

**코로나19 이후 정부역할
확대에 대응하는
효율적 정부조직 관리방안**

2024년 4월

**행정안전부
강준엽**

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1. 국외훈련 개요

1. 훈련국 : 미국

2. 훈련기관명 :
플로리다 주립대학교
(Florida State University)

3. 훈련분야 : 정부조직관리

4. 훈련기간 : 2022.7.31.~2024.5.29.

2. 훈련기관 개요

1. 주소 : 222 S. Copeland Street, Tallahassee,
Florida 32306

2. 연락처

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- FAX번호 : +1-850-644-0197
- 이메일 : graduateadmissions@fsu.edu

3. 역사

- 1851년 플로리다 주의회의 입법을 통해 설립근거 마련(플로리다주 내 最古 교육기관)
- 남북전쟁 당시 플로리다 군사 및 대학연구소로 변경
- 1947년 플로리다 주립대학으로 명칭 변경

4. 캠퍼스

- 1,715 에이커 면적, 394개 빌딩
- 파나마시티, 텔러해시 남서부쪽에 일부 캠퍼스 건물 위치
- 플로리다주의 주도인 텔러해시에 위치

5. 조직

- 교장, 13명의 이사회가 최고의사결정 기구
- 16개 단과대학, 283개 학위 프로그램
- 교수진 2,615명(노벨상 수상자 6명)
- 총 직원 14,705명
- 운영예산 \$1.95 Billion
- 2023 회계연도 연구비 \$414 Million

6. 미션 및 비전

- 미션 : 배움의 철학을 수용하면서 과학 · 기술 · 예술 · 인문학 · 직업에 대한 지식을 보존 · 확장 · 보급. 다양성을 수용하는 공동체 내에 평생학습 · 개인적 책임 · 지속적 성취에 필수적인 힘 · 기술 · 성격을 심어주기 위해 노력
- 핵심가치 : Transformative Daring / Inspired Excellence / Dynamic Inclusiveness / Responsible Stewardship / Engaged Community
- 비전 : 훌륭한 교수 · 연구 · 창의적 활동 · 봉사들을 통해 학생들의 삶을 변화시키고, 사회의 미래를 형성하는 가장 기업가적이고 혁신적인 대학

7. 학생

- 44,597명(학부생 73.5%, 대학원생 24.4% 등)
- 평균연령 20.5세
- 80.2%는 플로리다주 주민, 94.4%는 미국인
- 입학생 평균 GPA 4.4, SAT score 1,390점

8. 입학과정

- 점수요건 : Toefl 800점, GPA 3.0/4.0
- 제출서류 : CV(이력서), SOP(학업계획서), 추천서 3개

9. 학교생활

- Master of Public Administration 과정 기준, 총 42학점 수료 + 졸업논문(Capstone paper)을 통해 졸업요건 충족
- 통상 4학기에 걸쳐 6~9학점 수강
- 수업 1개당 3학점

3. 훈련보고서

**The comparative study of the factors affecting the number
of government personnel**

**Capstone Project Submitted to The Faculty of the College
of Social Sciences and Public Policy In Candidacy for the
Degree of Master of Public Administration**

**Reubin O'D. Askew School of
Public Administration and Policy**

Joonyub Kang

April 19th, 2022

Tallahassee, FL

April 19th, 2022

Sang-min Lee

Minister of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety of Korea

42 Doum 6-ro, Sejong-si,

Republic of Korea

Dear minister Lee,

I am pleased to present you with my paper entitled, "The comparative study of the factors affecting the number of government personnel". This study suggests the policy options on what the Korean government should do to suppress the rapid increase of the number of civil servants. The Ministry of the Interior and Safety is an agency which is in charge of comprehensive management of government organizations and personnel. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety has been working to improve the efficiency of government, and has a high level of expertise.

This study conducts a thorough review of the current status and problems of government management in Korea, by comparing other countries, such as U.S., U.K., and Japan. Based on comparative studies, this paper defines the factors affecting the

number of government personnel. And Considering these factors, this paper recommends several policy options to improve government efficiency. Each policy option has been thoroughly evaluated for feasibility, effectiveness, and efficiency. And each option is prioritized. I hope that this report will be helpful to your government management policy.

Sincerely,

Joonyub Kang

Senior Deputy Director,

Ministry of the Interior and Safety of Korea

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Executive Summary

While some countries keep the number of civil servants constant, others continue to increase. For instances of OECD countries, the United and Japan show little change in the number of government officials in the past decade. On the other hand, South Korea and the United Kingdom increases the number of government officials. This study focuses on the case of South Korea.

It is important to research the reason because it is directly related to the government's financial burden. According to OECD, government debt-to-GDP ratio of South Korea was 45.3% in 2011, and it increased to 59.9% in 2021. Even though South Korea has a fairly low debt ratio, its government debt has increased greatly. The director of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Asia and Pacific Department also announced concerns about the increase in government debt of Korean government.

So, at this point, it is important to research the way how other countries can maintain constant government size. The literature review of this study can be divided three sectors, such as the criteria for calculation of the government personnel, the factors affecting the number of government personnel, and previous comparative studies.

And then, this study compares the institutions and policies of government personnel management between South Korea, U.S., U.K., and Japan for the same period. This comparison includes the act, presidential decree, executive order, government paper, white paper, etc. Through this comparison, this study identifies the factors

affecting the number of government personnel. The factors are "the basement of determining the number of government personnel", "degree of job security protection of government personnel", and "policies about government personnel management". Each case of countries is compared under these criteria.

Based on these findings and the relevant literature, this paper recommends three policy options to Korea government.

1. The first is stipulating the upper limit of the number of government personnel in the act. Now, the number of government personnel is stipulated by presidential decree, which can be revised without the consent of National Assembly. So if the upper limit is stipulated by the act, it will be much harder to increase the number of civil servants.

2. The second is weakening the job protection of public officials. The job protection of civil servants in Korea is too strong that government cannot fire low performing worker and conduct reduction plan. So this option increase the overall efficiency of governments.

3. The third is promoting a strong reduction plan. Government can conduct reduction plan by top-down manner. For instance, 1% of civil servants can be reduced annually. Considering the case of Japan, it will be the most effective option.

4. The fourth is establishing the principle of 'Not increase, but relocation'. This option does not decrease the number of civil servants, but mandates the relocation. It is not radical than option 3, but not effective too.


According to the evaluation, policy option 1 and option 2 received a lower score of 7. Policy option 3 received a highest score of 10, and option 4 received 9. Government must choose an option between 3 and 4, and can conduct option 1 and option 2 simultaneously. So, it is desirable to conduct policy option 3, while conducting policy option 1 and 2. This study presented policy alternatives that the South Korean government can choose through comparative studies between countries. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the efficient operation of the Korean government.

I. Problem Statement

While some countries keep the number of civil servants constant, others continue to increase. Comparing OECD countries with relatively similar economic levels and systems over a 10 year period (2011-2021), the United States (Office of Personnel Management, 2023) and Japan (Ministry of International Affairs and Communications, 2021) have seen little change in the number of federal or central government officials in the past decade. On the other hand, South Korea (Ministry of the Interior and Safety, 2022) and the United Kingdom (Office for National Statistics, 2023) are showing a trend of increasing the number of central government officials. The focus of this paper will examine the trends for South Korea.

< Changes of the number of government personnel >

Country	2011 year	2016 year	2021 year
U.S.	2.124 million	2.067 million	2.171 million
Japan	0.327 million	0.328 million	0.302 million
U.K.	2.807 million	2.936 million	3.481 million
South Korea	0.612 million	0.629 million	0.758 million



※ data of Federal & central government personnel. Source: Office of Personnel Management, Ministry of International Affairs and Communications, Ministry of the Interior and Safety, Office for National Statistics

It is important to research the reason because it is directly related to the government's financial burden. If the number of government personnel increases, the government spending including salaries and pensions will increase. Salary is short-term expense, and pension is long-term expense. Together, these fixed expenses impact a countries' budget for personnel creating long-term financial obligations.


There are concerns when governments' financial obligations increase. If the fiscal deficit is severe, the government will not be able to intervene even if the economy falls into recession. In addition, the issuance of government bonds increases to fill the fiscal

deficit, and as the interest burden on government bonds increases, the fiscal deficit may fall back into a vicious cycle. Also, as the government has more money to pay back, it has less resources to spend on investment.

The status of government finance can be identified by monitoring government debt-to-GDP ratio. This ratio measures the gross debt of the government as a percentage of GDP. According to OECD, in 2011, the OECD (including 39 member countries)'s average of government debt-to-GDP ratio was 71.9%, and it increased to 89.2% in 2021. In 2011, the government debt-to-GDP ratio of South Korea was 45.3%, and it increased to 59.9% in 2021. In 2011, the government debt-to-GDP ratio of U.K. was 103.3%, and it increased to 141.8% in 2021. In 2011, the government debt-to-GDP ratio of U.S. was 130.5%, and it increased to 148.1% in 2021. In 2011, the government debt-to-GDP ratio of Japan was 218.0%, and it increased to 256.0% in 2021 (OECD, 2023). In other words, government's financial status is getting worse.

< Government debt-to-GDP ratio >

Country	2011 year	2021 year
U.S.	130.5%	148.1%
Japan	218.0%	256.0%
U.K.	103.3%	141.8%
South Korea	45.3%	59.9%
OECD average	71.9%	89.2%




※ Source: OECD, 2023

Although South Korea has a fairly low debt ratio, its government debt has increased greatly over the past ten years. In 2011, the government debt of South Korea is \$310.8 Billion. In 2021, the government debt of South Korea increases to \$717.6 Billion (130.8% increase than 2011). Furthermore, the government debt of South Korea is predicted to increase to \$995.6 Billion in 2026 (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2023). In 2011, the personnel cost of Korean government was \$19.3 Billion, and it increased to \$30.5 Billion (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2023). The director of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Asia and Pacific Department, voiced concerns about the increase in government debt over the recent years, and advised Korean government to conduct stronger regulations (Lee, 2022).

