 2 winset also.

Therefore, it is very important for both sides to maintain their current position continuously. If they can show smooth progress to the public, they will be able to enlarge US domestic winsets in the related negotiations in the future. In this way, the virtuous cycle of negotiation and implementation could be achieved.

We are watching the historic moment right now in Korean peninsula. However, to keep it as a real historic moment that changed the past, implementation is the key. Now, the

challenge is to carry out the agreement in reality. Despite of the urgent need, denuclearization takes time and effort naturally. There will be series of negotiation and implementation and verification will have to follow for each talks. In the past, related countries agreed on three stage of denuclearization and each took years to negotiate. Verification of each stage is more time-consuming. And there cannot be 100% guaranteed verification in this situation. Therefore, political trust among each countries and people is essential again. I hope we can go on the way of trust building through dialogue and negotiations to the end.

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