< Government debt of Korea >

year	2011 year	2021 year	2026 year
debt	310.8 Billion	717.6 Billion	995.6 Billion



In this situation, an increase in the number of public officials causes an additional long-term financial burden to Korean government. Korean civil servants retire at 60, and receive pension from 60 to death. It is very difficult to fire them once they are hired. Unless they commit a crime, they can work until they retire (State Public Officials Act, 2022). About 99.1% of public officials have tenure after a probationary period (from 6 months to 1 year), and 98.9% of them end up tenured jobs after hiring (Ministry of Personnel Management, 2023). Therefore, an increase in the number of public officials causes a continuous increase in labor costs for about 30 years, and pension expenditures continue to increase even after retirement.

So, at this point, it is important to research the way how other countries can maintain constant government size. Efforts should be made to analyze what government management institutions or regulations they are operating and what innovation policies they are pursuing, and to introduce them to the Korean government.

In South Korea, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety (MOIS) is in charge of managing the size of government. MOIS controls the number of government personnel, and decides the structure of government. The MOIS is in charge of managing the number of division and personnel of the South Korean government. Each ministry must submit an application to the MOIS if it intends to increase its personnel. The MOIS reviews the contents of the application, approves it, and then revises the Presidential Decree (Government Organization Act, 2023). Through this project, MOIS can get the implications of government management. These implications can be applied to the policy of MOIS. I have worked 10 years in the MOIS, so it will be helpful to introduce this study to MOIS.

The purpose of this study is to understand the factors affecting the number of government personnel. I will compare the institutions and policies of government personnel management between South Korea, U.S., U.K., and Japan for the same period. Through this comparison, I will identify the factors affecting the number of government personnel, and understand reasons for increase of Korean government personnel for a period of 2011 to 2021. Based on these findings, the ultimate goal of this study is to provide a set of policy recommendations that could mitigate an increase in the number of government personnel. The findings of this study could contribute to the improvement of the government's

financial status.

I will conduct literature review, and then compare the organizational management institutions and policies of selected OECD countries (e.g. U.S, U.K, Japan, etc). For instance, the following institutions and policies may affect the size of government. First, whether the number of the government personnel is regulated by law or not can affect the government size. Second, the percentage of tenure jobs of civil servants can make the difference. Last, countries have conducted different policies for managing the number of government personnel. I will compare the policies of countries, and the way how to implement them.


II. Background and Literature Review

1. Background

This background knowledge helps to understand the management system of government personnel of South Korea in three key areas: (1) Way of determining the number of government personnel, (2) Degree of job security protection of government personnel, (3) Historical overview of personnel hiring policies that have been enacted over the past 10 years.

a. Way of determining the number of government personnel

< The process of change of the number of government personnel in South Korea >



The South Korean government determines the number of civil servants based on a presidential decree (Government Organization Act, 2023).

The presidential decree is a lower regulation than the law, so the government can amend it alone without the consent of the National Assembly, which is the legislative body of government in South Korea. The National Assembly can intervene the government in an indirect way of cutting government labor costs. In general, it takes at least 2-3 months of administrative procedures to amend the presidential decree. The presidential decree determines the number of employees in every central government agency, and public officials exceeding this number cannot be hired. If additional government employees are required, each central government agency submits a request to the Ministry of the Interior and Safety (MOIS). The MOIS examines the necessity of the increase and, if the request is approved, makes an amendment of presidential decree. If the president finally approves, the increase will be made. Conversely, when the number of civil servants decreases, the same procedure is followed (Government Organization Act, 2023).

Government Organization act

Article 8 (Prescribed Number of Public Officials)

(1) The kinds and prescribed number of public officials to be assigned to each administrative agency, positions to be filled by public officials in the Senior Executive Service, prescribed number of public officials in the Senior Executive Service, standards and procedures for assigning public officials, and other necessary matters shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree: Provided, That the case of assigning public officials in political service to each

administrative agency (excluding public officials in political service assigned to the Office of the President and the National Security Office) shall be prescribed by statutes.

Article 34 (Ministry of the Interior and Safety)

(1) The Minister of the Interior and Safety shall take charge of affairs concerning general affairs of the State Council, promulgation of statutes and treaties, government organization and prescribed numbers of public officials, awards and decorations, government reformation, administrative efficiency, electronic government, maintenance of government buildings, local government systems, support for business, finance and taxation of local governments, support for underdeveloped regions, mediation of disputes among local governments, support for elections and referendums, establishment, management and coordination of security and disaster relief policies, emergency preparedness, civil defense, and disaster prevention

Constitution Of The Republic Of Korea

Article 75

The President may issue presidential decrees concerning matters delegated to him/her by Act with the scope specifically defined and also matters necessary to enforce Acts.

Article 89

The following matters shall be referred to the State Council for deliberation:

1. Basic plans for state affairs, and general policies of the Executive;

2. Declaration of war, conclusion of peace and other important matters pertaining to foreign policy;
3. Draft amendments to the Constitution, proposals for national referendums, proposed treaties, legislative bills, and proposed presidential decrees;
4. Budgets, settlement of accounts, basic plans for disposal of state properties, contracts incurring financial obligation on the State, and other important financial matters;
5. Emergency orders and emergency financial and economic actions or orders by the President, and declaration and termination of martial law;
6. Important military affairs;
7. Requests for convening an extraordinary session of the National Assembly;
8. Awarding of honors;
9. Granting of amnesty, commutation and restoration of rights;
10. Demarcation of jurisdiction between Executive Ministries;
11. Basic plans concerning delegation or allocation of powers within the Executive;
12. Evaluation and analysis of the administration of State affairs;
13. Formulation and coordination of important policies of each Executive Ministry;
14. Action for the dissolution of a political party;
15. Examination of petitions pertaining to executive policies submitted or referred to the Executive;
16. Appointment of the Prosecutor General, the Chairperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of each armed service, the presidents of national universities, ambassadors, and such

other public officials and managers of important State-run enterprises as designated by Act; and

17. Other matters presented by the President, the Prime Minister or a member of the State Council.

Article 95

The Prime Minister or the head of each Executive Ministry may, under the powers delegated by Act or Presidential Decree, or ex officio, issue ordinances of the Prime Minister or the Executive Ministry concerning matters that are within their jurisdiction.

b. Degree of job security protection of government personnel

The percentage of tenure jobs of civil servants in South Korea is pretty high. Most civil servants are legally guaranteed lifetime employment. So, once government hire civil servants, it's very difficult to fire them.

Under the State Public Officials Act, "'Public officials in career service' means public officials appointed based on their performance and general qualifications, whose status is guaranteed, and who are expected to spend their entire lives as public officials (State Public Officials Act §2)". "No public official shall be suspended from service, demoted, or dismissed from service against his or her will unless he or she is sentenced to a penalty, or is subject to a disciplinary action or a reason prescribed by this Act (State Public Officials Act §68)." It cannot be dismissed because of insufficient work

performance. An exceptional dismissal can only be made when official commits crime or a violation of the law (State Public Officials Act, 2022).

State Public Officials Act

Article 2 (Categories of Public Officials)

(1) The State public officials (hereinafter referred to as "public officials") shall be classified as either public officials in career service or public officials in non-career service.

(2) "Public officials in career service" means public officials appointed based on their performance and general qualifications, whose status is guaranteed, and who are expected to spend their entire lives (referring to a specified period where public officials are appointed for such period of service) as public officials, and such officials shall be classified as follows:

State Public Officials Act

Article 68 (Measures on Status against Will)

No public official shall be suspended from service, demoted, or dismissed from service against his or her will unless he or she is sentenced to a penalty, or is subject to a disciplinary action or a reason prescribed by this Act: Provided, That the same shall not apply to cases of public officials of Class I, and members in general service of the Senior Executive Service who is appointed to a position of the highest grade from among the duty grades assigned as prescribed in Article 23.

This legal basis has not been changed since the Korean government was established in 1948. South Korea belongs to a country with strong employment guarantee not only in the government but also in private companies. There has been a culture of working in one workplace for a lifetime for a long time, which has also affected the government employee management system. In addition, during the military dictatorship in the 60s~ 90s, politicians often put undue pressure on public officials, which was a big social problem. Therefore, there was a lot of arguments that the status of public officials should be strengthened so that they could resist unfair external pressure.


c. Historical overview of personnel hiring policies

The increase of civil servants in the South Korean government has begun rapidly since 2017. Between 2011 and 2017, the number of Korean government personnel increased from 612 thousand to 629 thousand. But between 2017 and 2021, the number of Korean government personnel rapidly increased from 629 thousand to 751 thousand (MOIS, 2023). The increase of civil servants was a major pledge in the 2017 presidential election, and the increase was promoted after the presidential election (Korea Herald, 2017). At that time, there were many opinions that youth employment should be increased because South Korea's youth unemployment rate was high as 9.8% (KOSTAT, 2017).

< Unemployment rate of South Korea >

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Unemployment rate	3.4	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.7
Youth unemployment rate	7.6	7.5	8.0	9.0	9.1	9.8	9.8

※ Source : Kostat



The government began to increase the number of civil servants to directly hire young people. In particular, the number of civil servants in public safety-related fields, such as police and firefighters, intensively increased (Jihyoung Son, 2023). However, this sharp increase caused many concerns in the media, opposition parties, and academia. Opposition party pointed out that there was a lack of in-depth review in the process of intensively increasing the number in a short period of time. In addition, many pointed out that the increase in civil servants puts a great burden on government finances in the long run. There were also concerns that young people who had to work for private IT companies would work in the government, reducing their national competitiveness. According to a study published in 2017, the social loss caused by young Koreans focusing only on civil service exams is estimated at \$13 billion per year. While young people are preparing for the civil service examination, they cannot work at private companies, and their

consumption decreases because they have no income. As a result, domestic production decreases and domestic consumption decreases, resulting in social losses (Hyundai Research Institute, 2017). This debate has continued to this day.

2. Literature Review

A. The criteria for calculation of the government personnel

Entity	Criteria
OECD	<p>General Government Employment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- employment in all levels of government (central & state & local), social security funds, and agencies and non-profit institutions that are controlled by public authorities
previous studies of South Korea	<p>Public official</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- central government officials, local government officials, and central & local teachers
OPM of U.S.	<p>On-Board Employment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- the number of employees in pay status at the end of the quarter, including full-time, part-time, and seasonal employees
OMB of U.S.	<p>Full-Time Equivalent Employment (FTE)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- function of working hours rather than the number of employees

In previous studies, the criteria for calculating the number of government personnel are somewhat different for each study. In the previous studies of OECD, OECD used the criteria of 'General Government Employment'. It means employment in all levels of government (central & state & local), social security funds, and agencies and non-profit institutions that are controlled by public authorities (OECD, 2023).

In the previous studies of South Korean government, 'government personnel' usually means just public official. Public official means the employees under the State Public Officials Act, including central government officials, local government officials, and central & local teachers. This definition didn't include the employment of social security funds, and agencies and non-profit institutions that are controlled by public authorities, which was included in the OECD studies (Kim, 2012; Ha, 2002; Lee & Hong, 2007).

In the United State, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) use different concepts. The OPM uses the concept of 'On-Board Employment'. It means the number of employees in pay status at the end of the quarter, including full-time, part-time, and seasonal employees. The OMB uses the concept of 'Full-Time Equivalent Employment (FTE)'. FTE quantifies employment as a function of working hours rather than the number of employees. One FTE is equivalent to 2,080 working hours (Wilson, 2022).

Table I. Measuring Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Employment

Number of Actual Employees	Work Schedule	Normal Hours Worked Per Week	Total Number of Weeks	Total Compensable Hours	FTEs ^a
1	Full-time	40	52	2,080	1
2	Part-time	20	52	2,080	1
5	Full-time	40	52	10,400	5
10	Part-time	20	52	10,400	5
17	Part-time	20	52	17,680	8.5
163	Part-time	20	52	168,520	81.5

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations based on guidelines located in Section 85 of OMB Circular No. A-11.

a. FTE equals the total number of compensable hours worked divided by 2,080 hours.

On the other perspective, there was a study which argued that there was a hidden workforce among U.S. government personnel that was not explicitly revealed. This study claimed that the number of federal officials was 1.8 million (as of 2000), but that the total number of hidden personnel, such as contracted and subsidized civilian personnel, soldiers, and postal officials, was actually six times more than 12 million (Light, 1999).

In order to effectively compare the number of government personnel between countries, it will be better that the criteria for calculating the government personnel are similar to some extent. In this study, I will count only the number of central or federal government of countries.

First of all, the roles played by the federal and central governments are similar. In addition, this study aims to analyze institutional differences in each country. However, management institutions of central and local government are different within one country, so it is difficult to compare several countries including local government. In addition, it is easy to obtain data on the number of public officials from the federal and central governments. In addition, depending on the country, there is a difference in whether social security funds, and agencies and non-profit installations that are controlled by public authorities have a public character.

B. The factors affecting the number of government personnel

Perspective	Factors
bureaucratic behavioral factor	nature of bureaucracy
economic factor	income
political factor	preference of rulling party
demographic factor	changes in population

In the case of previous studies, the factors affecting the size of the government's manpower were classified into several categories. These categories include bureaucratic behavioral factors, economic factors, political factors, and demographic factors.

First of all, the bureaucratic behavior factor perspective recognizes that the government continues to expand regardless of the administrative demand of the people. This view argues that the managers always try to maximize the size of their budgets and organizations, and that government personnel become excessive because they require more than the necessary manpower (Williamson & Strategizing, 1986; Romer & Rosenthal, 1979; Muller, 1990). In this view, managers do not prioritize the efficiency of the organization as a whole. Instead, managers value growing their authority within the organization, because of their human nature.

The second view values economic factors. This view believes that if the income of the people increases as the country's economy develops, the size of the government increases. As the economy develops, administrative demand increases, and the size of the government increases to respond to it (Wagner, 1977). On the other hand, if the economy is in a slump, the number of the government personnel may decrease as the government's finances deteriorate (Hong & Lee, 2016; Oh & Sim, 2001).

The third perspective focuses on the political factors. This view argues that the number of government personnel is affected by the political preference of the ruling party or elite group (Lewis-Beck & Rice, 1985). If the ruling party or the president think active government intervention positively, the number of government personnel will increase (Cameron, 1978). For example, there is a view that the size of the government increases when a left-wing

regime takes power (Cameron, 1978). According to a study of the United States government, the more seats Democrats hold in Congress than Republicans, the larger the size of the government (Davis & Dempster & Wildavsky, 1966).

Finally, the perspective of demographic factors sees that changes in the population ratio affect the size of the government. For example, as the population of the elderly and young people in the United States increases, administrative demand for elderly welfare and youth education increases, and the size of the government in this field increases (Lowery, 1983; Kelly, 1976). There are also previous studies in which the population of the country is a major factor in determining the number of the government workforce (Hong & Lee, 2016; Lee, 1998; Song, 1993). These studies argue that as the population increases, the number of government manpower increases.

In the case of previous studies, there was a lack of research on institutions and policies for managing the number of public officials. Bureaucratic, political and economic factors will occur similarly in most countries. However, even if the economic level is similar, the number of civil servants can be different if the institution and policy for managing the number of civil servants are different. Therefore, this study will focus on institutions and policies.

C. Previous comparative studies


Previous comparative studies are classified into two categories. The first category is studies comparing just the number

of government personnel between countries. And the second category is studies comparing the management systems of government personnel between countries.

Kim (2000) analyzed that the number of government personnel per 1,000 people in Korea was 20-24, about one-third of the OECD average, as of 1997 (Kim, 2000). Kim (2012) analyzed that the number of government personnel per 1,000 people was 89.1 in the U.K., 72.4 in the U.S., 34.9 in Japan, 32.3 in Korea, and 83.0 in the average OECD as of 2010. He analyzed that in Korea, the number of government personnel was smaller than other countries because many public services had been provided through private contract (Kim, 2012). Jin (2005) analyzed that the number of central government personnel per 1,000 people was 25.41 in the U.S., 16.8 in Japan, 13.61 in the U.K., and 12.17 in Korea as of 2003 (Jin, 2005). Cho (2017) analyzed the number of general government employment, including the employment of central government, local government, and public institutions. He analyzed that the number of general government employment per 1,000 population was 91.4 in the U.K., 68.5 in the U.S., 38.91 in Korea, and 31.1 in Japan as of 2014 (Cho, 2017).


**< Previous Studies of the number of government personnel
(per 1,000 people) >**

Country	Kim (as of 2010)	Jin (as of 2003)	Cho (as of 2014)
U.S.	72.4	25.41	68.5
Japan	34.9	16.8	31.1
U.K.	89.1	13.61	91.4
South Korea	32.3	12.17	39.1




Employment in general government between 2019 and 2021: Each year, the OECD investigates the percentage of general government employment among total employment. According to data released in 2023, the ratio of general government employment among all employment is very low in Korea. Northern-Europe countries show higher percentage than other countries. U.K., U.S., and Japan are below than OECD average.

< Employment in general government as a percentage of total employment, 2019 and 2021 >



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database). Data for Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Türkiye and the United States are from the International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT (database), Public employment by sectors and sub-sectors of national accounts.

< Annual average growth rate of general government employment and total employment, 2019-21 >



Source: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database). Data for Japan, Mexico, Türkiye and the United States are from the International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT (database), Public employment by sectors and sub-sectors of national accounts.

d. Comparative study of institution

Kim (2013) compared the management institution of government personnel of OECD countries. He analyzed that in the United States, each agency can manage the government personnel in a decentralized manner with autonomy. For example, in the event of an urgent policy issue, each ministry can quickly further increase the number of personnel involved. Therefore, while it is possible to respond flexibly to environmental changes, there is a concern about indiscriminate government expansion. However, due to regulations of OMB and OPM, excessive expansion is suppressed. He analyzes that the U.S. is a more autonomous system than Korea, and side effects are being minimized.

On the other hand, he analyzes that Japan strictly restricts the increase of personnel. The upper limit of government personnel has been stipulated by law and personnel reduction has been continuously conducted.

In the case of Korea, he argued that Korean government had overly centralized management system. It was difficult to respond flexibly to environmental changes due to the lack of autonomy of each administrative agency. There was lack of mid or long-term personnel management plans, and government personnel management policy changed too significantly each time the administration changed.

In the case of the UK, he analyzed that high-ranking government officials have an open recruitment structure, so many private workers are hired, and lower-level officials have a closed

recruitment structure.

In the cases of Canada and France, he analyzed that the governments were implementing continuous job cuts to reduce the fiscal deficit (Kim, 2013).

III. Research Methodology and Evaluative Criteria

1. Research Methodology

The purpose of this study is to understand the factors affecting the number of government personnel. To define the factors, I analyze previous literatures, statistic data, institutions, and recent policies of countries.

- Analyzing scholarly literature and relevant statistical data of governments (South Korea, U.S., U.K., Japan, OECD).
- Reviewing the institutions of countries, by comparing the acts, presidential decrees, regulations, and administrative rules.
- Analyzing the recent policies of countries, by reviewing the government documents, white papers, media reports, and scholarly literature.

This paper analyzes the factors affecting the number of government personnel. First, this capstone project reviews a wide range of previous literature, and collected statistic data of the number of government personnel, between 2011~2021. These data are collected through officially published government papers and documents that show the number of government personnel. These documents include the documents published by the Office of

Personnel Management (for U.S.), the Ministry of International Affairs and Communications (for Japan), the Ministry of the Interior and Safety (for South Korea), and the Office for National Statistics (for U.K.). The purpose of analyzing data of government personnel is to compare the recent trends and current status of countries.

Second, this paper reviews the institutions of government personnel management of countries. The acts, presidential decrees, regulations, and administrative rules related to the management of the number of public officials are subject to analysis. For South Korea, I review the Government Organization Act and State Public Officials Act. For U.K., I review the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. For U.S., I review the Civil Service Reform Act. of 1978 and Title 5 of U.S.C. (Government Organization and Employees). For Japan, I review the Civil Service Act of the State. And I investigate the regulations or codes under the above acts. Since each country operates a different institution, this study can find the difference between them. The purpose for finding the difference is to find a reason why there were no rapid increase of government personnel in other countries, and then suggest an institutional improvement plan that the Korean government can introduce to suppress the rapid increase of government personnel.

Next, this paper analyzes the recent policies about the management of the number of government personnel. Through government documents, government websites, white papers, media reports, and previous scholarly literature, the recent policies of various countries are analyzed. This comparison is focused in the period of 2011~2021. All governments promote policies to improve the efficiency of government personnel management, but their methods and contents are quite different. For South Korea, I analyze the policy of 'Plan to increase the number of civil servants'. For

U.K., I analyze the policy of the 'Civil Service Reform Plan' and the reports related this plan. For U.S., I analyze 'Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch' and 'Workforce Reshaping Operations Handbook'. For Japan, I analyze the policy of the 'Administrative Reform Out-line'. The purpose for analyzing the policies is to find which policies curb the rapid increase in civil servants.

2. Evaluative Criteria

This paper compares the institutions and policies of countries, and suggests policy options for curbing the rapid increase of government personnel in South Korea. When suggesting policy options, each policy option is evaluated on the basis of criteria, such as feasibility, effectiveness, and efficiency. In order for policy options to be actually implemented as policies, policies must be feasible, policy goal must be achieved effectively, and costs must not be excessive.

a Feasibility

The dictionary definition of feasibility is "the possibility that something can be made, done, or achieved, or is reasonable" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023). Feasibility is defined in terms of relevant constraints; political, administrative, institutional, technical, and economic. In the real field of public policy, the range of policies that can be selected is very limited due to these numerous

restrictions. Therefore, the most important thing in the process of evaluating policies is to evaluate feasibility (Majone, 1975). There should be less political opposition, members of the government should approve, compatible with the existing institutions of the Korean government, and no excessive financial costs. The feasibility of each policy option can be evaluated by analyzing the position of political parties, predicted opposition from public officials' organizations, and required resources. No matter how attractive the policy may seem, it means nothing if it is not likely to be implemented. If it is not feasible, it is not a policy option but a mere proposal.

b. Effectiveness

Even if the policy is feasible, it should achieve the goal of policy. Effectiveness means the achievement of a valued outcome. It is measured in the terms of units of services (Dunn, 2018). This criteria does not evaluate how much policy spends, but how much a policy goal is achieved. This study proposes policy options to curb the rapid increase in civil servants. Therefore, this paper evaluates how effectively the increase can be prevented, if each policy option is implemented in the Korean government.

c. Efficiency

Efficiency means amount of effort required to produce a given level of effectiveness. In other words, it is the ratio of input to outcome. Efficiency is normally is calculated as the costs of producing a unit of product or service (Dunn, 2018). When

implementing policies, all governments must achieve their goals within limited resources. Even if the goal is achieved, policy failure can occur in other fields if too many resources are invested. Therefore, it is necessary to find policies that achieve as much performance as possible with as few resources as possible.

IV. Comparison between countries

I review the acts, presidential decree, presidential memorandum, executive order, policy papers, and previous literatures of countries (South Korea, Japan, U.S., U.K.). By collecting and analyzing these data, I can compare the differences and similarities between the countries. By understanding these differences and similarities, I can get implications about the management of government personnel, and establish the policy recommendations.

1. The basement of determining the number of government personnel

a. South Korea

Under the Government Organization Act, the presidential decree determines the number of personnel of central government agencies (Government Organization Act, 2023). Each central government agency has a presidential decree that stipulates the number of public officials in the agency. For instance of the Ministry of Justice, there is a "Decree On The Organization Of Ministry Of Justice And Institutions Under Its Jurisdiction", which determines the number of government personnel in the Ministry of Justice as "780" (Decree On The Organization Of Ministry Of Justice And Institutions Under Its Jurisdiction, 2022).

DECREE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF KOREA POST

Article 29 (Prescribed Number of Public Officials Assigned to Korea Post and Affiliated Agencies)

(1) The prescribed number of public officials assigned to Korea Post and affiliated agencies shall be as specified in attached Table 2: Provided, That where necessary, the prescribed number of public officials may be separately prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Science and ICT to an extent not exceeding five percent of the total prescribed number of public officials under attached Table 2. <Amended on Jul. 26, 2017; Feb. 20, 2018; Dec. 29, 2020; Aug. 30, 2023>

(2) The prescribed number of public officials assigned to Korea Post and its affiliated agencies by rank, shall be prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Science and ICT. In such cases, the prescribed number of public officials in Grade IV (including the prescribed number of public officials in Grade III or IV) shall be 169; the prescribed number of public officials in Grade III or IV shall be 15/100 of the prescribed number of public officials in Grade IV (including the prescribed number of public officials in Grade III or IV) respectively, and the prescribed number of public officials in Grade IV or V shall be 15/100 of the prescribed number of public officials in Grade V (including the prescribed number of public officials in Grade IV or V), respectively.

The Ministry of Justice can't hire more public officials than 780. The process of amending the presidential decree is difficult to go through and takes long time. First, the necessity of the amendment to the Presidential Decree must be approved by the MOIS. Then, the amendment to the Presidential Decree must be approved at the Cabinet meeting and finally approved by the President. Under normal circumstances, it is very difficult to pass these administrative procedures, so the management of government personnel is rigid. However, if the President has a strong will and can afford the government's finances, a rapid increase may be made in a short time.

b. Japan

The total number of Japanese civil servants is stipulated by law. Under the Act on Limitation on Number of Personnel of Administrative Organs, the maximum number of central government officials is 331,984 (Act on Limitation on Number of Personnel of Administrative Organs §1). Within this total limit, the number of personnel for each central government agency is determined by the cabinet decree for each institution (Act on Limitation on Number of Personnel of Administrative Organs §2).

This legal system has continued since its enactment in 1968. Japan's legal system has the effect of suppressing the increase in the number of civil servants more strongly than in Korea. Since the limit on the total number of civil servants is stipulated in the law, the cabinet cannot arbitrarily increase the number of civil servants. Even

if new administrative demands arise, the total number of civil servants cannot be increased, so it is necessary to rearrange the existing workforce or reduce the workforce in other fields. Therefore, it is possible to suppress the continuous enlargement of the government organization according to bureaucratic behavior, and efforts to improve the efficiency of the government organization can be promoted.

On the other hand, situations that require a rapid increase may occur due to new environmental changes, and it is difficult to respond quickly to these changes. However, in the countries suffering from a long-term economic recession, such as Japan, it is highly likely to pursue policies to reduce civil servants, and it can be seen as a legal system to help promote such policies.

行政機関の職員の定員に関する法律

第一条 内閣の機関（内閣官房及び内閣法制局をいう。以下同じ。）、「内閣府」、「デジタル庁及び各省の所掌事務を遂行するために恒常的に置く必要がある職に充てるべき常勤の職員の定員の総数の最高限度は、「三十三万九千九百八十四人とする。」

2 次に掲げる職員は、「前項の職員に含まないものとする。」

一 国家公務員法（昭和二十二年法律第百二十号）第二条第三項第一号、「第二号及び第四号から第七号の四までに掲げる職員並びに同項第九号に掲げる職員のうち常勤の職員

二 宮内庁長官、「侍従長」、「東宮大夫」、「式部官長及び侍従次長

三 自衛官

四 国際平和協力隊の隊員

c. U.S.

In the United States, there is no act or regulation or presidential action that regulates the number of public officials. Therefore, the number of public officials is determined by the budget. Under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, the President's Budget is submitted to Congress in February, and the Congress passes the budget by the end of June (Budget Enforcement Act, 1990). For instance, the Department of Justice received budget for salaries for personnel as 23,311 million dollars in FY 2021 (Department of Justice, 2021). Under this budget, the Department of Justice hired 116,271 employees in 2021 (Office of Personnel Management, 2021).

As long as the regulations and guidelines set by OPM and OMB are followed, each federal agency can autonomously operate the number of public officials within budget. Therefore, if financial conditions are positive, there is more room to increase the number of public officials, and if financial conditions deteriorate, there is a high possibility of reducing the number of public officials. The number of public officials is not fixed by law or presidential decree like South Korea and Japan, so the number of public officials can be operated flexibly according to changes in the external environment.

**U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SUMMARY OF BUDGET AUTHORITY BY APPROPRIATION
(Dollars in Thousands)**

APPROPRIATION	FY 2019 ENACTED	FY 2020 ENACTED	FY 2021 REQUEST
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION	\$113,000	\$114,740	\$121,769
JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING TECHNOLOGY	32,000	33,675	34,064
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW	563,407	672,966	882,872
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (2017)	559,407	668,966	878,872
Transfer from Immigration Fees Account	4,000	4,000	4,000
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL	101,000	115,000	107,211
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL	101,000	105,000	107,211
Transfer from Crime Victim Fund	0	10,000	0
WORKING CAPITAL FUND	-151,000	-107,000	-75,000
WORKING CAPITAL FUND (Rescissions)	-151,000	-107,000	-75,000
U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION	13,000	13,308	13,539
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION	101,369	110,000	117,451
GENERAL LEGAL ACTIVITIES	904,000	920,000	971,429
SOLICITOR GENERAL	11,828	12,250	13,565
TAX DIVISION	105,925	112,631	113,502
CRIMINAL DIVISION	193,715	195,617	195,754
CIVIL DIVISION	289,334	295,084	327,207
ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION	109,423	109,423	114,254
LEGAL COUNSEL	7,951	8,114	9,393
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION	148,239	148,239	157,332
INTERPOL	33,111	33,676	35,592
PARDON ATTORNEY (2017)	4,474	4,766	4,810
VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION TRUST FUND	[10,000]	[13,000]	[19,000]
ANTITRUST	164,977	166,755	188,524
U.S. ATTORNEYS	2,212,000	2,254,541	2,378,418
U.S. TRUSTEES	226,000	227,229	234,464
FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION	2,409	2,335	2,366
U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE	2,925,397	3,312,461	3,669,682
SALARIES & EXPENSES	1,358,000	1,430,000	1,608,073
CONSTRUCTION	15,000	15,000	15,000
FEDERAL PRISONER DETENTION	1,552,397	1,867,461	2,046,609
COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE	15,500	16,000	0
ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND CURRENT BUDGET AUTHORITY	20,514	20,514	20,514
INTERAGENCY CRIME & DRUG ENFORCEMENT	560,000	550,458	585,145
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	9,452,811	9,880,928	9,570,724
SALARIES & EXPENSES	9,192,137	9,467,902	9,748,829
Rescissions - Direct and CJIS Balances	-124,326	-71,974	-80,000
CONSTRUCTION	385,000	485,000	51,895
Rescission of Prior Year Balances	0	0	-150,000
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION	2,267,000	2,269,153	2,652,805
SALARIES & EXPENSES	2,267,000	2,279,153	2,398,805
Rescission of Prior Year Balances - DEA	0	-10,000	0
HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREAS PROGRAMS	0	0	254,000
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES	1,316,678	1,400,000	1,666,259
SALARIES & EXPENSES	1,316,678	1,400,000	1,637,574
CONSTRUCTION	0	0	28,685
FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM	7,514,000	7,778,000	7,205,579
SALARIES & EXPENSES	7,250,000	7,470,000	7,611,126
BUILDINGS & FACILITIES	264,000	308,000	99,453
Rescission of Prior Year Balances - BOP B&F	0	0	-505,000
FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES (limitation on Administrative Expenses)	2,700	2,700	2,700
SUBTOTAL, DISCRETIONARY w/o State and Local	28,356,762	29,753,963	30,350,515
DISCRETIONARY GRANTS PROGRAMS	2,819,300	3,078,300	1,755,000
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS	2,044,800	2,245,800	1,765,000
RESEARCH, EVALUATION & STATISTICS	80,000	79,000	86,500
OJP SALARIES AND EXPENSES	[225,000]	[235,000]	[285,336]
JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS	267,000	320,000	227,500
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE	1,723,000	1,892,000	1,511,200
PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS' BENEFITS	24,800	24,800	24,800
OJP- wide rescissions	-70,000	-70,000	-85,000

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SUMMARY OF BUDGET AUTHORITY BY APPROPRIATION
(Dollars in Thousands)

APPROPRIATION	FY 2019 ENACTED	FY 2020 ENACTED	FY 2021 REQUEST
COMMUNITY POLICING (INCLUDES OJP PROGRAMS)	287,000	330,000	0
COMMUNITY POLICING (FY2020 Request in OJP)	303,500	343,000	0
COPS SALARIES AND EXPENSES	[32,101]	[30,678]	0
Rescission of Prior Year Balances	-16,500	-13,000	0
OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN	487,500	502,500	-10,000
OFFICE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN	497,500	67,500	0
Funding within CVF - OVW	[497,500]	435,000	[498,500]
OVW SALARIES AND EXPENSES	[24,211]	[24,772]	[23,578]
Rescission of Prior Year Balances	-10,000	0	-10,000
SUBTOTAL, DISCRETIONARY w/o Scorekeeping Credits	31,176,062	32,832,263	32,105,515
FEE COLLECTIONS			
Offset from Antitrust Pre-Merger Filing Fee	-136,600	-136,000	-136,000
Offset from U.S. Trustee Fees and Interest on U.S. Securities	-360,000	-309,000	-313,000
SUBTOTAL, FEES COLLECTIONS	-496,600	-445,000	-449,000
SUBTOTAL, DISCRETIONARY with Fees	30,679,462	32,387,263	31,656,515
SCOREKEEPING CREDITS			
CRIME VICTIMS FUND	[-7,783,000]	[5,695,000]	0
ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND - Permanently Cancelled	-674,000	0	0
SUBTOTAL, SCOREKEEPING CREDITS	-674,000	0	0
TOTAL DOJ DIRECT DISCRETIONARY BA	30,005,462	32,387,263	31,656,515
MANDATORY AND OTHER ACCOUNTS:			
FEES AND EXPENSES OF WITNESSES (MANDATORY)	270,000	270,000	270,000
Sequester Cut	-16,740	-15,930	0
Rescission of Prior Year Balances	0	0	-150,000
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL (PERMANENT INDEFINITE)	4,760	500	500
Sequester Cut	-295	-30	0
RADIATION EXPOSURE COMPENSATION TRUST FUND	45,000	65,000	70,000
PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS' DEATH BENEFITS	129,000	117,000	117,000
Sequester Cut	-744	-576	0
ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND (PERMANENT BUDGET AUTHORITY)	1,704,719	2,410,188	1,296,124
Sequester Cut	-135,273	-86,582	0
ANTITRUST PRE-MERGER FILING FEE COLLECTIONS	136,600	136,000	136,000
U. S. TRUSTEES FEE COLLECTIONS	360,000	309,000	313,000
DIVERSION CONTROL FEE	420,703	450,046	460,499
Sequester Cut	-26,586	-26,553	0
9/11 VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND	5,932	0	0
Sequester Cut	-184	0	0
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND	0	897,051	2,958,397
Sequester Cut	0	-2,425	0
DOMESTIC VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING	6,000	6,000	6,000
Sequester Cut	-62	-59	0
CRIME VICTIMS FUND	3,353,000	2,641,000	2,300,000
OFFICE on VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN - Mandatory	[-497,500]	[-435,000]	[-498,500]
OFFICE of INSPECTOR GENERAL - Mandatory	0	[-10,000]	0
VICTIM OF STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM	170,000	170,000	170,000
Sequester Cut	-186	-590	0
SUBTOTAL, MANDATORY AND OTHER ACCOUNTS	6,425,644	7,339,040	7,947,520
TOTAL BA, DISCR & MANDATORY, DEPT. OF JUSTICE	36,431,106	39,726,303	39,604,035
HEALTH CARE FRAUD REIMBURSEMENTS			
HCFAC MANDATORY REIMBURSEMENT	61,120	62,471	67,308
FBI-HEALTH CARE FRAUD - Mandatory	138,344	141,423	153,596
HCFAC DISCRETIONARY REIMBURSEMENT	78,381	83,000	83,000
SUBTOTAL, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REIMBURSEMENTS	277,845	286,894	303,904
TOTAL BA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WITH OFFSET	36,708,951	40,013,197	39,907,939

d. U.K

Like U.S., U.K doesn't have any act or regulation that regulates the number of government personnel. Therefore, similar to the United States, each central government agency can autonomously define the number of public officials within its budget. Under their budget, each central government agency has Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL). Under the DEL, the amount of Administration Budget which includes the labor cost of government personnel affects the number of employees. Each central government agency may determine the number and grades of public officials within this Administration Budget, and HM Treasury reserves the right to interfere with detailed operation plans (Korea Institute of Public Finance, 2009). Therefore, organizational management can be made more flexible than the method of determining the number of public officials by law or presidential decree.

2. Degree of job security protection of government personnel

a. South Korea

Degree of job security protection of government personnel in South Korea is pretty strong. Korea has a strong concept of a lifelong workplace in both the government and private companies. Therefore, the job market is not flexible and very rigid. In the South Korea government, "No public official shall be suspended from service, demoted, or dismissed from service against his or her will unless he or she is sentenced to a penalty, or is subject to a disciplinary action or a reason prescribed by this Act (State Public Officials Act §68)." It cannot be dismissed because of insufficient work performance. An exceptional dismissal can only be made when official commits crime or a violation of the law.

And the mandatory retirement age of public officials is legally guaranteed to be 60 (State Public Officials Act §74). In 2023, 98.9% of leaving civil servants of central government were people who retired at 60 (Ministry of Personnel Management, 2023). This strong retirement age guarantee system has the advantage of protecting the status of public officials from undue political pressure and promoting fair performance of their duties. However, since it is almost impossible to fire public officials, incompetent personnel cannot be fired, and there are disadvantages of undermining work efficiency. In addition, it is very difficult to reduce the number of public officials even in bad economic conditions, and once the number of public officials increases, it is difficult to turn back.

State Public Officials Act Article 74 (Retirement Age)

(1) Except as otherwise provided in other statutes, public officials shall retire at the age of 60. <Amended on Jun. 13, 2008>

(4) Where the day on which a public official reaches the retirement age falls between January and June, he or she shall be retired ipso facto from office on the 30th of June, and if between July and December, on the 31st of December, respectively. <Amended on Mar. 28, 2008>

b. Japan

Degree of job security protection of government personnel in Japan is lower than South Korea. Even if a public official does not commit a crime, he or she can be fired if his or her work performance is insufficient. Under National Public Service Act, the public officials may be dismissed against the official's will when "the official's work performance is deemed not satisfactory in light of personnel evaluation or facts that show the state of the official's performance", "the official otherwise lacks the qualifications required for the government position", and "the position is abolished or the official becomes redundant due to a revision or repeal of the laws and regulations concerning the administrative organization or of the ceiling of the number of officials, or as a result of a reduction in

budget" (National Public Service Act §78). According to a survey by The Asahi Shimbun in 2018, 59% of leaving civil servants of central government were people who retired at 60 years (mandatory retirement age). The figure is lower than that of the Korean government (Choi, 2018).

National Public Service Act Article 78

If any official falls under any of the following items, the official may be demoted or dismissed against their will, as provided for by the Rules of the National Personnel Authority:

(i)when the official's work performance is deemed not satisfactory in light of personnel evaluation or facts that show the state of the official's performance;

(ii)when due to a mental or physical disorder, the official has difficulty or is incompetent in performing duties;

(iii)when the official otherwise lacks the qualifications required for the government position;

(iv)when the position is abolished or the official becomes redundant due to amendment or repeal of the laws and regulations concerning the administrative organization or of the ceiling of the number of officials, or as a result of a reduction in budget

c. U.S.

Degree of job security protection government personnel in U.S. is lower than South Korea and Japan. Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, federal government can fire consistently un-productive employees. The act created "actions based on unacceptable performance", which was linked to the new performance appraisal systems. Under the performance appraisal systems, supervisors designated some performance elements and standards as "critical". Then government employees can be dismissed if their performance about one or more critical elements is unacceptable. It was huge change, because managers no longer must evaluate employees' whole performance (Ban & Goldenberg & Marzotto, 1982).

Under this act, "an agency may reduce in grade or remove an employee for unacceptable performance", and 'unacceptable performance' means performance of an employee which fails to meet established performance standards in one or more critical elements of such employee's position (Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 §4301 & 4303). Unlike South Korea and Japan, mandatory retirement age exists only for firefighters and federal law enforcement officials in U.S. federal government. There are only minimum retirement ages for federal employees depending on their age (Wersing, 2023). In 2023, 37.9% of leaving civil servants of federal government were people who retired at 55 or more (Office of Personnel Management, 2023).

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 §4301

"(3) 'unacceptable performance' means performance of an employee which fails to meet established performance standards in one or more critical elements of such employee's position.

& 4303 Actions based on unacceptable performance

"(a) Subject to the provisions of this section, an agency may reduce in grade or remove an employee for unacceptable performance.

"(b)(1) An employee whose reduction in grade or removal is proposed under this section is entitled to --,

"(A) 30 days' advance written notice of the proposed action which identifies

"(i) specific instances of unacceptable performance by the employee on which the proposed action is based; and

"(ii) the critical elements of the employee's position involved in each instance of unacceptable performance;

"(B) be represented by an attorney or other representative;

"(C) a reasonable time to answer orally and in writing; and

"(D) a written decision which --,

"(i) in the case of a reduction in grade or removal under this section, specifies the instances of unacceptable performance by the employee on which the reduction in grade or removal is based, and

"(ii) unless proposed by the head of the agency, has been concurred in by an employee who is in a higher position than the employee who proposed the action.

d. U.K.

Degree of job security protection of government personnel in U.K. is lower than South Korea and Japan. Based on Civil Service Management Code 6.3, "departments and agencies must have procedures in place for dealing with dismissals in the interests of the continued efficiency of the service and the wellbeing of the individual, that is: poor performance - where the work of a member of staff has deteriorated to an unacceptable standard", and "Where performance or attendance does not improve and medical retirement is inappropriate, staff may be dismissed on efficiency grounds". And "Departments and agencies must have procedures in place for dealing with limited efficiency. This denotes performance, which is not sufficiently poor to be considered inefficient, but no longer measures up to the requirements of the post or where the individual fails to carry out his or her full duties satisfactorily" (Civil Service Management Code §6.3, 2016).

In the case of British officials, even if there is no crime, they can be fired if their work performance is extremely low. Like U.S., U.K. government doesn't have fixed retirement age (Civil Service Management Code §11.3, 2016). In 2022, 20.6% of leaving civil servants of central government were people who chose retirement (Cabinet office, 2023).

Civil Service Management Code §6.3, Poor Performance: Efficiency Departures and Limited Efficiency

Efficiency Departures

6.3.1 Departments and agencies must have procedures in place for dealing with dismissals in the interests of the continued efficiency of the service and the wellbeing of the individual, that is:

- a. poor performance - where the work of a member of staff has deteriorated to an unacceptable standard; and
- b. poor attendance - where the frequent absence of a member of staff adversely affects the efficient running of the office.

6.3.2 In determining their procedures, departments and agencies must:

- a. have regard to the ACAS guidance on discipline and grievances at work and the ACAS Code - Discipline and Grievance Procedures
- b. provide for staff to have the right to the assistance of a trade union representative or colleague during a hearing under formal proceedings about poor performance;
- c. refer cases to the medical services adviser appointed by the Cabinet Office for provisions relating to the PCSPS or CSOPS when either management or the person concerned consider that the causes of poor performance or poor attendance may make retirement on medical grounds appropriate without prejudice to any decision made by the medical services adviser (see Section 11.10); and
- d. inform staff of their right to:
 - have their case referred to the medical services adviser appointed by the Cabinet Office for provisions relating to the PCSPS or CSOPS; and
 - apply for medical retirement.

6.3.3 Where performance or attendance does not improve and medical retirement is inappropriate, staff may be dismissed on efficiency grounds (see Section 11.4).

3. Policies about government personnel management

a. South Korea

In the 2017 presidential election, the increase of civil servants was a major pledge of Democratic party. After Democratic party won the election, the rapid increase was promoted (Korea Herald, 2017). The ruling party pushed for an increase of civil servants as a major policy tool for 'Income-Led Growth.' The ruling party argued that increasing the government's jobs could increase the income of people, and that increased income further would promote consumption and thus became a driving force for economic growth. In addition, most of the increasing civil servants was mainly composed of police officers, firefighters, teachers, and safety management personnel, for improving the quality of public service (Korea Herald, 2017).

As a result, between 2017 and 2021, the number of Korean government personnel rapidly increased from 629 thousand to 751 thousand. It was huge increase when considering the number of Korean government personnel in 2011 was just 612 thousand (MOIS, 2023). Taking advantage of the sound fiscal situation compared to other OECD countries, the Korean government used the increase of public officials as a means of revitalizing the economy.

During the same period, policies such as manpower retraining, and manpower reduction were not used. In other words, it can be evaluated that the size of public officials was determined from the

perspective of economic revitalization, not from the perspective of government efficiency.

b. Japan

The Abe Shinjo Cabinet revised the National Public Service Act in 2014. First of all, the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs was established to build a comprehensive strategy for personnel management, and to achieve the successful allocation of personnel suited to high-rank positions. Previously, the prime minister was not involved in the appointment and promotion of high-ranking public officials, but this amendment to this law gave the prime minister the authority to directly intervene in the personnel process of all executive officials. In other words, Japan attempted to improve the inefficiency of the bureaucratic society through active intervention of elected public officials. Executive officials could not be appointed simply by their working years, but could only be appointed after harsh personnel evaluation, passing the exam, and the final approval from the Prime Minister (Watanabe, 2017).

In addition, the Japanese government has conducted 'Policy on the Management of Organizations and Personnel of National Administrative Agencies' since 2014. First of all, it was decided to reduce the total number of civil servants of central government agencies by 2% every year, and to reset the target figure every five years. In order to curb the increase in the number of public officials, it has become mandatory to rearrange the existing manpower within the agency even if new administrative demands arise. If it was difficult to rearrange manpower within the agency, the manpower

within another agency should be dispatched to new workload. Each central government agency should improve work efficiency, such as ICT reform, as much as possible. The Prime Minister's Office inspects each central government agency's work efficiency efforts every year, and refers to the results in determining the number of public officials of the agency for next year (Policy on the Management of Organizations and Personnel of National Administrative Agencies, 2014). It can be evaluated that the Japanese government is strongly controlling the increase of public officials in a top-down manner and is pursuing efficiency in government operation.

c. U.S.

The U.S. federal government has strongly pushed for a policy to reduce the size of the government since 2017. President Trump declared the 'Hiring Freeze' of federal officials through the presidential memorandum in January 2017. This memorandum ordered "No vacant positions existing at noon on January 22, 2017, may be filled and no new positions may be created, except in limited circumstances.". This hiring freeze applied to "All executive departments and agencies regardless of the sources of their operational and programmatic funding, excepting military personnel", and asked that federal government agencies "seek efficient use of existing personnel and funds to improve public services and the delivery of these services" (Trump, 2017).

Presidential Memorandum Regarding the Hiring Freeze

SUBJECT: Hiring Freeze

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby order a freeze on the hiring of Federal civilian employees to be applied across the board in the executive branch. As part of this freeze, no vacant positions existing at noon on January 22, 2017, may be filled and no new positions may be created, except in limited circumstances. This order does not include or apply to military personnel. The head of any executive department or agency may exempt from the hiring freeze any positions that it deems necessary to meet national security or public safety responsibilities. In addition, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) may grant exemptions from this freeze where those exemptions are otherwise necessary.

Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in consultation with the Director of OPM, shall recommend a long-term plan to reduce the size of the Federal Government's workforce through attrition. This order shall expire upon implementation of the OMB plan.

Contracting outside the Government to circumvent the intent of this memorandum shall not be permitted.

This hiring freeze applies to all executive departments and agencies regardless of the sources of their operational and programmatic funding, excepting military personnel.

In carrying out this memorandum, I ask that you seek efficient use of existing personnel and funds to improve public services and the delivery of these services. Accordingly, this memorandum does not prohibit making reallocations to meet the highest priority needs and to ensure that essential services are not interrupted and national security is not affected.

This memorandum does not limit the nomination and appointment of officials to positions requiring Presidential appointment or Senate confirmation, the appointment of officials to non-career positions in the Senior Executive Service or to Schedule C positions in the Excepted Service, or the appointment of any other officials who serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Moreover, it does not limit the hiring of personnel where such a limit would conflict with applicable law. This memorandum does not revoke any appointment to Federal service made prior to January 22, 2017.

This memorandum does not abrogate any collective bargaining agreement in effect on the date of this memorandum.

DONALD J. TRUMP

To implement this memorandum specifically, the executive order "Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch" was made. This order's purpose was to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of federal agencies. The order instructed the heads of each agency to reorganize overlapping functions among government agencies, reorganize government functions, and draw up plans to eliminate unnecessary departments. The heads of each agency had to submit an efficiency improvement plan to the Office of Management and Budget (Trump, 2017).

The Office of Personnel Management published "Workforce Reshaping Operations Handbook" to provide the assistance for reshaping federal agencies. This manual specifies the roles and responsibilities of HR departments in each agency, procedures necessary for Reduction in Force (RIF), and types and procedures of transfer of functions. The HR department should operate a dedicated RIF team, and minimize RIFs in the restructuring process. As an alternative to dismissal, temporary suspension, education and training, voluntary reduction of working hours, and voluntary retirement were recommended. In addition, when government functions are extinguished or agencies are merged, each agency should increase the efficiency of the government by the transfer of functions (Office of Personnel Management, 2017).

The U.S. government has continued to promote efficiency in the public sector in an institutional environment with budget-based manpower management and high employment flexibility. It can also be evaluated that this efficiency policy has been strongly promoted in a top-down manner.

**Administration of Donald J. Trump, 2017 Executive Order 13781—
Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch**

March 13, 2017

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. This order is intended to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the executive branch by directing the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Director) to propose a plan to reorganize governmental functions and eliminate unnecessary agencies (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code), components of agencies, and agency programs.

Sec. 2. Proposed Plan to Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Accountability of Federal Agencies, Including, as Appropriate, to Eliminate or Reorganize Unnecessary or Redundant Federal Agencies.

(a) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the head of each agency shall submit to the Director a proposed plan to reorganize the agency, if appropriate, in order to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of that agency.

(b) The Director shall publish a notice in the Federal Register inviting the public to suggest improvements in the organization and functioning of the executive branch and shall consider the suggestions when formulating the proposed plan described in subsection (c) of this section.

(c) Within 180 days after the closing date for the submission of suggestions pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Director shall submit to the President a proposed plan to reorganize the executive branch in order to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of agencies. The proposed plan shall include, as appropriate, recommendations to eliminate unnecessary agencies, components of agencies, and agency programs, and to merge functions. The proposed plan shall include recommendations for any legislation or administrative measures necessary to achieve the proposed

reorganization.

(d) In developing the proposed plan described in subsection (c) of this section, the Director shall consider, in addition to any other relevant factors: (i) whether some or all of the functions of an agency, a component, or a program are appropriate for the Federal Government or would be better left to State or local governments or to the private sector through free enterprise; (ii) whether some or all of the functions of an agency, a component, or a program are redundant, including with those of another agency, component, or program; (iii) whether certain administrative capabilities necessary for operating an agency, a component, or a program are redundant with those of another agency, component, or program; (iv) whether the costs of continuing to operate an agency, a component, or a program are justified by the public benefits it provides; and (v) the costs of shutting down or merging agencies, components, or programs, including the costs of addressing the equities of affected agency staff.

(e) In developing the proposed plan described in subsection (c) of this section, the Director shall consult with the head of each agency and, consistent with applicable law, with persons or 1 entities outside the Federal Government with relevant expertise in organizational structure and management.

Sec. 3. General Provisions.

(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

d. U.K.

Since 2012, the Cameron cabinet in the U.K. has promoted The Civil Service Reform Plan. This plan aimed to improve the efficiency of the government and reduce the number of civil servants. Under this plan, each agency introduced the latest digital technologies in the process of performing its duties, increased the recruitment of scientific experts, and continuously reduced the number of civil servants. In accordance with this plan, each agency tried to be operated transparently, make evidence-based decisions, and strengthen performance evaluation. And this plan aimed to reduce about 23% of civil servants by 2015 (HM Government, 2012).

< The Civil Service Reform Plan >

Chapter 1 – Clarifying the future size and shape of the Civil Service

What needs to change

The Civil Service will become smaller and more strategic. The organisational model of the Civil Service will need to adapt if it is to successfully reform. With 17 main departments varying greatly in size, the Civil Service will need a much stronger corporate leadership model, and much more sharing of services and expertise, if it is to deliver the step change in efficiency needed. It needs to use different delivery models where doing so will achieve better outcomes or lower costs. It needs to transform the delivery of services to users, moving to a Digital by Default approach.

The demands of a smaller Civil Service together with relentless pressure to save money requires greater clarity in the relationship between the corporate centre and departments. Departmental boards will hold executives to account for how they deliver departmental projects and programmes, and responsibility for delivery will be pushed ever closer to the front line. In this “loose-tight” balance there will be tighter control and oversight where collective action is needed for

effectiveness and efficiency. This includes development and management of leadership, talent, IT and property infrastructure, major projects carrying financial and operational risk, and procurement of common goods and services which will enable the Government to harvest economies of scale and ensure that what seems like the right decision for one part of Government does not damage another.

The Size and Shape of the Civil Service


There is no right size for the Civil Service – the size is driven by the needs of the Government. It has changed significantly over time, from a peak in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, through progressive reductions as the focus has moved from directly delivering public services to outsourcing and delivering through others. Based on figures from current departmental change programmes, it is estimated that by 2015 the Civil Service will be around 23% smaller than it was in March 2010, operating with around 380,000 staff – the lowest since the Second World War, with departments ranging in size from around 400 to 80,000 people.

There are no targets for any further headcount reductions but the current financial pressures and the Government's commitment to reforming major services means that the Civil Service must ensure it is resilient to any future decisions about its size and shape, and embrace the principle of a smaller and more strategic Civil Service that delivers services differently.

However, things changed after Brexit in 2016. After Brexit, as policy tasks in various fields such as trade, commerce, environment, and food rapidly increased, the number of personnel in related ministries began to increase. For example, in the final three months of 2017, staff numbers increased by 14.5% at the Department for Exiting the European Union, 11% at the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, 9% at the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, and 6% at the Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs. And since the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, the number of public officials has increased further to respond to quarantine work (Cheung, 2018).

Civil service staff numbers (FTE), March 2009 to December 2017

IfG




Source: Institute for Government analysis of ONS Public Sector Employment Data (Table 9), Q1 2009 to Q4 2017.

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Change in civil service staff numbers (FTE) by department, Q3 2017 to Q4 2017

IfG




Source: Institute for Government analysis of ONS Public Sector Employment Data (Table 9), Q3 2017 to Q4 2017.

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Brexit-related workstreams by department, as at 10 November 2017

IfG



Source: Institute for Government analysis of National Audit Office, The Department for Exiting the European Union and the centre of government, 17 November 2017.



In conclusion, the British government tried to reduce the number of civil servants to increase government efficiency, but the number of civil servants inevitably increased due to the special political environment of Brexit. In the U.K., a system that determines the number of civil servants based on budget without a legal limit on the number of civil servants can be a factor that increased the number of personnel when administrative demand surged due to special events. If there was a legal upper limit on the total number of civil servants like Japan, it would have been difficult to increase the number of civil servants sharply.

V. Policy recommendations to South Korea

Option 1. Stipulating the upper limit of the number of government personnel in the act

1-1. Policy content

The first method is to curb the increase in public officials through legal regulations. Currently, the Korean government stipulates the number of public officials as a presidential decree. Therefore, the government can increase the number of public officials without the consent of the National Assembly. If the President wants to increase the number of public officials for his political benefit, there is a lack of legal means to curb it.

If an act, like the Japanese government, stipulates an upper limit on the number of public officials, the President cannot increase the number of public officials at his or her own will. If the administrative wants to increase the number of public officials, the act must be revised by the National Assembly, so it can be directly intervened by the political parties.

In fact, since 2017, the opposition party in South Korea strongly opposed the increase in the number of public officials, but there was no measure to prevent the president's will.

This method can also increase the efficiency of the

government. If there is an upper limit on the number of public officials, it is necessary to retrain and rearrange the existing personnel even if new administrative demand arises. In other words, this act serves as an opportunity to reduce unnecessary work and effectively utilize the surplus manpower. Since the law that regulates government organization and personnel in the Korean legal system is the Government Organization Act, the upper limit of central government public officials can be stipulated in the Government Organization Act.

1-2. Evaluation

a. Feasibility

The administrative feasibility of this policy is high. This policy can be realized by adding one article to the Government Organization Act. It does not cost enormous financial resources, and adding just one article is needed. However, political feasibility is low. In order to amend the Government Organization Act, an amendment must be passed by the National Assembly. However, the president's political party, which has pushed for a rapid increase since 2017, still occupies the majority in the Korean National Assembly. Although public opinion is dominant concerned about the increase in public officials, it is unlikely that the majority party will agree to amend the law. This is because they appear to admit their mistakes by themselves.

b. Effectiveness

The effectiveness of this policy is very high. Since it is possible to forcibly curb the increase in public officials, it is very helpful in realizing the policy goal of curbing the increase in public officials. If the upper limit on the number of public officials is stipulated by act, the increase in public officials can be strongly controlled without other policy measures.

c. Efficiency

The efficiency of this policy may be somewhat low. The achievement of 'suppressing the increase in public officials' can be achieved greatly. However, if an emergency occurs in which a rapid increase is inevitable, such as Brexit or Covid-19, it may be difficult to actively respond to the external environment. In such an emergency, it is difficult to retrain and rearrange the existing workforce within a short period of time, so it is necessary to quickly recruit the workforce. However, this article can make it difficult to increase the number quickly, and the flexibility to cope with emergency situations may be insufficient. In other words, the performance is high, but the social cost can also be high.

Option 2. Weakening the job protection of public officials

2-1. Policy content

The strong job protection of Korean civil servants is a major factor in reducing government efficiency. Once employed, they are not likely to be fired until the age of 60 unless they commit a crime, so government agencies cannot fire officials who have extremely low performance. So, once the number of government personnel increases significantly, it is almost impossible to reduce the number of civil servants. There are few policy measures to reduce the number of civil servants, other than removing the positions of those who naturally retire.

Therefore, it is necessary to weaken the excessive protection of public officials. It is necessary to introduce a system that can fire extremely underperforming public officials such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. By revising the State Public Officials Act, it is necessary to introduce a new regulation that can fire low performers. For example, by amending Article 68 of the State Public Officials Act, it is possible to introduce a provision that "each minister may fire the public official if it is deemed inappropriate to perform his or her duties due to extremely poor performance." In order to promote this policy, it is necessary to strengthen the performance evaluation system, establish requirements for dismissal of low performers, and establish dismissal procedures.

2-2. Evaluation

a. Feasibility

The political feasibility of this policy is not high. If the government attempts to weaken the protection of public servants, it will face strong resistance from the government employees' labor unions. It is highly likely to face protests from the government employees' labor unions and a campaign to lose the presidential election. Government also has to persuade the political parties of the National Assembly to revise the law. Few lawmakers want to be demonized by the 758,000 voters. Therefore, implementing this policy requires strong leadership from the president and a great social demand for civil service reform within society.

b. Effectiveness

This policy is very effective to achieve the goal of policy. Weakening the job protection of public officials will greatly help reduce unnecessary fields of public officials. Until now, even though the situation needed the reduction of public officials, it could not be legally reduced, as it is now possible to fire them. Also, civil servants who did not work hard before will work hard, so the overall capability of the government will increase.

c. Efficiency

This policy can achieve high results, but it can consume large social costs due to strong resistance from public officials' union within a short period of time. If the union hold protests and strike, the government may not operate smoothly and public services may not be delivered properly. However, from a long-term perspective, if this policy is eventually pursued, it is a very efficient policy. This is because by introducing several systems, it is possible to reduce enormous labor costs that were unnecessarily consumed.

Option 3. Promoting a strong reduction plan

3-1. Policy content

Referring to the Japanese government and the Cameron cabinet, a policy that promotes a strong workforce reduction policy in a top-down manner is very effective in reducing the size of the government. For example, a policy to reduce the number of civil servants in each ministry of the central government by 1% every year can be implemented. Given that the annual retirement of civil servants in the central government in Korea is currently 1.32 percent of the total civil servants, a 1% reduction is expected to be physically possible every year (Ministry of the Personnel Management, 2023). The government can push for a 5% reduction

in the total number of civil servants over the next 5 years, and review the need to reduce it again five years later.

First, each central government ministry should conduct its own organizational diagnosis. It is necessary to closely diagnose which functions of each ministry have been weakened, which departments have the lowest operational need at present, and which areas of administrative demand will decrease in the future. Private experts must also participate in the organizational diagnosis process. Civil servants tend to think that all their works are important, so it is difficult to decide on areas for reduction. Therefore, relevant experts who are well aware of changes in the external administrative environment should actively give their opinions. As a result, each ministry should submit annual reduction plan to the Ministry of the Interior and Safety.

Second, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety reviews the reduction plans submitted by ministries. The Ministry of the Interior and Safety analyzes whether the organizational diagnosis contents of each ministry are appropriate and whether the reduction field is appropriately selected. By synthesizing the review results, a five-year reduction plan at the whole central governmental level will be established.

Finally, the reduction plan will be executed every year and the results are disclosed to the public. The reduction will be carried out through the revision of the Presidential Decree and the reduction of new hiring. Public concern about the expansion of government size may be reduced if many public officials have been reduced across the government over the five years. After evaluating the effectiveness of the policy five years later, the necessity of an additional reduction plan will be reviewed again.

3-2. Evaluation

a. Feasibility

The feasibility of this policy is high. It is possible to reduce the number of public officials by 1% every year only with the revision of the Presidential Decree, so there is no need to obtain the consent of the National Assembly. In addition, given that the current annual number of retirement is 1.32% of all public officials every year, it is also administratively feasible. This is because, instead of compulsory dismissal, policy can be implemented by reducing the number of new recruits. Unions may oppose the reduction of the number of public officials too, but the level of resistance will be lower than the direct dismissal.

b. Effectiveness

Due to the nature of the bureaucracy, the government is tempted to continuously expand. Therefore, it is difficult to autonomously promote reduction. Therefore, government expansion can be suppressed only by pursuing a reduction policy under strong leadership in a top-down manner. This policy can achieve great results of a 1% reduction in public officials every year.

c. Efficiency

This policy incurs less cost. The social cost is not great because there will be little opposition from public officials union. In addition, the organizational diagnosis of each ministry does not require much financial resources. On the other hand, the labor cost budget saved by reducing public officials by 1% is much larger. However, it will be little difficult to respond quickly in the event of an emergency such as Covid-19 and Brexit. There will be a problem that it becomes difficult for the government to respond efficiently to rapid changes in the external environment due to the lack of manpower to be invested in new administrative demand.

Option 4. Establishing the principle of 'Not increase, but relocation'.

4-1. Policy content

This policy does not reduce the number of civil servants. Instead, the policy strictly prohibits the increase even if new administrative demand arises and mandates the relocation of existing personnel. As the external environment changes, there must be less-needed departments and personnel within ministries. Therefore, it is necessary to retrain these workers and relocate them to jobs that have increased need. This policy is a less radical policy option than policy option 3.

First, like Option 3, each ministry should conduct organizational diagnosis. However, each ministry establishes a relocation plan together with a reduction plan. While reducing unnecessary personnel, ministries should reallocate the reduction manpower to areas where administrative demand is increasing. In order to effectively relocate, continuous retraining of public officials is required. Education programs should be strengthened to gain necessary competencies and experience in new policy areas. Each ministry will submit both a reduction plan and a relocation plan to the Ministry of the Interior and Safety.

Second, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety will establish a whole central governmental reduction and relocation plan. Respecting each ministry's own plans, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety can intervene to certain sectors. It is effective to promote reduction and relocation at the whole governmental level, not just within the ministry level. Some ministries may greatly reduce their functions, while others may greatly increase their functions. Therefore, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety can reduce the personnel for some ministries and increase the personnel for others instead.

Finally, the policy will be promoted and the results will be disclosed to the public. Every year, the government discloses which field of human resources have been reduced and which field of human resources have been increased, and listens to the opinions of the public.

4-2. Evaluation

a. Feasibility

The possibility of realizing this policy is high. There is no need for the consent of the National Assembly as it is possible to promote the policy only by revising the presidential decree. There will be no opposition from the civil service union because the number of civil servants is not reduced.

b. Effectiveness

This policy is effective in curbing the increase in the number of civil servants. It can prevent future increases in the number of new employees. However, it cannot reduce the size of the current government. Therefore, it is less effective than Option 3.

c. Efficiency

This policy does not involve a large cost. There is no resistance from public officials, so there is no social cost consumption, and organizational diagnosis does not require a large


cost. In addition, since public officials are not reduced, it is highly likely to respond to some extent even if administrative demand increases due to changes in the external environment. However, since public officials are not reduced, there is no effect of reducing labor costs.

VI. Conclusion

< Comparing Table for policy options >

Option	Feasibility	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Total
Option 1. Stipulating total number in act	2	3	2	7
Option 2. Weakening the job protection	1	3	3	7
Option 3. Strong reduction plan	3	4	3	10
Option 4. Mandating relocation	4	3	2	9

※ Criteria for grade : Not Likely (1) - Less Likely (2) -
Likely (3) - Strongly Likely (4)



South Korea's institutional and policy environment has greatly influenced the number of civil servants. Through comparative studies with other countries, it was found that the number of civil servants has increased sharply due to various factors, such as strong job protection of civil servants, the way the number of civil servants is defined, and the policy to increase the number of civil servants. Therefore, policy alternatives should be reviewed to address the causes.

First of all, policy option 1 stipulates the total number of civil servants by act. Compared to the current system, which regulates the number of civil servants by presidential decree, it will be of great help in suppressing the increase in civil servants. However, considering the composition of the National Assembly, the political feasibility is low, and the efficiency may be low in the event of an emergency such as Brexit.

Policy option 2 weakens the job protection of public officials. If excessively strong job protection is weakened, it will be possible to dismiss low-performing people and implement policies to reduce public officials. However, there is a problem that strong resistance from hundreds of thousands of public officials is expected.

Policy option 3 is to implement a strong policy to reduce civil servants. The efficiency of the government can be increased by reducing civil servants by 1% every year. It is the most effective policy option, but the persuasion process is important as it may cause some resistance from the civil service union.

Policy option 4 is a policy that does not reduce public officials, but mandates relocation instead. Compared to Policy Option 3, it is a less radical option and is highly feasible. However, the effectiveness will be lower than that of Policy Option 3.

When comprehensively considering policy options, policy option 1 and policy option 2 can be performed simultaneously. The Korean government must choose one of policy options 3 and 4. Therefore, it would be desirable to promote policy option 3 while performing policy options 1 and 2. It is because policy option 3 is the most effective option (4 point) to curb the rapid increase of civil servants. Furthermore, option 3 has high feasibility (3 point) and efficiency (3 point) also. So, total score of option 3 (11 point) is the highest. It means that policy option 3 is the most desirable option among these options. If it is impossible to promote policy option 3, policy option 4 should be promoted as an alternative.

In the current situation where the government's financial conditions are rapidly deteriorating, a rapid increase in public officials can have additional adverse effects. Therefore, this study presented

policy alternatives that the South Korean government can choose through comparative studies between countries. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the efficient operation of the Korean government.

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